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Chapter One: General Introduction 
The Buddhist canon contains a substantial amount of material that treats the subject 
matter of ethics.  Topics addressed in these texts include how we should live our lives, how we 
should treat others, classifications of right and wrong actions, and the articulation of virtues to be 
cultivated and vices to be avoided.  The abundance of Buddhist material treating ethical issues 
even led O.H. de A. Wijesekera (1971) to make the grandiose claim, "It is universally recognized 
that Buddhism can claim to be the most ethical of all religio-philosophical systems of the world" 
(p. 49).  Charles Goodman (2009) describes Buddhist ethics with its emphasis on non-violence 
and compassion as one of most appealing parts of the teachings of Buddhism.  He writes, "Many 
people have drawn inspiration from Buddhism's emphasis on compassion, non-violence, and 
tolerance, its concern for animals, and its models of virtue and self-cultivation" (p. 1).  Damien 
Keown (1992) even argues that Buddhism itself is foremost an ethical project: "Buddhism is a 
response to what is fundamentally an ethical problem—the perennial problem of the best kind of 
life for a man (sic) to lead" (p. 1).  
It should be no surprise that ethics plays an important role in Buddhism, given its 
soteriological goal of an ideal state.  Like many other religions, Buddhism calls for ethical 
conduct as a requirement for attaining its soteriological goal.  The Buddhist canon includes 
extensive guidelines for conduct that foster the move from an ordinary state to an ideal state.  
Buddhist ethics, however, is not based on a theistic model: No omnipotent creator decrees what 
constitutes good and evil.  Instead, I will argue that common themes underlying Buddhist ethical 
works are nested in the larger Buddhist project that sees suffering and its causes as the primary 
human existential problem.  The distinction between good and bad, I will argue, depends entirely 
on the analysis of suffering and its causes.  The Buddha explained in what Buddhists take to be 
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his first teaching upon attaining enlightenment that it is confusion about ourselves and the world 
we live in that causes us to suffer, and that only knowledge of the reality of our world removes 
this confusion and frees us from suffering.  The good, I will argue, is linked with this knowledge; 
the Buddhist soteriological goal of liberation from suffering is achieved not through faith, but 
through reason.  Liberation is not a reward for ethical conduct, but is, as I aim to demonstrate in 
the coming chapters, the state of the morally mature person who experiences the world mediated 
by an accurate metaphysical understanding.   
Despite the extensive material treating ethical issues in Buddhist texts, there is no explicit 
Buddhist theoretical account of the nature and scope of ethics such as those found in Western 
philosophical traditions.  Harvey (2000) notes, "The schools of Buddhism have rich traditions of 
thought on ethics, though this is often scattered through a variety of works which also deal with 
other topics" (p. 1).  It seems that Buddhist philosophers never formulated an explicit theory of 
meta-ethics.  As Keown (1992) observes, "Ethics, as an independent philosophical discipline, has 
not attained in Buddhism the autonomy which it has in the west" (p. 1).  Ethics as a branch of 
philosophy is not articulated in Buddhism. Ethical concepts such as good and evil, right, wrong, 
virtue, or moral choice are not critically examined.  The lack of such philosophical reflection in 
the area of ethics alongside such deep philosophical interest by Buddhists in subjects such as 
epistemology and metaphysics has led Western scholars such as George Dreyfus (1995) to claim 
that ethical concepts were viewed as not philosophically interesting by Buddhist scholars (p. 30).  
However, this need not be the case.  As Garfield (2015) has argued, the lack of theoretical 
systematization in Buddhist ethics may be due to Buddhist recognition of the complexity of 
moral life and moral assessment due to their being located in the intricate network of cause and 
results explained in the Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) (p. 279). 
 3 
The fact that Buddhism does not have an explicitly articulated theory of meta-ethics has 
led Western scholars to propose various approaches to the study of Buddhist ethics.  The 
Western study of Buddhist ethics has come a long way since 1992 when Keown called Buddhist 
ethics an academic backwater, stating that "only recently have the signs appeared that this 
neglect is to be remedied and the initiative has not come from Buddhist studies but from the 
emerging and yet ill-defined area of the comparative study of religious ethics” (p. 2-3).  Keown 
(1992) further comments, "Of the small number of scholars who have studied the subject few 
have put forward detailed hypotheses as to the formal structure of Buddhist ethics" (p. 11).  By 
2000, however, Harvey observed, "Buddhist ethics as a field of academic study in the West is not 
new, but in recent years has experienced a considerable expansion, as seen, for example in the 
very successful Internet Journal of Buddhist Ethics" (p. 1).  
Western scholars have now expended considerable effort seeking to understand which 
type of Western ethical theory best characterizes Buddhist ethics.  In making a case for this 
approach to the study of Buddhist ethics, Charles Goodman (2008) insists that a fruitful dialogue 
between East and West on the subject of ethics will be very difficult “unless we Westerners can 
find some way of understanding, in our terms, what kind of ethical theory Buddhism might 
involve” (p. 17).  Goodman (2009) further asserts, “Buddhist texts have much to contribute to the 
conversation of contemporary ethics: but they can only make those contributions if the values 
and forms of moral reasoning they exhibit can somehow be connected with the way philosophers 
discuss ethics today” (p. 4).  This prevailing attitude has resulted in an ongoing debate in 
secondary scholarship concerning the Western ethical system with which Buddhist ethics best 
conforms and discussions on whether Buddhist ethics should be classified as a kind of virtue 
ethics or as a type of consequentialism.  
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In earlier secondary literature, Buddhist ethics was commonly read as classical 
utilitarianism, a meeting of utilitarianism and hedonism.  For example, C. A. F. R. Davids (1974, 
1976) views Buddhists as hedonists and, together with Kalupahana, holds Buddhist morality to 
be utilitarian.  As I will show, a great many scholars still consider Buddhist ethics to be 
consequentialist but regard it as universalist, or utilitarian, understanding it to take into 
consideration the well-being of not only the agent, but all those affected by the action.  For a 
system of ethics to be universalist, it has to regard an action as morally right if and only if, from 
among the actions available to the agent, it is the one that maximizes overall happiness.  
Goodman (2009), Williams (1998), Siderits (2000), and Clayton (2009) turn primarily to 
Śāntideva's works to support their arguments that Mahāyāna ethics is a type of universalist 
consequentialism.  They argue that Buddhist ethics, like universalist consequentialism, is 
primarily concerned with the consequences of actions and their impacts on the welfare of all 
sentient beings.  
An alternate approach to Buddhist ethics, one that highlights the psychological domain, is 
represented in the work of such scholars as Cooper and James (2005), Finnigan and Tanaka 
(2011), Keown (1992), and Tillemans (2008), who have argued that Buddhist ethics is best 
thought of as a type of virtue ethics.  Theorists who advocate a virtue ethics approach to 
Buddhist ethics also note that a virtue construal accounts for why we do not find in Buddhist 
texts the kind of hypothetical thought experiments or artificial ethical conundrums the likes of 
which many analytical philosophers utilize in order to test the limits of their ethical rules, for 
Buddhist ethicists were not attempting to isolate some objective discoverable moral truth 
separate from human nature, but to understand ethics in a broader sense as an elucidation of what 
constitutes a life well lived.  Keown, in particular, draws mainly on the Pāli literature to argue 
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that Buddhist ethics has much in common with Aristotelian virtue ethics, contending that what is 
important in Buddhist ethics is the cultivation of good character traits. 
There is certainly benefit in comparing different ethical systems, and Buddhist and 
Western ethical systems no doubt have much to offer each other.  I will argue, however, that to 
force Buddhist ethics into a Western doctrinal box inhibits our understanding of Buddhist ethics 
by de-contextualizing and even overlooking Buddhism's most important ethical concepts.  In 
particular, I aim to challenge the assumption that Buddhist ethics should be classified as either as 
a kind of virtue ethics or as a type of consequentialism.  Through an examination of the reasons 
that have led recent scholars to deem Buddhist ethics as an instance of one of these two Western 
ethical systems, I will argue that referencing a list of attributes distinguishing two competing 
Western ethical systems is an ineffective method for understanding Buddhist ethics.  I will 
instead demonstrate that if Buddhist ethical texts are read on their own terms, instead of 
consequentialism or virtue ethics, we find common threads indicating a unique moral perspective 
that prioritizes mental states and is primarily concerned with a transformation of the way the 
agent engages with the world. 
Roy Perrett (1987) already recognizes that the familiar Western ethical oppositions such 
as those between egoism and altruism, and intentionalism and consequentialism, do not feature 
in Buddhist ethics (p. 71).  Garfield (2011) also endorses the study of Buddhist ethics on its own 
terms as a unique system, arguing that it is "a symptom of a dangerous hermeneutic temptation to 
force Buddhist ethics into a Western mould" (p. 2).  He asserts that doing so misses the essential 
point that Buddhist ethics is primarily a kind of moral phenomenology.  Drawing on Śāntideva’s 
classic Mahāyāna Buddhist treatise How to Lead an Awakened Life (Bodhicarāvatāra), Garfield 
(2011) notes that Śāntideva does not ask "what our duties are, nor what actions are 
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recommended, nor what the relation is between good and our actions" (p.23), but instead gives 
an account of how the practice of Mahāyāna ethics is related with a transformation of one's 
experience in the world.  This shift in the discussion treating Buddhist ethics moves away from 
the narrow focus of determining which normative ethical theory best describes the doctrine of 
karma towards a consideration of how Buddhist ethics fits within the broader Buddhist 
philosophical project of finding a solution to suffering. 
We can then organize these competing theories of the structure of Buddhist ethics into 
three main camps.  The first two identify Buddhist ethics with various forms of Western ethical 
theory: either as a form of consequentialism or as a type of virtue ethics.  The third, reading 
Buddhism on its own terms, asserts that Buddhist ethics is best understood as a unique kind of 
moral phenomenology.  This third way of approaching Buddhist ethics was first put forward by 
Garfield (2011).  In the coming chapters, I will argue that when Buddhist ethics is critically 
examined independently of the confines of the parameters of a familiar normative ethical theory, 
common ethical concerns emerge that indicate that Buddhist ethics in general might be best 
understood as a kind of moral phenomenology, being primarily concerned with the way we 
experience the world and with effecting a transformation in this experience. 
I suggest that understanding Buddhist ethical traditions in this way with an appreciation 
for their common phenomenological approach has much to contribute to contemporary 
conversations on ethics.  Bringing Buddhist ethics into contemporary discussions on ethics first 
requires a more complete picture of Buddhist moral perspectives that focus on the nature of 
experience rather than human happiness or our actions and their consequences. A common theme 
that runs through Buddhist ethical writings is the notion that the way we experience the world is 
the foundation for moral concerns. On this account, the moral problem is the fact that we are 
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ordinarily confused about the nature of the world and our place in it, which leads to a life 
characterized by the experience of suffering and vice.  The moral solution, then, is the removal 
of this confusion through the development of a metaphysically accurate understanding of the 
world and our place in it, which transforms the way we experience the world in such a way that 
frees us from suffering, promotes virtues, and brings us to a morally mature state.  For this 
reason, Buddhist ethicists express concern with how we experience ourselves in relation to the 
world and others.  
1.1 Methodology and Sources 
Buddhism has a rich and complicated tradition with many diverse schools of thought, so 
it would be a naïve disservice to the tradition to seek to represent Buddhist ethics as a univocal 
entity.  I will include sources from the Theravāda tradition such as Buddhagosa and non-
Mahāyāna texts like Vasubandhu’s Treasury of Higher Knowledge (Abhidharmakośa), and I 
suggest that much of my argument could be generally applied across Buddhist traditions.  
Nonetheless, my argument is primarily intended to represent what the 14th Dalai Lama has come 
to call the Nālandā tradition, referring to the important Indian Buddhist masters, including 
Vasubandhu and Asaṅga and focusing primarily on the Mahāyāna Madhyamaka tradition of 
Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Candrakīrti, and Śāntideva, which was also taken up in Tibet.  
I suggest that by analyzing Buddhist ethicical texts on their own terms rather than 
through a comparative lens, it is possible to articulate with a degree of confidence the moral 
framework that underlies the normative ethics described extensively in Buddhist texts.  My 
strategy for drawing out this framework begins with an examination of the Buddhist 
psychological treatises that outline the topography of the mind and the nature of experience.  The 
sources for this component of the inquiry will include representatives from the Pāli and Sanskrit 
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traditions of Indian Buddhism, such as the psychological treatises of the fifth century Theravāda 
scholar Buddhaghosa of the Pāli tradition, and the fourth century scholars Vasubandhu and 
Asaṅga of the Sanskrit tradition.  
There are two main reasons that I am drawing on non-Mahāyāna sources for this section 
despite my greater emphasis on Indian Mahāyāna sources.  The first is that much of the 
discussion in the secondary literature on Buddhist ethics has focused on the Pāli tradition, so it is 
important to address this discussion at least in general terms.  The second is that since this 
section treats the psychological aspects of Abhidharma treatises, and there are close parallels 
among the Abhidharma works across the Sanskrit and Pāli traditions, one can make larger 
observations that apply trans-traditionally in this context.  In this section, I will also draw on 
Tibetan explanations of psychology, particularly in texts from the mind training (blo sbyong) 
genre, which further develop the Indian Mahāyāna ethical concepts.   
An examination of these works will reveal the Buddhist psychological account of the 
fundamental components of experience and the way in which our mental activities play a role in 
constructing our experience.  Importantly, these texts also place explicit ethical values on the 
mental processes that play this fundamental role in molding experience.  As an example of the 
way in which the key psychological components of ascertainment (samjñā) and feeling (vedanā) 
are critical to Buddhist moral phenomenology, I will discuss an example of a Buddhist ethical 
practice, that of equanimity, which demonstrates (1) the role that mental processes play in 
constructing our experience, (2) the way in which this construction is ethically significant, and 
(3) the potential to transform the way in which mental processes construct our experience.  In 
this discussion, I will draw on the Tibetan Mahāyāna Buddhist works of Tsongkhapa (1357-
1419) and Patrul Rinpoche (1808-1887). 
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I will then examine how Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist works in particular, growing 
naturally out of this psychological foundation, prioritize mental states in their treatment of ethics.  
I will rely specifically on the Perfection of Wisdom literature (prajñāpāramitā) and the ethical 
works of Āryadeva (third century C.E.), Candrakīrti (seventh century), and Śāntideva (eighth 
century), all of which call for a transformation in vision as the moral solution, a transformation 
from the confusion that characterizes the morally immature state prone to vice, to a 
metaphysically accurate understanding that characterizes the morally mature state inclined 
toward virtue.  
1.1.1 Avoiding Two Methodological Extremes: Globalized Descriptions and Radical 
Particularism  
One of the aims of this dissertation is to challenge the claim that Buddhist ethics is best 
understood through a Western ethical categorization.  Others, like Charles Hallisey and Maria 
Heim, have also criticized the idea that Theravāda Buddhist ethics can be understood in terms of 
a formal western ethical category.  Heim likens this approach to the study of Buddhist ethics to 
“archeological projects,” noting with skepticism that, “These excavations unearth structures 
apparent to modern scholars but that have somehow managed to elude even the most systematic 
of Buddhist thinkers” (2014, p. 222).  Hallisey argues that any attempt to uncover the existing 
moral theory with which Buddhist ethics accords is misguided, not because it represents its own 
unique moral theory, but because, he contends, there is no Buddhist ethical theory to be 
categorized.  He says,  
I think we need to determine first whether “What is the family of ethical theory to which 
Buddhism belongs?” is the best question. In other words, are we so sure that we should 
begin our investigations into Buddhist ethics assuming a generic answer to this 
question?—namely that Buddhists have an as-yet-unknown moral theory, one which both 
defines the fundamental principles of Buddhist morality and establishes the authority of 
those principles. (1996, p. 35) 
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Hallisey emphasizes the pluralistic reality of Buddhist traditions, and on these grounds he 
expresses a suspicion of globalized or general descriptions.  Hallisey goes on to conclude that 
there is no single Buddhist moral theory.  He argues that Buddhists “approached their ethical 
concerns without any ethical theory at all,” exhibiting a kind of ethical particularism (1996, p. 
37).1  As Schilbrack has pointed out in his response to Hallisey, it is unclear if Hallisey means to 
say that Buddhism has no moral theory, many competing moral theories, or merely one moral 
theory, namely ethical particularism (1997, p. 100). 
Hallisey begins his argument for understanding Theravāda Buddhist ethics as a kind of 
moral particularism by suggesting a parallel between the epistemological problem of the criteria 
for knowledge and the problem of criteria for ethical knowledge.  Chisholm (1982) introduces a 
modern iteration of the problem of the criteria of knowledge turning on two pairs of questions 
which may be phrased in meta-epistemological or epistemological terms as follows: (1) What 
can we know, or what is true? (2) What are the criteria for knowledge, or how do we tell which 
propositions are true?  Answering the first question requires already having answered the second, 
since we cannot recognize an instance of knowledge without a set of identifying criteria.  Yet 
answering the second requires already having answered the first, since we cannot extract criteria 
for knowledge without any instances of knowledge from which to extrapolate.  In addition to 
skepticism, Chisholm posits two possible responses to this problem: (1) the methodist response 
takes it to be possible to answer the second question without having already answered the first, 
and (2) the particularist response takes it to be possible to answer the first question without 
having already answered the second.  Chisholm suggests that both of these responses to the 
problem of the criteria entail begging the question.  
                                                
1 For other examples of interpretations of Buddhist ethics as a kind of moral particularism, see 
Barnhart (2012) and Bartholomeusz (2002). 
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Hallisey argues that “most studies of Buddhist ethics” have taken something similar to a 
methodist approach, “assuming that only by theoretically knowing the criteria for ethical 
knowledge can we recognize any particular instance of morality as such” (1996, p. 38).  
Conversely, particularism in the context of moral knowledge would mean assuming that only by 
theoretically recognizing any particular instance of morality as such can we know the criteria for 
ethical knowledge.  Shifting from the discussion of the study of Buddhist ethics to Buddhist 
ethics proper, Hallisey then claims that Theravāda Buddhists approach ethics in a particularist 
manner, which would suggest the position that one can know what is the moral action in a given 
situation without first having any criteria for judging what is a moral action.  He draws parallels 
between Theravāda Buddhist ethics and contemporary moral particularism of prima facie duties, 
as espoused by W. D. Ross and Jonathan Dancy (1991).  
As support for this interpretation, Hallisey cites stories from the commentarial tradition 
on the Maṅgalasutta, a text which consists of a list of thirty-eight instances of auspiciousness, 
and which Hallisey describes as a list of prima facie duties.  The commentaries on this work 
cited by Hallisey, such as the Lamp on the Meaning of Auspiciousness, instantiate the list of 
occasionally conflicting moral duties (1996, p. 39, 42).  He cites the fact that certain principles 
are conflicting as evidence for the argument that Theravāda Buddhist ethics accords with moral 
particularism in that principles are context-dependent in their applicability as reasons for action.  
The moral agent, then, must assess each particular situation in order to judge which principle 
might rightly indicate the appropriate moral act.  
On this account, moral judgment is not founded on criteria, but is developed through 
experience, or through vicarious experience by hearing stories of correct moral action, “allowing 
us to recognize a prima facie duty” (1996, p. 42).  This is because moral particularism is founded 
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on epistemological holism, which recognizes the complexity of the interconnected causes and 
conditions of each particular situation, which must be assessed as a unique whole within 
experience.  Although this does not entail that there are no moral principles at all, on this 
account, there are no absolute moral principles that apply universally.2  
Hallisey’s argument looks problematic owing to a tension between particularism as a 
response to the problem of criteria for (moral) knowledge and his account of Theravāda Buddhist 
ethics as a kind of moral particularism.3  This is because particularism as a response to the 
problem of criteria suggests that we can arrive at a set of criteria for judging what is true (or 
good) through starting out with particular instances of such knowledge.  Yet, Hallisey argues that 
the outcome of interpreting Theravāda Buddhist ethics as a kind of moral particularism is that 
there are no such criteria at all (1996, p. 41).  He paints a radically particularist picture in which 
the Theravāda Buddhist moral agent may develop some kind of moral judgment based solely on 
hearing a litany of stories against the backdrop of a relativist and contingent list of occasionally 
conflicting moral principles.  The question remains of how the moral agent knows which 
                                                
2 There are, of course, more and less radical accounts of moral particularism. For instance, in 
“Particularity and Principle: The Structure of Moral Knowledge,” Garfield argues for a more 
moderate conception of moral particularism than does Dancy, who refuses the inclusion of any 
moral rules at all or the possibility of universalizing any moral claims, a view Garfield describes 
as “rule nihilism” stemming from a variety of ontological particularism (2000:181). 
Instead, Garfield argues for a kind of epistemological particularism, which understands moral 
knowledge to involve the ascertainment of rules, but which conceives this ascertainment in 
particular terms. Garfield’s epistemological moral particularism provides a convincing account 
of how we in fact go about learning the moral norms of our respective cultures and learn to make 
moral judgments in accordance with them, but even this more moderate version of moral 
particularism, as Garfield would surely agree, is not an appropriate description of 
Buddhist ethics. 
3 For other critical assessments of a moral particularist interpretation of Buddhist ethics, see 
Gowan (2015), Keown (2013), Schilbrack (1997), and Vélez de Cea (2004). 
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principle to follow based on the particular context.  This account seems all the more to demand 
some kind of guiding criteria or underlying moral theory.  
 I agree with Hallisey that Buddhist ethics is not best thought of as adhering to a set of 
absolute moral principles and that the incredible diversity of Buddhist traditions should be 
understood in its plurality.  I also agree that the attempt to force Buddhist ethics into the 
interpretive box of a Western ethical system is misguided, obscuring the possibilities for both 
learning about and learning from Buddhist ethics.  Yet to dissolve Buddhist ethical thought into a 
sea of particulars unmoored from any underlying moral theory is, I suggest, the opposite extreme 
on the spectrum of interpretive approaches, and one which equally obscures the possibilities for 
both learning about and learning from Buddhist ethics.  Moreover, as with any tradition taken up 
by scholarly inquiry, the simple fact that Buddhism is not a monolith does not automatically 
deem an inquiry into its general form and common features methodologically flawed or fruitless.  
While it is naive and unhelpful to make globalized claims about some fictional monolithic 
Buddhism or Buddhist ethics, I suggest that in the study of Buddhist ethics, it is helpful and even 
imperative to seek out common threads within the particulars of the various Buddhist traditions 
that point to underlying moral theories and ethical priorities helping to guide the moral agent in 
making moral judgments.  
When it comes to methodology, I disagree with Hallisey’s claim that “the study of ethics 
in Theravāda Buddhism is best pursued historically” (1996, p. 42).  My aim here is not to 
undertake a historic study of particular instances of Buddhist ethics in action, but a philosophical 
inquiry into what might be common forms and themes that run through the works of important 
Buddhist ethical thinkers.  Identifying these commonalities, I argue, will help one navigate 
Buddhist ethical thought in a way that might provide a point of contact with Buddhism for 
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comparative philosophy, allowing us to not only learn about, but also learn from or think with 
Buddhist ethical writings.  
Many others, such as Keown (1992), Schilbrack (1997), Williams (1998), Siderits (2000), 
Cooper and James (2005), Tillemans (2008), Goodman (2009), Finnigan (2011), Carpenter 
(2015), Garfield (2015), Gowans (2015), etc., agree that it is worthwhile inquiring into the 
general forms of Buddhist ethics.  It is with these scholars and their conversations in the field of 
Buddhist philosophy and comparative philosophy that I wish to engage.  For this reason, this 
dissertation is intentionally weighted towards a more philosophical approach rather than a 
historical study of particulars.  Moreover, I do not think that the more general philosophical 
approach is at odds with the historical study of the particular, with its recognition of Buddhist 
pluralism.  The idea that there might be central themes that commonly run through Buddhist 
ethical thought represents an appreciation of the fact that there are similarities as well as 
differences across traditions, thinkers, times, and places.  It does not necessitate that we see 
Buddhist ethics as a single entity, but allows for the recognition of multiple theories that share 
common threads.  
What I hope to contribute to the conversation on Buddhist ethics and comparative ethics 
are arguments that lend support to the idea that Buddhist ethical writings share central themes 
and that when these themes are appreciated, Buddhist ethics can better engage in not only 
comparative ethics, but also has something to add to the contemporary discussion on ethics.  I 
suggest that if one undertakes the inquiry into Buddhist ethics on its own terms without the 
preconceived western ethical categories, one does indeed discover a common theme that might 
be counted as constituting the criteria for moral knowledge, helping the Buddhist moral agent 
navigate the complexity of distinct particular contexts and the list of occasionally confusing and 
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conflicting moral principles.  This common thread, I will argue, is the priority given to 
phenomenological properties, or the accompanying mental state, associated with an act.  
My claim is that a central and common thread carried through Buddhist writing on ethics 
is a concern with the mental sphere, and in particular the understanding that for an action to be 
considered good, the accompanying mental state must be associated with certain 
phenomenological aspects.  Put another way, Buddhist ethicists share a concern for what it is like 
when you engage in a moral act.  I am not arguing that the requisite phenomenal qualities 
themselves are the same for all Buddhist ethicists.  For example, I will argue that the Buddhist 
ethicists from the Mahāyāna Madhyamaka tradition, such as Āryadeva, Candrakīrti, and 
Śāntideva, informed by the Perfection of Wisdom sūtras and the middle way philosophy of 
Nāgārjuna, are specifically interested in the way we see ourselves, our actions, and others during 
moral acts.  However, this is not to say all Buddhist ethicists emphasize these same phenomenal 
properties.  While the Mādhyamika ethicists might consider the act of giving to be good only if 
the agent is not essentializing themselves as the giver, the act of giving, or the receiver, other 
Buddhist ethicists might instead consider the act of giving to be good as long as it is not 
accompanied by the mental properties of stinginess or regret.  What is shared, though, is a 
concern for the first person experience of the moral act.  
To be clear, my claim that Buddhist ethics is best understood as a type of moral 
phenomenology is not a claim that there is a single Buddhist moral theory that, although 
unarticulated, was shared by Buddhist ethicists for the last 2,500 years.  I’m also not claiming 
that the Buddhist ethicists that I cite are a representative sample of such a single ethical system.  
Instead, what I claim is that there are common themes that run through the works of Buddhist 
ethicists and that understanding these themes gives us a way to not only better understand 
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“Buddhist ethics,” but also to allow for this tradition to better engage in and contribute to 
contemporary conversations in ethics.  
1.1.2 A Note on the Use of the Term “Moral Phenomenology” 
Phenomenology has come to mean many different things since Edmund Husserl initiated 
it as a philosophical discipline with his groundbreaking work, Logical Investigations (1900-01).  
From the beginning of this movement, each of the major modern European phenomenologists 
(Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty), has approached phenomenology with a distinct 
methodology.  Their respective methodologies are sometimes at odds with one another.  Husserl, 
for instance, insists on bracketing the external world; Heidegger, in urging his hermeneutical 
approach, rejects that bracketing.  Moreover, the subject matter regarded as falling in the domain 
of phenomenology is wide-ranging, including a variety of types of experience, such as memory, 
imagination, emotion, perception, thought, the intentional structure of consciousness, accounts of 
spatial awareness, the experience of the flow of time, intention in action, etc.   
When I use the term “phenomenology” to characterize certain Buddhist philosophical 
approaches, I do not intend to suggest that any particular Buddhist phenomenologist adopts a 
specific European phenomenological approach, or to indicate the system of one particular 
phenomenologist.  My aim in this study is to approach Buddhist thinkers on their own terms and 
not through a Western philosophical lens.  Guided by this approach, I use the term 
“phenomenology” to refer to an approach to philosophy characterized by an emphasis on the first 
person experience.  My aim is not to reframe Buddhist philosophy in terms of the Western 
phenomenological tradition, but to identify the emphasis on both the first person account of 
moral experience and the transformation of experience that are emphasized by Buddhist thinkers, 
and in particular Buddhist ethical thinkers. 
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 Just as in Western philosophical traditions prior to the formal inception of 
phenomenology as a philosophical discipline, a number of different philosophers engaged in 
what would now be described as phenomenological inquiry, similarly, in the Buddhist tradition, 
although there is no exact term in Sanskrit, Pāli, Tibetan, etc. that corresponds to 
“phenomenology,” there is nonetheless a rich history of first person examination of the features 
of experience.  This concern with the mental properties of experience is apparent in the 
abundance of detailed first person accounts of meditative states.  
In particular, the Yogācāra Buddhist philosophical system has been characterized as a 
kind of phenomenology by contemporary scholars such as Lusthaus (2002) and Garfield (2015).  
Lusthaus comments on the Yogācāra system as follows:  
Buddhism has focused on issues of cognition, psychology, epistemology, soterics and 
ethics. Dharmas are factors of experience, or the phenomena which constitute experience. 
Therefore the investigation of dharmas can be called “Buddhist phenomenology.” [T]he 
affinities between Buddhist phenomenologists and Western phenomenologists are at 
times striking. (2002, p. 4) 
 
Garfield highlights the Yogācāra account of the three natures (trisvabhāva) as an example of a 
Buddhist phenomenological approach that treats the structure of subjectivity (2015, pp. 186-
193).  
A phenomenological approach is also evident in Buddhist Abhidharma/Abhidhamma 
literature, which gives first person descriptive accounts of different mental experiences.  
Nyanaponika describes this approach as “a rigorous phenomenology that disposes of the notion 
that any kind of static unity or underlying substance can be traced in the mind” (2015, p. 5).  He 
writes,  
Let us make a rough division of philosophy into phenomenology and ontology, and 
briefly characterize them as follows: Phenomenology deals, as the name implies, with 
“phenomena,” that is, with the world of internal and external experience.  Ontology, or 
metaphysics, inquires into the existence and nature of an essence, or ultimate principle, 
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underlying the phenomenal world… The Abhidhamma doubtlessly belongs to the first of 
these two divisions of philosophy, that is, to phenomenology. (2015, pp. 19-20)  
 
Nyanaponika is careful to point out that despite the fact that the Abhidhamma literature uses a 
phenomenological methodology, it does result in specific ontological assertions. He says, 
The penetrative phenomenological investigation undertaken in the Abhidhamma makes a 
definite and valuable contribution to ontological problems, that is, to the search for an 
abiding essence in reality.  The Abhidhamma philosophy shows clearly and irrefutably 
where such an alleged essence can never be found, namely, anywhere in the world of the 
five aggregates (khandha)... It is true that these ontological results of the Abhidhamma 
are “merely negative,” but they certainly represent more substantial and consequential 
contributions to the ontological problem than the “positive” assertions of many 
metaphysical systems, indulging in unprovable or fallacious conceptual speculations. 
(2015, pp. 20-21) 
 
Maria Heim, in the context of her treatment of moral agency and intention (cetanā) in early 
Buddhist sources, describes the Abhidhamma literature as not only phenomenological in 
methodology, but also as an account of a complex moral phenomenology.  Heim says, “Texts 
that richly describe moral phenomenology, chiefly the Abhidhamma literature, have been largely 
sidelined in current Theravāda studies” (2014, p. 2).  I agree with Heim that the Abhidhamma 
texts both exemplify the engagement of Buddhist thinkers in a phenomenological methodology, 
and also that the ethical emphasis in these texts qualifies them as incorporating a type of moral 
phenomenology.   
In claiming that Buddhist ethics is best understood as a type of moral phenomenology, I 
use the term “moral phenomenology” to refer to the way Buddhist ethical thinkers emphasize the 
first-person study of the experiential aspect of our moral life.  Just as a phenomenological 
methodology can be seen as a consistent and important thread that runs through Buddhist 
Abhidharma literature, I argue that there is also a phenomenological emphasis that runs through 
Buddhist ethical texts themselves, especially those ethical writers from the Mahāyāna 
Madhyamaka tradition.  
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I do not simply claim that Buddhist ethical texts emphasize the psychological domain. I 
aim to demonstrate that the concerns of Buddhist ethicists go beyond the psychological 
mechanics of moral decisions (in which a third person description would be sufficient) to a 
concern for the first-person experiential aspects of moral experience. Moreover, I do not simply 
argue that Buddhist ethicists draw on introspection to give descriptions of moral states, but that 
moral development is explained and moral experience is evaluated in terms of the 
phenomenological properties that characterize the mental states associated with moral actions.  
The idea that an action is considered good only if the accompanying mental state is 
associated with certain phenomenological properties is exemplified in a number of Buddhist 
texts that explain what makes generosity praiseworthy. We can see this even in the Pāli sūttas of 
early Buddhism. For example, the Numerated Discourses (Aṅguttaranikāya) gives the following 
description for how one ought to be generous:  
And how is a family man accomplished in generosity? Here, Vyagghapajja, a family man 
dwells at home with a mind devoid of the stain of stinginess, freely generous, open-
handed, delighting in relinquishment, one devoted to charity, delighting in giving and 
sharing. In this way a family man is accomplished in generosity. (AN 8:54; IV 281–85; 
trans. Bikkhu Bodhi, 2005, p. 126) 
 
Here, in describing what makes generosity good, the mental realm is prioritized.  In order for an 
act of giving to qualify as a moral deed the primary concern is that the act of giving not be 
accompanied by the experience of stinginess, but with the experience of delight. 
My claim is not that all Buddhist ethicists, across traditions, emphasize the same 
phenomenal properties, but that there is a shared central concern for the first person experience 
of the moral act.  For example, in the Diamond Cutter Sūtra, a later Mahāyāna Perfection of 
Wisdom sūtra, we see a concern with a different set of phenomenological properties in 
discussions of the moral act of generosity.  The Diamond Cutter Sūtra reads, 
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However, a bodhisattva should not give a gift while fixing on an object, Subhūti. He 
should not give a gift while fixing on anything.  He should not give a gift while fixing on 
physical forms. He should not give a gift while fixing on sounds, smells, tastes or objects 
of touch, or on dharmas.  For this is the way, Subhūti, a bodhisattva should give a gift, so 
that he does not fix on the idea of the distinctive features (of any object).  Why is that? 
Subhūti, it is not easy to take the measure of the quantity of merit, Subhūti, of the 
bodhisattva who gives without fixation. (trans. Harrison, 2006, p. 143) 
 
While the sutta passage cited above emphasizes that giving ought to be accompanied by delight 
rather than stinginess, this Perfection of Wisdom sūtra passage emphasizes a concern with the 
way in which the bodhisattva experiences objects such as the gift.  In particular, the bodhisattva 
should experience the gift without hypostatization.  What is shared is an emphasis on the mental 
experience associated with the act of giving, or on what it is like to engage in giving, and it is the 
appropriate subjective experience that constitutes the prescriptive element qualifying the act as 
good.  The moral emphasis on the phenomenal properties of how the agent experiences an object 
that is observed in the Perfection of Wisdom sūtras is also taken up and developed by later 
Buddhist ethicists from the Mahāyāna Madhyamaka tradition, such as Āryadeva, Candrakīrti, 
and Śāntideva, who were informed both by the Perfection of Wisdom sūtras and the middle way 
philosophy of Nāgārjuna. These authors are interested in the way we experience ourselves, our 
actions, and others during moral acts, specifically placing a higher moral value on those deeds 
wherein the moral agent does not experience herself, the patient of act, or action itself as having 
an essence (svabhāva). In these later Mahāyāna ethical writings on generosity, we consistently 
see an emphasis not on the obvious utilitarian value of the act of giving, but rather on the mental 
experience associated with the act of giving. For example, Śāntideva describes what qualifies 
generosity as having been perfected, he says, 
If one perfected generosity only upon having eliminated poverty from the world, then 
since there are destitute people in the world even now, how could the previous Protectors 
have perfected it? 
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The perfection of generosity is stated as the thought to give to all beings the entirety of 
one’s possessions together with one’s karmic fruit.  Thus, it is simply a state of mind. (V: 
9-10)4  
 
It is clear here that generosity is perfected not through the success of the result of the action, but 
through the mental state with which the generous act is associated.  Garfield has demonstrated 
how, in How to Lead an Awakened Life, Śāntideva presents contrasting phenomenologies, 
comparing phenomenology of a neophyte bodhisattva’s act of generosity with that of a more 
cultivated bodhisattva (2011, p. 343).  Śāntideva describes the neophyte bodhisattva’s generosity 
in Chapter Three as focused on depersonalizing the agent’s motivations, whereas he describes 
the generosity of a more developed bodhisattva in Chapter Ten as depersonalizing even his own 
state of being (2011, p. 343).  Garfield argues that we can read How to Lead an Awakened Life as 
a “treatise on the distinction between the phenomenologies of benighted and of awakened moral 
consciousness” (2011:335).  Garfield explains that for Śāntideva, “The task of leading an 
awakened life – a morally desirable life – is the task of transforming our phenomenology” (2011, 
p. 356). 
I contend that there is an important link between the elements of moral phenomenology 
that Heim sees in the Abhidamma/Abhidharma texts and those that Garfield identifies in 
Śāntideva’s work.  I suggest that if we look at the most basic level of experience as described in 
the Buddhist Abhidharma texts in light of later Buddhist ethical writings, we find evidence for a 
moral phenomenology that goes beyond the explicit characterization of mental functions as 
                                                
4 adaridraṃ jagat kṛtvā dānapāramitā yadi | jagaddaridram adyāpi sā kathaṃ pūrvatāyinām 
||V:9|| phalena saha sarvasvatyāgacittāj jane ’khile | dānapāramitā proktā tasmāt sā cittam eva 
tu ||V:10|| gal te ‘gro ba dbul bor nas // sbyin pa’i pha rol phyin yin na // da rung ‘gro bkren yod 
na sngon // skyob pa ji ltar pha rol phyin // bdog pa thams cad ’bras bcas te // skye bo kun la 
btang sems kyis // sbyin pa’i pha rol phyin gsungs te // de ltas de ni sems nyid do // (Toh. 3871, 
10b). 
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having a moral tone based on certain phenomenological criteria.  The always operative 
(sarvatra-ga) fundamental building blocks of each moment of experience described in the 
Abhidharma literature, such as feeling (vedanā), ascertainment (saṃjñā), and intention (cetanā), 
are of particular ethical significance.  Importantly, it is frequently these always operative mental 
activities that are the phenomenological properties emphasized by Buddhist ethical texts in 
assessing the moral value of an act.  Mahāyāna Buddhist ethical texts in particular stress how we 
think about and feel towards ourselves, others, and the world; consequently, it is the character of 
these phenomenological properties accompanying an action that determine whether or not the 
deed is praiseworthy.  
Beyond assessing the moral value of individual actions based on their associated 
phenomenological properties, I will further argue that Buddhist ethical texts present moral 
development as a transformation of phenomenology at this fundamental level of experience.  
This is reflected in Buddhist ethical exercises that work to influence the way we experience the 
world through a transformation of these same basic components of experience, like feeling and 
ascertainment.  It is, then, the character of these fundamental phenomenal building blocks of 
experience that not only condition the moral value of actions, but that also serve to differentiate 
the experience of the moral mature and morally immature.   
In sum, my primary claim concerns writers in the Mahāyāna Mādhyamaka text 
tradition—in particular Āryadeva, Candrakīrti, and Śāntideva—who inherited both the 
Abhidharma literature of authors like Vasubandhu and Asaṅga and the Perfection of 
Wisdom sūtras, with both collections of writings influencing the resulting ethical accounts that, I 
argue, are best described as a kind of moral phenomenology.  From the Abhidharma tradition 
was inherited an ethical emphasis on the basic building blocks of experience in the form of the 
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five always operative mental activities. From the Perfection of Wisdom sūtras was inherited an 
ethical emphasis on the metaphysical way the agent “sees” or understands herself, her action, and 
the patient of her actions. It is this unique kind of moral phenomenology evidenced in the 
writings of these Mādhyamika ethicists that I primarily seek to characterize in this thesis.  
Moreover, as I will argue, this concern with the phenomenological properties qualifying the 
moral value of both action and agent is a central and consistent thread running throughout 
Buddhist ethical writings, and it is for these reasons that I claim that Buddhist ethics may best 
described as a type of moral phenomenology. 
1.2 Outline of Chapters 
This dissertation comprises two main sections.  The first section, comprising Chapters 2 
and 3, addresses the methodological problems with seeking to understand Buddhist ethics 
through categorizing it into a Western ethical system.  Since Buddhist ethics has often been 
interpreted as either a type of consequentialism or a type of virtue ethics, Chapter 2 is devoted to 
addressing the problems with a consequentialist reading of Buddhist ethics, and Chapter 3 to 
highlighting the structural differences that inhibit a faithful reading of Buddhist ethics as a type 
of virtue ethics.  In the second section, consisting of of Chapters 4 and 5, I argue that when 
Buddhist ethical writings are considered on their own terms, there emerges a recurrent and 
dominant emphasis on the phenomenology of moral acts.  Chapter 4 draws on Buddhist 
psychological texts to elucidate the Buddhist explanation of the foundational components of 
experience and the way in which these are ethically significant.  Chapter 5 looks at Buddhist 
ethical texts to demonstrate that mental states are prioritized in ethical discussions and that both 
the Buddhist moral problem and moral solution pertain to the way we see and experience the 
world.  
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Since Goodman has argued most extensively that Buddhist ethics is best understood as a 
kind of universalist consequentialism, Chapter 2 begins with an examination of Goodman’s 
methodology and arguments.  Goodman identifies an agent-neutral approach as the central 
characteristic of a consequentialist ethical system, the characteristic that differentiates it from 
systems of virtue ethics, which are agent-relative.  He interprets themes within Buddhist texts 
such as the promotion of self-sacrifice and the dedication of merit as evidence of the agent 
neutral approach of a consequentialist ethical system.  I aim to demonstrate that these examples 
should be read as moral instructions for the agent’s motivational state rather than evidence 
supporting that Buddhist ethics is a type of consequentialism.  In doing so, I intend to 
demonstrate that Goodman’s methodology of confining the inquiry into Buddhist ethics to its 
categorization as one of two Western ethical systems based on the criteria of Western ethical 
thought limits the possibility for a comprehensive understanding of Buddhist ethics.  
I then turn to arguments made by Goodman, Williams, and Siderits specifically in regard 
to Śāntideva.  These scholars each contend that Śāntideva’s metaphysical position commits him 
to a universalist consequentialist ethics and point to his discussion of the ethical meditative 
practice of equalizing and exchanging self and other in Chapter 8 of How to Lead an Awakened 
Life as evidence.  I will contest the claim that the Buddhist doctrine of selflessness entails the 
agent neutrality that characterizes consequentialism.  I will argue that Śāntideva’s use of the 
metaphysical doctrine of selflessness within an ethical context does not aim to demonstrate a 
moral obligation based on agent neutrality, and thus is not a form of consequentialism.  Instead, I 
will argue that he uses it to effect a psychological shift in the agent for the purposes of moral 
development.  
 25 
 I argue that, in Chapter 8, Śāntideva is simply pointing out the irrationality of 
distinguishing pains based on their owners, together with the possibility for taking on the 
concerns of others as our own, because of the malleable boundaries of the conception of identity.  
I contend that, in this section of his treatise, Śāntideva is instructing the practitioner to harness 
the powerful psychological forces that already exist within our experience, such as the aversion 
to our own pain or attachment to our future selves, and extend their scope through expanding the 
conception of self, transforming our experience and moral conduct from one motivated by self-
concern to one centered on concern for others.   
After arguing that the emphasis on the mental domain of the agent fatally undermines a 
consequentialist interpretation of Buddhist ethics, in Chapter 3, I address the virtue ethics 
interpretation.  While it might seem that an emphasis on the mental states of the agent could 
accord with a form of virtue ethics, I argue that there are structural differences between the two 
systems that preclude this classification.  It is Keown who offers the most detailed account of 
this position, so using his arguments I engage in a comparative analysis of the structures of virtue 
ethics and Buddhist ethics.  I identify five critical structural features of virtue ethics and argue 
that they do not characterize Buddhist ethics.  I will argue that neither the Buddhist account of 
the relationship between virtues and nirvana nor the Buddhist explanation of moral choice and 
agency are consistent with a virtue ethics.  
 In the second section, I begin the inquiry into Buddhist ethical writings on their own 
terms.  To argue that moral phenomenology is foundational to Buddhist ethical thought, in 
Chapter 4, I turn first to the Buddhist psychological treatises of Vasubandhu, Asaṅga, and 
Buddhaghosa, highlighting the fundamental mental processes that shape experience with the 
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intention of demonstrating that these Buddhist psychology texts provide the foundation for 
understanding that the way we construct our experience of the world is ethically significant.  
In Chapter 5, I turn to Mahāyāna Buddhist ethical texts to demonstrate how this 
psychological foundation is used in these texts in the formulation of a moral phenomenology.  I 
use primarily the works of Āryadeva and Śāntideva; I call attention to the fact that these texts 
prioritize mental states in their ethical discussions and present a division of two types of moral 
perception: the confused way of seeing the world that is characterized by vice and the accurate 
way of seeing the world that characterizes virtue.  These texts identify the moral problem with 
confusion about reality, and the moral solution as a transformation of the way we experience the 
world through the cultivation of a metaphysically accurate understanding.  In the final stage of 
making the case for moral phenomenology as central to Buddhist ethical thought, I turn to the 
Prajñāparamitā literature, focusing on the Heart Sūtra and Diamond Cutter Sūtra to 
demonstrate that in these sūtras we can find the seeds of the ethical system of Āryadeva and 
Śāntideva since they also stress the importance of a transformation of vision as the basis of 
ethical activity.  
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Chapter Two: Buddhist Ethics and Consequentialism  
Many Western philosophers examining Buddhist ethics, particularly when considering 
Mahāyāna Buddhist ethics, have argued that Buddhist ethics is a type of universalist 
consequentialism.  Goodman (2009), Williams (1998), and Siderits (2000) each argue that 
Buddhist ethics, like universalist consequentialism, is primarily concerned with the consequences 
of actions, especially the impact of actions on the welfare of all sentient beings.  In this chapter, I 
will explain and examine the argument that Buddhist ethics is a type of universalist 
consequentialism, and I will challenge the interpretation of Mahāyāna Buddhist ethics as a type 
of consequentialism.  In particular, I will demonstrate that a consequentialist reading of 
Śāntideva's Guide to Awakened Living obscures the unique features of his ethical system.  When 
read on its own terms, the unique ethical system that begins to emerge is one that prioritizes 
mental states and is primarily concerned with a transformation of the way the agent engages with 
the world. 
2.1 Goodman's Account 
In Consequences of Compassion, Goodman (2009) argues that if the Buddha himself, or 
important historical Buddhist ethicists such as Buddhaghosa, Asaṅga, or Śāntideva, were 
somehow able to engage in dialogue with contemporary Western philosophers on moral theory, 
then they would endorse the views of those Western thinkers who put forward a type of universal 
consequentialism (p. 4).  He approaches Buddhist ethics by first partitioning the space of 
possibilities into virtue ethics or consequentialism, and then proposing a set of criteria to 
distinguish consequentialism from virtue ethics, arguing that these criteria force Buddhist 
thinkers into the consequentialist camp (p. 90).  In examining Goodman's approach, I aim to 
demonstrate that this methodology of assessing Buddhist ethics based on the criteria which 
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distinguish Western ethical systems impedes from the outset the possibility of a complete and 
accurate understanding of the structure of Buddhist ethics.5  
 Goodman (2009) focuses on the difference between the agent-neutral approach of 
universal consequentialism and the agent-relative approach of virtue ethics as the key criteria for 
determining with which of these ethical theories Buddhist ethics is to be identified.  Agent-
relative approaches distinguish between different agents and their associated aims, while agent-
neutral approaches assign common ethical aims to all agents.  In an agent-neutral approach, it is 
not important who performs or receives the benefit of a particular action, but that the benefit 
itself is maximized.  In making his argument for Buddhist ethics to be understood as a type of 
consequentialism, Goodman emphasizes the fact that the agent-neutral approach of universalist 
consequentialism sometimes calls for demanding actions, like that of self-sacrifice or neglecting 
loved ones in order to increase the overall welfare of many.  With this in mind, Goodman is 
interested in seeking out instances in which Buddhist ethicists express an agent-neutral approach 
and the accompanying signs of demanding actions as evidence that Buddhist ethical theory is not 
a virtue theory, but a universalist consequentialist theory.   
2.1.1 Theravāda Ethics and Rule-Consequentialism 
Goodman (2009) begins his argument that Buddhist ethics is a form of consequentialism 
by challenging the view that Theravāda ethics is best thought of as a type virtue ethics, a view 
made popular by the influential work of Damien Keown.  Goodman argues that the ethical view 
of the Theravāda Buddhist tradition, a tradition he takes to represent a continuation of early 
Buddhist thought, is closer to consequentialism than virtue ethics (p. 47).  In particular, he first 
                                                
5 For alternative critiques of Goodman’s consequentialist intepertation of Buddhist ethics, see for 
example, Garfield (2011), Gowan (2015, pp. 129-137), Harvey (2000, p. 50), and Todd (2013, 
pp. 32-33). 
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argues that the doctrine of karma provides evidence that the Theravāda tradition defines actions 
as right or wrong in dependence upon their consequences.  He then argues that Theravāda 
Buddhists, like proponents of universalist versions of consequentialism, take into consideration 
the welfare of all beings, and that this is evidenced in their meditative instructions on the need 
for the development of the four divine abodes (brahmavihāra), which are compassion (karuṇā), 
love (mettā), joy (muditā), and equanimity (upekkha).  Goodman then argues that it is in the later 
Mahāyāna tradition that the consequentialist-like features found in early Buddhist traditions 
develop into an explicit consequentialist ethical position.  My critique of Goodman’s position 
focuses primarily on his interpretation of Mahāyāna sources; however, I will first address some 
of the problems with considering early Buddhist ethical concepts as consequentialist.  
There are two obvious objections to understanding Theravāda Buddhist ethics as a type 
of consequentialism, and it is in response to these objections that Goodman provides a detailed 
account of the way in which he understands Buddhist ethics to conform to a consequentialist 
model.  He concedes that if Theravāda Buddhist ethics is a form of consequentialism, then it has 
to be an indirect form, and one that considers virtues to be an important part of the welfare that is 
to be maximized.  
The two possible objections to regarding Theravāda ethics as a type of universalist 
consequentialism to which Goodman responds are: (1) Theravāda ethics does not explicitly deal 
with the resolution of conflicts.  A common feature of many universalist consequentialist ethical 
theories is concern with determining the best course of action in situations where the needs of 
one group of people are incompatible with the well-being of another group of people.  If 
Theravāda ethics is indeed a form of universalist consequentialism, then one may question why 
we do not see discussions addressing these kinds of moral dilemmas in Theravāda ethical texts.  
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(2) One may object that Theravāda ethics is not a form of consequentialism because it prioritizes 
the observance of vows over concern for the consequences of actions. This means, for example, 
that a Theravādin monastic should follow the rule of not lying regardless of the possible 
outcome, even if that means that telling the truth might result in an innocent person losing her 
life. 
Goodman defends his position from the first objection, the concern that Buddhist ethics is 
unlike universalist consequentialist ethics because it does not deal with conflicts of interest, by 
arguing that well-being in Theravāda ethics has two components: it includes not only worldly 
happiness, but also virtues.  Goodman (2009) uses the term “character consequentialism” to refer 
to this two-fold theory of well-being (p. 70).  He argues that since virtues can be personally 
cultivated without others incurring an expense, conflicts of interest are less of an issue than with 
theories that describe a type of welfare that relies on a limited or shared resource.  Goodman 
explains, “If we interpret the Theravāda as regarding virtue as the primary component of well-
being, we can explain the fact that their formulations of consequentialism seem not to address the 
issue of conflicts of interest” (p. 49).  In trying to distinguish Buddhist ethics from a form of 
virtue ethics, Goodman is still forced to acknowledge and account for the emphasis on virtues in 
Buddhist ethical texts.  This seems to be an inconvenience incorporated into the system.  The 
question remains open as to why Buddhist ethics is consequentialist rather than a form of virtue 
ethics. 
Goodman’s response to the second objection, that Theravāda ethics is not 
consequentialist, since it prioritizes adherence to vows over consequences, is to argue that even 
though Theravāda ethics is not a direct form of consequentialism, it is nonetheless an indirect 
form of consequentialism.  He further characterizes Theravāda ethics as a type of rule 
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consequentialism.  He grants that Theravāda ethicists prescribe a set of inflexible rules, but 
asserts that these rules are justified in terms of the consequences of following them.  This, he 
suggests, “explains both the insistence on following the rules no matter what and the scriptural 
statements that those who practice Buddhism are practicing for the many” (Goodman, 2009, p. 
59).  I find Goodman’s response to this objection unconvincing, and I will analyze and critique 
this position below.   
In summary, Goodman argues that Theravāda ethics is not a form of virtue ethics, but is 
instead a form of consequentialism, albeit an indirect one, and that it is universalist in part 
because it includes virtues such as love and compassion in the good that is to be maximized.  
Goodman (2009) claims, Theravāda ethics is a “form of rule-consequentialism, with a well-being 
that counts both happiness and virtue as intrinsically good” (p. 69).  As evidence for his position, 
Goodman appeals to accounts of self-sacrifice and other moral demands found in Buddhist 
ethical texts.  
My critique of Goodman’s position will first focus on the problems I see with interpreting 
Theravāda ethics as rule-consequentialism and then move to an analysis of those accounts of 
self-sacrifice and moral demands that Goodman cites.  Rather than being a form of 
consequentialism, I will argue that the moral focus of Theravāda ethics is on the mental domain, 
and that this focus is taken up and fully developed in Mahāyāna ethics into a type of moral 
phenomenology.  I will also argue that this reading has been overlooked because of the 
problematic methodology of considering Buddhist ethics under the constraints of classifying it 
either as a kind of virtue ethics or consequentialism.   
Goodman's argument that Buddhist ethics is a form of consequentialism, and that 
Theravāda ethics is an indirect from of consequentialism, is based on an explanation of karma as 
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found in the Pāli canon.  According to the Buddhist doctrine of karma, actions that bring about 
harm result in future pain for the agent, and actions that bring about benefit result in future 
pleasure for the agent.  Since the former are considered unwholesome actions and the latter 
wholesome actions, Goodman (2009) argues that Buddhist ethicists, like consequentialists, take 
consequences as the criteria for determining the moral value of an action (p. 48).  
If Goodman were correct, we would expect to see evidence that actions described as good 
and bad are assessed solely by their consequences.  However, when we look at the explanation of 
karma in the Pāli canon, we see that that the most important ethical considerations are not the 
consequences of the action, but instead the moral psychology of the agent at the time of engaging 
in the action.  Praise or blame is attributed to agents based on their motivation and not based on 
the outcomes of their actions.  When discussions of karma do turn to the consequences of 
actions, the focus is not on the immediate results of the action, but on the later “karmic” result 
for the agent.  If this is an example of consequentialist ethics, then it is an egoistic version rather 
than universal welfare that Goodman asserts the Theravāda Buddhist promotes.  For Goodman’s 
argument to succeed, he has to clearly demonstrate that the action is judged as good or bad 
depending on the karmic outcome of the action, and that the operation of karma is not such that 
the outcome is positive based on the action being accompanied by a good intention.  
Goodman cannot do so: the moral evaluations in Buddhist texts explain that karma is not 
unidirectional.6  For the consequentialist, an action is judged right or wrong solely in virtue of 
the result; the intention with which the act is undertaken is irrelevant to the moral assessment of 
the action.  The Buddhist explanation of karma, on the other hand, demonstrates that intention is 
an essential component of Buddhist moral assessment.  Karma is equated not only with action, 
                                                
6 See, for instance, Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa, IV.9. 
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but also with the intention that motivates these actions.7  For example, if the action were 
undertaken with a positive motivation, then, according to the doctrine of karma, the result would 
have some positive aspect.  If Euthyphro were a Buddhist, Socrates may well have asked him 
whether actions are right due to their good outcomes or whether outcomes are good due to right 
actions.  While a consequentialist would stress that an action is judged right only due to its 
outcome being good, Buddhist ethicists also stress that an action is good because of its associated 
wholesome mental states, such as intention.  Moreover, Buddhist ethicists also claim that it is 
because the action is right that a good karmic outcome results.   
Theravādin Buddhists, for whom the Pāli canon represents the authentic teachings of the 
Buddha, are characterized by their valuing a strict adherence to monastic discipline and their 
emphasis on personal liberation from samsara as the goal of practice.  These values, Goodman 
concedes, indicate a different ethical structure than that of typical consequentialism.  Goodman 
(2009) acknowledges that there are "important aspects of the moral outlook of Theravādins that 
seem to be clearly non-consequentialist. For many Theravādins, the precepts are absolute rules 
that must not be broken even to prevent terrible consequences. For example, the tradition tells us 
that Saints, who perfectly exemplify Theravādin moral ideals, would never kill any sentient 
being, whether person or animal, under any circumstances" (p. 56). Goodman explains this 
prioritizing of adherence to vows over consequences by suggesting that Theravāda ethics is an 
indirect form of consequentialism, which he describes as rule-consequentialism.  He describes 
rule-consequentialism as follows:  
                                                
7 See, for instance, Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa, IV.1: The variety of the world arises from action 
(karma).  Karma is intention (cetanā) and what it produces.  Intention (cetanā) is mental action: it 
engenders bodily and vocal actions.  (IV.1) Las las 'jig rten sna tshogs skyes, de ni sems pa dang des 
byas/ sems pa yid kyi las yin no, des bskyed lus dang ngag gi las/ (D4089: 10b). 
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the way to determine what to do involves first ascertaining the set of rules that, if 
everyone followed them, would produce the best overall consequences.  Since these 
rules, if they were obeyed, would achieve the maximum welfare of all, they are the true 
principles of morality.  We might argue, then, that the criterion for determining the 
rightness of actions should appeal to these rules, and therefore should depend only 
indirectly on consequences.  If we adopt this suggestion, we become rule-
consequentialists. (p. 28)   
 
Goodman suggests that Theravāda monastic rules are justified in terms of the consequences that 
generally follow from those actions, and not only personal consequences, but also the 
consequences for others.  Goodman writes, "Such a theory could explain both the insistence on 
following the rules no matter what and the scriptural statements that those who practice 
Buddhism are practicing for the benefit of the many" (p. 59).  
If Goodman’s claim that Theravāda ethics is best thought of as rule consequentialism 
were correct, we should be able to find within Theravāda ethics the important structural 
components that make an ethical system rule consequentialist.  For an ethical system to be rule-
consequentialist, it must (1) comprise rules or ethical guidelines that are accepted because of 
their consequences, (2) what is morally wrong must be determined either directly by these rules 
(strict) or indirectly through the consequences of not following the rules (partial).  The fact that 
Theravāda Buddhists refer to a set of rules when making moral decisions, or that the moral 
standing of a Theravādin is assessed in part by how well he or she follows a set of rules, is not 
sufficient to establish that Theravāda is rule-consequentialist.  
There is, however, no evidence to suggest that the ethical guidelines set forth in the Pāli 
literature of the Theravāda texts were selected only because of their consequences, or that moral 
wrongness is determined by these rules.  Theravāda monks follow the vināya rules not because 
of concerns about consequences, but in virtue of the importance of adherence to vows regardless 
of the consequences of their actions.  Their mental training focuses on self-cultivation, the 
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elimination of destructive emotions, and the development of positive mental states, rather than 
the increase of a universal good.  Moreover, while the success of rule-consequentialism is 
premised on some degree of universal adherence in order to produce the best consequences, the 
Theravāda monastic vows are not intended to be universally followed, and are able to fulfill their 
purpose of supporting individual liberation even if only one person follows them. 
2.1.2 Self-sacrifice as Moral Development 
Goodman (2009) argues that one of the features that distinguish virtue ethics from 
consequentialism is that in consequentialism, an action can be right even though it is harmful to 
one's own flourishing, while in virtue ethics there is a close connection between virtuous actions 
and the agent's own well-being (p. 42).  Consequentialist theories are agent-neutral, meaning that 
there is no distinction made between one's own welfare and the welfare of others.  For this 
reason, consequentialism can be extremely demanding, at times even calling for self-sacrifice for 
the benefit of others.  Goodman argues that since self-sacrifice inhibits the further development 
of the agent, it is at odds with the agent-relative approach of virtue ethics.  He cites passages 
from Buddhist texts in which the act of self-sacrifice is explained as morally praiseworthy, 
arguing that this reveals that Buddhist ethicists prioritize universalist moral considerations at the 
expense of self-concern, and for this reason they should be considered consequentialists.  
Goodman refers to a well-known Jātaka tale, an account of one of the Buddha's previous 
lives, in which he, as a bodhisattva, sacrifices his own body, so that a starving tigress would not 
eat her cubs.  Goodman (2009) describes the ethical message of this tale as "foreign to common-
sense moral thought," but "quite similar to the very demanding character of universalist 
consequentialism" (p. 52).  He concludes that only "consequentialism shares both the noble 
altruism and the frightening extremism of Buddhist ethics" (p. 52).   
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From the general perspective of Western ethical thought, the fact that an ethical theory 
requires an agent to sacrifice himself indicates that the system prioritizes some good or value 
above the moral development of the agent, since an act of self-sacrifice entails the end of that 
agent's moral development.  This, however, is not a compelling means for evaluating a Buddhist 
ethical system, since according to the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth, an act of self-sacrifice does 
not result in the end of an agent's moral development, and could even contribute to it.  Self-
sacrifice and self-cultivation are not necessarily inconsistent in Buddhist ethical systems.  In this 
Jātaka tale the Bodhisattva even comments that the act of sacrificing his body “might also 
thereby fulfill my dream of some day being of help to others… and so come closer to perfect 
enlightenment” (trans. Khoroche, 1989, p.8). We therefore cannot use instances of self-sacrifice 
to infer that a Buddhist ethical system is closer to universalist consequentialism than to ethical 
systems that promote personal cultivation, such as virtue ethics.  Indeed, to argue that this Jātaka 
tale is an example of consequentialist ethics because it overlooks the moral development of the 
agent is to miss the context of the Jātaka tales as a whole; these stories describe how the Buddha 
progressed throughout his previous lives towards ethical maturity. 
The Jātaka tale of the starving tigress is not only a story of self-sacrifice for the good of 
others, but also a story of personal cultivation.  The bodhisattva gives multiple reasons for 
undertaking his act of self-sacrifice beyond the direct benefit to the tigress and her cubs, saying, 
“I cannot be happy as long as there is someone who is not happy” (trans. Khoroche, 1989, p.7).  
In reference to his decision to sacrifice his body to the tigress, he says, “this would be an 
example to those who strive for the good of the world, an encouragement to those who falter, a 
delight to those who are practiced in charity, a powerful attraction to noble hearts…  It would 
 37 
inspire faith in those who follow the better way” (trans. Khoroche, 1989, p. 8).  Thus the 
bodhisattva shows consideration for his own and others’ mental states in undertaking this action.  
One of the lessons of this Jātaka tale of the starving tigress is to give insight into what it 
is like to be a bodhisattva, in particular, what it is like to be a bodhisattva encountering a 
suffering and desperate mother. The selfless compassion of a bodhisattva is being contrasted 
with the ordinary self-cherishing attitude that prioritizes one's own life over that of others.  The 
bodhisattva is described as unconcerned for self-preservation, not even experiencing fear for his 
own life upon seeing the tigress.  Instead he is described as being moved by incredible 
compassion at her distress: 
The Bodhisattva remained calm at the sight of her, but compassion for another creature in 
distress made him shake like Himalaya in an earthquake. [17] It is remarkable how the 
compassionate put a brave face on things when they themselves are in dire trouble—but 
tremble at others’ distress, however slight. (trans. Khoroche, 1989, p. 7) 
 
While the motherly love of the tigress is described as overcome by concern for self-preservation:  
 
Starvation forces this beast to break the laws of affection. Here she is, ready to devour her 
own offspring. [19] Oh! How fierce is the instinct for self-preservation, such that a 
mother can be willing to eat her own young. (trans. Khoroche, 1989, p. 7) 
 
These are two distinct ways of experiencing and acting in the world.  The attitude of self-
cherishing is even capable of overpowering motherly love when personal survival is threatened, 
while the selfless compassion of a bodhisattva may lead one to give up one's own life.  These 
contrasted states represent two different moral phenomenologies, one that is characterized by 
care and the lack of self-concern, and the other characterized by intense self-grasping.  These 
two moral phenomenologies are expressed in behavior in very different ways: the tigress is 
prepared to kill her cubs to save her own life, while the bodhisattva is willing to give up his life 
to save the tigress and cubs.   
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Goodman argues that we can read this narrative as indicating consequentialist ethics 
because the act required of the bodhisattva is very demanding; but we find no description of the 
bodhisattva struggling to fulfill a moral obligation.  Instead, the bodhisattva is described as calm 
upon first seeing the tigress and as joyful when arriving at the decision to offer his body: 
On making this decision to be of use to another creature, though it cost him his life, he 
felt a surge of joy, then astounded even the calm minds of the gods by hurling himself 
down. (trans. Khoroche, 1989, p. 8) 
 
At every point in this story there is a description of the bodhisattva’s mental experience: he is 
described as fearless when encountering the tigress, compassionate in response to her suffering, 
and joyful upon deciding to offer his flesh to her. Moreover, the story does not contain any 
uniquely consequentialist reasoning for why a bodhisattva should sacrifice himself for the tiger 
cubs.  We might ask whether there are a certain number of cubs for whom the bodhisattva should 
not sacrifice himself.  For example, if there were only one cub, we might question whether or not 
it would still be right for the bodhisattva to sacrifice himself, for surely a bodhisattva’s life is of 
greater benefit to the world than a single cub’s life.  
Moreover, the story is not telling us that if we see a starving tigress about to eat her cubs, 
we ought to offer our body to the tigress.  Instead, it describes how the morally mature engage 
with the world in a different way than the morally immature, and also how this looks in the 
world. A bodhisattva experiences the world influenced by compassion and the understanding of 
selflessness, and this perspective when expressed in the world may look as if it is terribly 
demanding.  A moral action that is not demanding for the morally mature might be very 
demanding from the perspective of the morally immature, since their inner life is still dominated 
by self-grasping.  In fact, in this story, the bodhisattva is said to be travelling with a disciple 
whom he sends away because he knows that the disciple would not understand the act of self-
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sacrifice.  This certainly undermines any universalist reading of this story, and, in particular, 
Goodman’s.   
Sacrificing one's body might ordinarily be considered "foreign to common-sense moral 
thought," or an example of "frightening extremism."  For the bodhisattva, however, this act is 
neither demanding nor extreme; instead, it is a natural response generated from the 
compassionate and selfless way he experiences the situation.  Importantly, the bodhisattva does 
not give up his life based on some moral obligation or calculation of benefits and harms, as we 
might find were he a consequentialist.  
Moreover, there is no indication in this Jātaka tale that there is some universal good that 
the bodhisattva should promote above his own moral development.  There is also no mention of 
balancing, in which a single bodhisattva's life is judged to be of lesser value than a number of 
cubs.  What makes this act right is not its consequences, but that it was undertaken without self-
cherishing and conjoined with compassion.   
Goodman finds another example of self-sacrifice in Śāntideva's text, How to Lead an 
Awakened Life, citing it as evidence for a consequentialist reading of Śāntideva's ethical 
philosophy: “See, I give up without regret my bodies, my pleasures, and my good acquired in all 
three times, to accomplish good for every being” (III:10, as cited by Goodman, 2009, p. 90). 
Goodman argues that, in this verse, since Śāntideva is prepared to sacrifice all his possessions 
and even his life for the welfare of all others, he is demonstrating a consequentialist ethical 
approach by prioritizing universalist moral considerations over self concern.  Goodman (2009) 
likens this passage to the act-consequentialist approach of Peter Singer who "insists on the 
supreme moral significance of altruistic self-sacrifice" (p. 90).  Goodman concludes that 
Śāntideva's endorsement of altruistic self-sacrifice is clear textual evidence of his commitment to 
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universalist moral concerns, which leaves no room for the agent's future moral development, and 
so Śāntideva's ethics cannot be an agent-relative virtue ethics.  
Goodman (2008) claims, "If we find a thinker presenting an ethical position that is 
extremely demanding, then this is evidence that we are dealing with a form of consequentialism" 
(p. 20).  But this argument is unsound: extreme demands do not make a theory consequentialist.  
Deontological theories of ethics such as Kant's can be extremely demanding, although these 
demands are not derived from prioritizing the consequences of actions.  For Kant, actions that 
are mandatory on consequentialist grounds may well be morally forbidden, such as killing one 
innocent person to save many.  Reasons, for Kant, are the ultimate source for moral direction and 
the duties derived from reason cannot be sacrificed in order to bring about desired consequences.  
To arrive at a duty based on reason requires that maxims be universalized.  This, along 
with a commitment that humanity never be used as a means, may result in even more demanding 
moral dictates than those delivered by consequentialism.  For instance, when a consequentialist 
might be required to lie in order to save the lives of others, the deontologist might have a duty to 
tell the truth.  As Goodman (2009) himself notes,  
For, Kant, we may never violate the formula of humanity, no matter how severe the 
consequences of following it would be.  Thus Kant notoriously claims that if a murderer 
came to my door and asks the whereabouts of my friends, intending to find him and kill 
him, it would be wrong for me to answer with a lie. (p. 35)  
 
Consequentialist and deontological systems of ethics might both at times be demanding, and 
while there are very clear differences between the two, these differences are not marked by the 
degree to which they are demanding.  Hence, to argue that Buddhist ethics is consequentialist 
simply because it is demanding is patently unsound.  
 Moreover, consequentialism is not the only ethical system in which an act of self-
sacrifice might be required.  Aristotle's virtue ethics, for example, values courage in battle as a 
 41 
virtue, and this, when exercised, might result in the agent's death.  In verse ten cited above 
Śāntideva uses the plural term, "bodies," indicating that when a bodhisattva gives away his body, 
he does so with the doctrine of future lives in mind.  For a Buddhist, self-sacrifice does not 
necessitate the end of the development of the moral agent, but on the contrary this act of 
generosity supports further moral development.  
The position of Śāntideva on the sacrifice of the body is clarified in his only other extant 
text, the Compendium of Teachings (Śikṣāsamuccaya).  When discussing this topic, he 
incorporates a large section from the Vajradhvaja Sūtra, and we find that the moral emphasis is 
on the internal mental state of the agent rather than the resulting benefit for the recipient:  
Thus, indeed, is the Bodhisattva, giving himself for service, having a mind humble and 
attentive for those who ask, having a mind to rest on as upon a carpet, with attention 
fixed on supporting all unhappiness like the earth, with mind devoted to unwearied 
service for all creatures... sacrificing ears and nose to suitors who ask it...  He becomes 
unangered in mind, unoffended, not vexed, with mind absorbed in magnanimity, with 
mind partaking of the Buddha's race, with the chain of his thought unwavering in nature, 
full of strength and power, with mind not fixed upon his body... finding pleasure in 
renunciation, by sacrificing hand and foot... by the fact of not being troubled by suffering, 
by ability to take pleasure in the giving; with the restraint that consists in pure thought... 
has a mind delighting in wisdom... agreeable, pleased, delighted, joyful, friendly, happy, 
contented, and becoming joyful pleased and content... without expecting the reward of 
merit... not regarding his own body because of unconquerable joy and contentment, 
offering the blood from his own body...  Thus he with nature content and satisfied... even 
when he sacrifices only a nail from his own flesh with the thought, 'This is applied to the 
root of good,' thus renounces his own body. (Bendall and Rouse, 1990. pp. 25-29) 
 
Here the justification for giving away one's body is not based on the objective calculations of 
consequences arrived by an agent-neutral approach such as consequentialism.  Instead, when 
discussing the bodhisattva's self-sacrifice, the Buddha continually emphasizes the mind and 
mental states associated with the action of giving away one's body.  He describes an advanced 
moral state, one that the bodhisattva must aspire to and develop.   
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The ethical emphasis on the mental domain rather than consequences is also apparent in 
How to Lead an Awakened Life, when Śāntideva explains that a person should not engage in 
activities that are so demanding that they might later be regretted.  Instead, he advises that 
aspiring bodhisattvas start at their current moral capacity and gradually strengthen it.  He writes, 
At the beginning, the Guide enjoins the giving of vegetables and so forth.   After having 
habituated this, one may later gradually give away even one’s own flesh. 
 
Whenever the mentality has arisen of regarding one’s body just like vegetables, and so 
forth, at that time, what difficulty could there be in giving away of one’s flesh? (VII: 25-
26)8 
 
These verses do not concern what is given or the benefit that the recipient might gain from the 
various acts of generosity.  In fact, the recipient earns no mention at all.  Instead, the primary 
concern is the agent's mental state associated with the act of giving, in particular, that the agent 
not experience regret at the time of giving.  
This is clearly not the agent-neutral account of consequentialism, which would require 
that the course of action that maximizes overall welfare be followed, and should not be delayed 
for individual concerns.  Śāntideva is not describing the pursuit of maximizing welfare, but is 
offering an account of the first person experience of the moral act.  Here, moral development is 
not merely improvement in the types of objects given, nor does it necessarily involve a 
progressively greater level of hardship or inner struggle.  The gradual transformation of the agent 
whereby generosity becomes a natural expression of one's engagement in the world is the 
principal goal.  When Śāntideva considers the moral value of a particular act, his primary 
                                                
8 ādau śākādidāne ’pi niyojayati nāyakaḥ | tat karoti kramāt paścād yat svamāṃsāny api tyajet ||VII: 
25|| yadā śākeṣv iva prajñā svamāṃse ’py upajāyate | māṃsāsthi tyajatas tasya tadā kiṃ nāma duḥkaram 
||VII: 26|| tshod ma la sogs sbyin pa la’ang // ‘dren pas thog mar sbyor bar mdzad // de la goms nas phyi 
nas ni // rim gyis rang gi sha yang gtong // gang tshe rang gi lus la ni // tshod sogs lta bu’i blo skyes pa // 
de tshe sha la sogs gtong ba // de la dka’ ba ci zhig yod // (Toh. 3871, 21a). 
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concern is the mental status of the agent, something that is irrelevant for and does not feature in 
the calculations of act-consequentialism.  
This emphasis on the mental domain is fundamental to Śāntideva's account of Buddhist 
ethics.  To exclude this aspect is to misrepresent his ethical system.  This is evident in 
Śāntideva's definition of key moral terms and concepts.  For instance, his ethical emphasis on 
mental states is explicit in the way he defines the perfection of generosity (dānapāramitā): 
If one perfected generosity only upon having eliminated poverty from the world, then 
since there are destitute people in the world even now, how could the previous Protectors 
have perfected it? 
 
The perfection of generosity is stated as the thought to give to all beings the entirety of 
one’s possessions together with one’s karmic fruit.  Thus, it is simply a state of mind. (V: 
9-10)9 
 
Here again, the focus is not on external consequences, but on a transformation of the internal 
experience of the agent in a way that also transforms one's experience of the world.  Similarly, 
Śāntideva defines the perfection of moral discipline (śīlapāramitā) as a mental state:  
Where could fish and so forth be taken such that they would not be killed?  But when one 
has obtained the thought to cease [killing and so forth], that is considered the perfection 
of moral discipline. (V: 11)10   
 
This idea that the transformation of mind supersedes external deeds and consequences is central 
to Śāntideva's ethics and is captured in his famed metaphor:  
How could one possibly find enough leather to cover the earth?  Yet, with just the leather 
on the soles of one’s shoes, it is as if the entire earth were covered. 
 
                                                
9 adaridraṃ jagat kṛtvā dānapāramitā yadi | jagaddaridram adyāpi sā kathaṃ pūrvatāyinām 
||V:9|| phalena saha sarvasvatyāgacittāj jane ’khile | dānapāramitā proktā tasmāt sā cittam eva tu 
||V:10|| gal te ‘gro ba dbul bor nas // sbyin pa’i pha rol phyin yin na // da rung ‘gro bkren yod na sngon // 
skyob pa ji ltar pha rol phyin // bdog pa thams cad ’bras bcas te // skye bo kun la btang sems kyis // sbyin 
pa’i pha rol phyin gsungs te // de ltas de ni sems nyid do // (Toh. 3871, 10b). 
10 matsyādayaḥ kva nīyantāṃ mārayeyaṃ yato na tān | labdhe viraticitte tu śīlapāramitā matā ||V: 
11|| nya la sogs pa gang zhig tu // de dag gsod mi ‘gyur bar bskrad //  spong ba’i sems ni thob pa las // 
tshul khrims pha rol phyin par bshad // (Toh. 3871, 10b). 
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Likewise, although I cannot restrain the course of external affairs, I can restrain my own 
mind.  What need would there then be to restrain anything else? (V: 13-14)11 
 
Whenever Śāntideva discusses morality, as seen in these verses on guarding ethical conduct and 
developing virtues, at the heart of the discussion is the content of the agent's mental experience, 
and when he addresses moral development, he describes a transformation of the agent's 
experience of the world.  Whenever we see Buddhist texts promoting demanding actions, as in 
the early Buddhist Jātaka tales and Śāntideva’s advices, we see that the focus is on the inner life 
of the agent rather than the causes.  Goodman also cites the Buddhist practice of the transfer of 
merit (pariṇāmanā) as evidence of the demanding actions required in consequentialist ethical 
systems; so next I will demonstrate that in the case of this practice, too, the emphasis is not on 
consequences, but on the moral phenomenology of the agent. 
2.1.3 Dedication: Transference or Transformation?  
As evidence of consequentialism, Goodman draws from Śāntideva's dedicatory verses not 
only examples of demanding activities such as self-sacrifice, but also the activity of the 
dedication of merit.  Pariṇāmanā is a concept in Buddhist Mahāyāna texts which is usually 
translated as "merit transfer" or "dedication of merit."12  It refers to the wish that others receive 
the benefit of one's own accumulated merit (puṇya).  Goodman (2009) argues that Śāntideva's 
invocation of pariṇāmanā undermines a eudaimonist interpretation of Śāntideva's ethics, and is 
instead an example of one of the major characteristics of utilitarian consequentialism, the 
                                                
11 bhūmiṃ chādayituṃ sarvāṃ kutaś carma bhaviṣyati | upānaccarmamātreṇa channā bhavati medinī 
||V:13|| bāhyā bhāvā mayā tadvac chakyā vārayituṃ na hi | svacittaṃ vārayiṣyāmi kiṃ mamānyair 
nivāritaiḥ ||V:14|| sa stengs ‘di dag kos g.yogs su // de snyed ko bas ga la lang // lham mthil tsam gyi ko 
bas ni // sa stengs thams cad g.yogs dang ‘dra // de bzhin phyi rol dṅos po yang // bdag gis phyir bzlog mi 
lang gi // bdag gi sems ’di phyir bzlog bya’i // gzhan rnams bzlog go ci zhig dgos // (Toh. 3871, 10b). 
12 For a discussion on the development of pariṇāmanā and its relation to Theravada Buddhism, see 
Clayton, 2006, p. 81. 
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balancing of one's own interest against the interests of others in the pursuit of maximizing the 
good (p. 92).  
In making his argument that merit transfer is evidence for a consequentialist reading of 
Śāntideva's ethics, Goodman quotes from chapter three of Śāntideva's How to Lead an Awakened 
Life, which treats the topics of merit accumulation and generosity:   
May I avert the pain of hunger and thirst with showers of food and drink.  May I become 
both drink and food in the intermediate aeons of famine.  
 
May I be an inexhaustible treasure for impoverished beings.  May I wait upon them with 
various forms of offering.  
 
See, I give up without regret my bodies, my pleasures, and my good acquired in all three 
times, to accomplish good for every being. (III:8-10, as cited in Goodman, 2009, p. 90)13 
 
Goodman suggests that these verses on dedicating merit provide evidence of promoting others' 
well being above one's own and the type of demands that the universalist consequentialist 
approach may require of the agent.  In III:10, Śāntideva specifically refers to giving up his good 
(puṇya), which Goodman interprets as the bodhisattva intending to actually transfer his merit to 
others, something that might not fit neatly into an ethical system that promotes the well being or 
experiential development of the agent.  I will argue that these dedicatory verses do not imply a 
belief in actual merit transfer, but instead represent an aspirational state of mind to be cultivated 
by the bodhisattva. 
 An obvious objection to this reading of Śāntideva as consequentialist based on his 
account of merit transfer is that the notion that someone could actually transfer his or her 
accumulated merit to another contravenes the traditional Buddhist understanding of the operation 
                                                
13 From Crosby and Skilton's translation of Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra (1995, p. 20). Note that there is 
a difference in the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions of this text. In the Tibetan, the verses cited here are 9, 
10, and 11, while in the Sanskrit they are 8, 9, and 10. 
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of karma.  Udbhaṭasiddhasvāmin's Praise of the Exalted One (Viśeṣastava) (which opens the 
Tibetan Tengyur) states,  
The brahmins say that virtue and sin may transfer to others – like giving and 
receiving a gift.  You [O Buddha] taught that what one has done does not perish 
and that one does not meet with the effects of what one has not done.14 
 
The Buddha criticized the brahmins of his time who made a living based on the belief that they 
could perform ceremonies on the behalf of others, thereby increasing others' merit and providing 
them benefit. As the following quote from the King of Concentration Sūtra (Samādhirāja Sūtra) 
indicates, the Buddha taught that a person can only experience the results of his or her own 
actions: “Further, once you have committed an action, you will experience its effect; And you 
will not experience the effects of what others have done.”15  Śāntideva was well aware of this 
sūtra and of the standard Buddhist position on karma as non-transferrable.16  It is improbable 
then, that in his dedicatory verses of How to Lead an Awakened Life, Śāntideva is contending 
that others can actually receive his merit or that he could truly take on the suffering of the world.  
A literal understanding of merit transfer is all the more unlikely given the wording of III:10 
wherein Śāntideva wishes to transfer his merit of the three times.  Clearly, this must be read as an 
aspiration, since future merit is non-existent.  Moreover, if Śāntideva had intended these 
statements literally, this would imply that he thought that all the previous and current Buddhas 
and bodhisattvas had failed in this endeavor of the transfer of their presumably limitless merit 
since the suffering of beings persists.  Instead, for Buddhist, merit accumulation and moral 
development is the agent's responsibility.  It is not something that can be bestowed on someone 
like a boon.   
                                                
14 As cited in Tsongkhapa, 2000, p. 214. 
15 As cited in Tsongkhapa, 2000, p. 214. 
16 Śāntideva cites a story from the Samādhirāja Sūtra in Chapter Eight, verse 106 of his Bodhicaryāvatāra 
in addition to referencing the sūtra twenty times in his Śikśasamuccaya. 
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Clayton (2005) has explained that in Śāntideva's Compendium of Teachings, the function 
of the transfer of merit is to protect the merit.  She explains that in this text, Śāntideva lays out a 
nine-fold process, wherein the three tasks of guarding, purifying, and cultivating (rakṣā, śuddhi, 
vardhana), are each applied to three phenomena, the body, possessions, and merit (ātmabhāva, 
bhoga, śubha) (p. 2).  Interestingly, the three phenomena mentioned here are also the three items 
that Śāntideva dedicates in III:10 of his How to Lead an Awakened Life discussed above.17  
Clayton explains that the way that a bodhisattva guards his or her own merit is through the 
mental aspiration of dedicating it to others. She argues,   
It is also evident that for Śāntideva the essence of protecting (rakṣā) puṇya is 
bodhipariṇāmanā, the transference of merit-the fortunate results of one's deeds-to all 
beings, for the sake of their awakening (158.6; BR 156). Since the motive behind an act 
determines to a large extent the amount of karmic benefit that arises, naturally if the 
motive is to give the benefits to others, the karmic fortune will be “protected.” (p. 3) 
 
The fact that Śāntideva regards the mental aspiration of the "transfer of merit" as a way of 
guarding one's own merit indicates that he does not have in mind a literal transfer of merit in 
these dedicatory verses.  Not only is dedication of merit not considered a literal transfer of merit, 
but pariṇāmanā as an aspiration is actually a means by which one increases the karmic benefit to 
oneself. 
Another way to interpret pariṇāmanā is that a bodhisattva aspiring for awakening is 
instructed to imagine giving away the merit gained from his good deeds – not in the hope that it 
will somehow ripens for another, but so that the bodhisattva does not develop attachment to the 
gains that the merit might bring for himself.  In this way the merit is protected from ripening as 
worldly pleasure via craving, and instead contributes to the bodhisattva's development of non-
attachment and compassion.  For both the Compendium of Teachings and How to Lead an 
                                                
17 Clayton translates ātmabhāva, bhoga, śubha as respectively "one's self," "one's possessions," and "one's 
welfare."  Here I have used the common translation for ātmabhāva as "body" and śubha as "merit." 
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Awakened Life, the culmination of the explanation of the bodhisattva's path is a chapter on the 
dedication of merit, suggesting that the achievement of such a mental state plays an important 
role in the fulfillment of the bodhisattva path.  
The notion that the dedication and protection of merit are an experiential transformation 
of the way the agent approaches acting in the world rather than an actual exchange or 
transference of merit from the bodhisattva to another finds support in Nagao's work on the 
etymology of the Sanskrit word pariṇāmanā and the Tibetan equivalent sngo ba.  Nagao (1991) 
explains that the verbal root from which this noun derives "pari √ṇam means 'to bend,' 'to 
change,' 'to develop,' 'to become ripe,' and so forth when used in an intransitive sense," and the 
Tibetan equivalent for this verbal form, 'gyur ba, also suggests an act of transformation (p. 83).   
He notes that the nominal form pariṇāmanā is translated in Tibetan as sngo ba, which is 
interpreted, "yid kyis mos pa byed pa," referring to the mind making an aspiration or wish (p. 
83).  Taking this into account, although the common translation into English has been dedication 
or transfer of merit, Nagao postulates that translators have been "influenced by the Chinese 
translation and thus diverged from the fundamental meanings that are given in dictionaries" (p. 
84).  The dedication of merit, pariṇāmanā, represents more an aspiration than a giving away, and 
in this way is best understood as mental activity of the agent.  The dedication of merit is a moral 
practice now, rather than a hope to be moral in the future. 
If we look back at the dedication verses that Goodman quotes (III: 8-10) in context, we 
find that immediately after making these dedications, Śāntideva describes bodhicitta, the 
bodhisattva's motivational state (III: 22-24).18   This context suggests that the previous dedication 
verses were aspirations developed as part of the process of generating this particular mental state.  
                                                
18 These verses in Chapter Three became an important part of a ceremony in Tibetan Buddhism focused 
on generating this moral state called the awakened mind. 
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Śāntideva then describes strengthening this mental state by contemplating that "Today my life 
has (borne) fruit... I've been born into the family of the Buddha," and by making a commitment 
that this mental state shall guide all his future actions (III: 26).19 Seen within the larger logic of 
the chapter, these dedications are not a description of the actual transfer of merit, but of the 
development of the motivational state of a bodhisattva. 
In the verses III: 8-10 quoted by Goodman, Śāntideva's dedication is personal.  He writes 
in the first person, clearly expressing an aspiration rather than a call to action.  This aspiration 
represents the motivational state with which a bodhisattva should approach the world, and it is 
designed to reinforce positive mental states such as compassion and generosity rather than 
negative ones such as selfishness and greed.  Goodman acknowledges that his interpretation of 
Śāntideva's dedication as a transference of merit contradicts the traditional view of karma, 
however, he contends that to read these dedication verses in this traditional way is incorrect.  To 
demonstrate why such a reading of Śāntideva is mistaken, he quotes the following dedicatory 
verses from Chapter Ten:  
Through my merit may all those in any of the directions suffering distress in body or 
mind find oceans of happiness and delight.  
 
By this merit of mine may all beings without exception desist from every evil deed and 
always act skillfully. (X: 2-3, as cited in Goodman, 2008, p. 23)20 
 
These verses, he suggests, are indications that when Śāntideva is describing the act of dedication, 
what he has in mind is that his own merit be transferred to others so that they benefit. Any doubt 
that this is the case, he maintains, should be alleviated by the final verse in this chapter, a verse 
he describes as driving this point home “like a sledge hammer”:  
                                                
19 Trans. Batchelor, 1999. 
20 From Crosby and Skilton's translation of Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra (1995, 138, 141). 
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Whatever suffering is in store for the world, may it all ripen in me.  May the world find 
happiness through the pure deeds of the Bodhisattvas. (X: 56, as cited in Goodman, 2008, 
p. 23).21   
 
Goodman argues that this verse provides clear evidence that Śāntideva places the welfare of all 
sentient beings above the welfare and also the development of the agent.  There is not, that I am 
aware of, a Buddhist account that treats pariṇāmanā as an actual transfer of merit; but even if we 
were to accept that this is actually the intention of these verses, and that Śāntideva places the 
benefit of others ahead of himself, receiving a transfer of demerit, this still falls short of 
demonstrating a universalist consequentialist approach because it is agent-relative rather than 
agent-neutral.  Who experiences suffering counts.  There is again no mention of reducing the 
total amount of suffering.  Here, Śāntideva is not describing a case of balancing by taking on a 
small amount of suffering in order to ensure the removal of some greater amount of suffering.  
Śāntideva is not proposing an agent-neutral perspective in which those who have the capacity for 
taking on more suffering ought to take on the suffering of others who would experience the pain 
more intensely.  Instead, Śantideva is resolving to take on the suffering, so that others are 
relieved of it.  The amount of suffering remains the same. 
 Garfield offers an alternate reading to Goodman of the dedication of merit in Chapters 
Three and Ten, explaining them to be descriptions of moral states.  He comments that "to take 
these to be the expression of a kind of consequentialism would be to take them seriously out of 
context, and to miss the heart of Śāntideva's account" (Garfield, 2011, p. 3).  To completely 
appreciate Garfield's observation requires an understanding of the structure of the text, and to 
this end the first verse of Chapter Nine is pivotal.  Śāntideva writes, 
The Sage taught all of these matters 
For the sake of wisdom. 
                                                
21 From Crosby and Skilton's translation of Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra (1995, 143). 
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Therefore, if one wishes to avoid suffering, 
And to attain peace, one should cultivate wisdom.  
(IX: 1, as cited in Garfield, 2011, p. 21) 
 
Garfield, comparing the dedicatory verses in Chapters Three and Ten, observes that there is a 
shift in the emphasis away from the agent precipitated by the development of wisdom.  He notes 
that in the verses from Chapter Three, "the generosity [Śāntideva] imagines cultivating involves 
depersonalizing his own motivations and developing a commitment to benefit all beings in direct 
material ways," while in Chapter Ten, "Śāntideva is now depersonalizing not only his ends, but 
his own state of being" (p. 9-10).  Garfield frames this experiential shift with the two types of 
bodhicitta, aspirational bodhicitta and engaged bodhicitta.  He notes, "the generosity embodied in 
aspirational bodhicitta is personal, taking as its intentional object my own contribution to the 
welfare of the world; the generosity embodied in engaged bodhicitta is impersonal, taking as its 
intentional object only the benefit of others, with my achievements, not myself serving as its 
condition" (p. 11).   
The more explicit focus in the verses from Chapter Ten on a transformation of the world 
rather than of the person, then, is not further evidence that the dedications in Chapter Three 
should be read as consequentialist as Goodman would argue, but instead as a contrast between 
two moral states demonstrating the morally transformative power that the realization of wisdom 
has upon the agent.  What Goodman sees as evidence of consequentialism is rather a description 
of the depersonalization of the moral experience.  Śāntideva emphasizes not the consequences of 
actions, but the first person experience of engaging in ethical activity.  Aspirations themselves 
become a practice of ethics because they are actively transforming the moral experience.  
Understanding moral development as a transformation of one's engagement with the world 
serves as the foundation for building a structure of Śāntideva's moral theory.  
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These verses on dedication, therefore, do not show that Śāntideva is consequentialist; 
given that the traditional account of the transfer of merit is a figurative aspiration, these verses 
should be read as describing a motivational state that functions to counteract selfishness.  The 
aspiration is extreme not because of an ethical approach that is agent-neutral, but because it is 
designed to counteract selfishness which is ordinarily pervasive and powerful.  The dedication of 
merit is an example of a means of transforming the view of self and self-grasping, a 
transformation which is at the heart of Śāntideva’s ethics.  The practice of dedication supports 
the development of wisdom in an aspiring bodhisattva, and then becomes the spontaneous ethical 
expression of a bodhisattva who has realized wisdom.  Later in chapter five, I further examine 
Śāntideva’s view on merit in the context of the accumulation of merit and his concept of the field 
of merit (puṇya kṣetra).  It is evident, I will argue, that for Śāntideva the concept of merit –
whether the dedication of merit or the accumulation of merit – primarily pertains to the mental 
state, and in particular to the attitude of the agent.  For Śāntideva, ethical value resides in the 
mental domain, in any physical or verbal action itself or their consequences. 
 So far, I have responded to arguments that cite particular Buddhist ethical practices as 
evidence for the assertion that Buddhist ethics is consequentialist.   I have demonstrated that 
none of them are sound.   Instead, the ethical concern in these practices is primarily with the 
mental domain and in particular with how one takes up the world.  Another prominent argument 
for Buddhist ethics as consequentialist focuses on the Buddhist metaphysical position that there 
is no self.  The understanding of the ontology of agents and its relation to action theory is of 
course relevant to ethics, and modern scholars have reasoned that the Buddhist metaphysical 
position of selflessness forces Buddhist ethics to conform to a consequentialist approach.  In the 
next section, I will examine a number of those arguments, aiming to demonstrate instead that the 
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Buddhist metaphysical position does not commit Buddhism to a consequentialist ethical position, 
but instead highlights the relationship between epistemology and Buddhist moral 
phenomenology. 
2.2 An Approach to Compassion: Metaphysical or Psychological? 
Goodman, Williams, and Siderits all argue not only that Śāntideva is in fact committed to 
univeralist consequentialism, but also that Śāntideva's metaphysical position commits him to a 
universalist consequentialist ethics rather than a type of virtue ethics.  I will first consider 
Goodman’s argument and then turn to that of Williams. 
Goodman (2008) contends that commitment to the personal development emphasized in 
virtue ethics is inconsistent with the Buddhist metaphysical position, whose most important tenet 
is the rejection of the existence of self, and that a commitment to universalist consequentialism 
follows from the doctrine of selflessness.  He sees an agent-neutral approach represented in How 
to Lead an Awakened Life when Śāntideva argues for not distinguishing between oneself and 
other on the grounds of selflessness. 
 Goodman draws on the work of Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons, in which a 
metaphysical position, one that critically deconstructs the notion of personal identity, is used to 
support an agent-neutral and consequentialist view towards ethics.  Parfit's reductionist views of 
person and their implications for ethics, Goodman suggests, look strikingly similar to Śāntideva's 
introduction of the Buddhist concept of no-self (anātman) into the moral discussion.  Goodman 
(2008) claims, "In both cases, the author starts with a view that is a version of the no-self 
doctrine, and attempts to use this view to defend an ethics of self-sacrifice for the good of all 
sentient beings" (p. 24).  
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Goodman argues that the position of no-self entails the agent-neutrality of 
consequentialism, since it involves the commitment to seeing the divisions between ourselves 
and others as no more significant than the difference between our present and future selves.  
Parfit, based on his metaphysical position that questions the significance of the idea of persons 
and the divisions between them, argues that the irrationality of participating in actions that 
benefit me in the short term but hurt me in the long term equally applies to participating in 
actions that benefit myself but are harmful to others.  Śāntideva says something similar in the 
eighth chapter of his How to Lead an Awakened Life: 
If I give them no protection because their suffering does not afflict me,  
why do I protect my body against future suffering when it does not afflict me?  
 
If you think it is for the person who has the pain to guard against it,  
a pain in the foot is not of the hand, so why is the one protected by the other? 
(VIII: 97, 99, as cited in Goodman, 2008, p. 24)22 
 
Here Śāntideva gives two arguments to undermine our resistance to helping others, one spatial 
and the other temporal.  He asks, if the reason for not protecting others from pain is because I do 
not feel their pain, then why do I work against my future suffering, since the present "I" does not 
experience it?  The spatial argument is similar, asking, why does the hand help the foot when it is 
the foot's pain, not the hand's?  Śāntideva is not invoking the doctrine of selflessness in order to 
argue that it is irrational to distinguish between self and other; this passage is not meant to 
convey an ethical imperative based on a metaphysical premise, but to point out the inconsistency 
in our approach to ours and others' pain. 
Śāntideva does not question the rationality of the distinction between self and other, but 
rather the significance of the distinction.  There is a distinction between the hand and foot, but 
that distinction is not significant when the hand relieves the foot's pain.  Similarly, Śāntideva 
                                                
22 From Crosby and Skilton's translation of Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra (1995, p. 96). 
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does not argue that there is no distinction between self and other, but that the distinction is not 
significant when considering whether or not to help others in pain.   
Śāntideva points out that the experience of a distinction between ourselves and others 
arises from our strong identification with such things as our bodies and future selves.  It is this 
identification that demarcates our circumference of concern.  He suggests that our identification 
with things is not fixed but expandable.  His point is not that we should act without selfishness 
because there is no metaphysical difference between self and other.  Instead, he maintains that 
through identifying more closely with others by, for example, relating to them on the level that 
they also want happiness and don't want suffering, we could naturally become less selfish.  
Śāntideva emphasizes the expandability of one's circumference of concern.  If Śāntideva's 
audience had been broader than a gathering of monks, he may well have argued that although 
mothers and babies are distinct persons, the maternal instinct to protect one's child is an example 
of an experiential extension of the conception of self to include another.  Śāntideva asserts that it 
is possible to identify with all beings, similar to the way that a mother includes her child within 
her identity.  In this way we can overcome the personal selfishness that he believes is the cause 
for our disturbing mental states such as greed, pride, and jealousy, and instead cultivate 
wholesome mental states such as generosity, love, and compassion.   
While Goodman’s metaphysical argument for consequentialism is secondary to and 
merely supportive of his arguments based on demanding moral obligations and agent neutrality, 
Williams’ arguments that Buddhist ethics is consequentialist focus primarily on Śāntideva’s text, 
and, in particular, on how his metaphysical position leads directly to ethical consequentialism.  I 
will now turn to these arguments to demonstrate that a close reading of Śāntideva’s text 
reinforces my assertion above that Śāntideva’s ethical concern is the agent’s moral psychology, 
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and that the goal of Śāntideva’s metaphysical arguments is to transform the how the agent sees 
the world, rather than to provide the rationale for a demanding moral obligation.  
2.3 The status of persons and its implications for Śāntideva's ethics 
     In this section, I examine verses from the Guide to Awakened Living in which 
Śāntideva encourages people to act to remove others’ suffering based on an examination of pains 
and their owners.  Williams and Siderits provide interpretations of these verses that present 
Śāntideva as promoting the agent neutral approach that characterizes universalist 
consequentialism.  I will argue that an agent neutral ethical position need not follow from 
Śāntideva’s use of the doctrine of selflessness; instead, Śāntideva is emphasizing the importance 
of the agent in terms of his or her attitude towards others.  I will demonstrate that a close reading 
of these verses reveals Śāntideva to be contrasting two particular outlooks on the world, one that 
is characterized by selfishness and confusion and the other that is characterized by compassion.  
This investigation will give further insight into how Śāntideva’s ethics is primarily concerned 
with the way we perceive the world rather than with the consequences of our actions.    
Williams (1998) has suggested that Śāntideva, based on his metaphysical position which 
rejects the existence of a self (ātman), is committed to consequentialism.  Williams claims that 
Śāntideva argues that the "ought" of unselfishness follows from the "is" of no-self, an inference 
that Williams finds incoherent.  He refers to the following argument that Śāntideva makes in 
Chapter Eight of How to Lead an Awakened Life, 
A continuant and a collective--such as a [caste] row (paṅkti) or an army--are fictions 
(mṛṣā).  The one of whom there is pain (duḥkha) does not exist.  Therefore of whom will 
there be ownership of that?  
 
Pains without an owner are all indeed without distinction because of its quality as pain 
indeed it is to be prevented.  What limitation can be made there?  
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If one asks why pain is to be prevented (Tib.: 'pain of all is to be prevented'), it is 
[accepted] (Skt.: 'by all') without dispute /If it is to be prevented, all also is thus. If not, 
oneself also is like (other beings). (VIII: 101-103, as cited in Williams, 1998, pp. 105-6) 
 
Śāntideva's argument, according to Williams, seems to go like this:  
(i) the person who is thought to have pain is a fiction similar to an aggregate that is 
formed from a collection of parts or a continuum of moments.  
(ii) Pains, therefore, cannot be distinguished among based upon their owners.  
(iii) This then undermines the notion that my pains alone should be removed because they 
hurt me.  
(iv) The only justification for removing pains then is because they hurt.  
(v) All pains should be removed because they all hurt. 
Williams (1998) calls this position the "universal thesis," and he sees this as Śāntideva's 
attempt "to move directly from wisdom--insight into how things are--to morality through rational 
consistency, an argument directly from the Buddhist ontological insight to altruism" (p. 107).  
However, he believes that the argument for Śāntideva's "universal thesis" is logically 
inconsistent, and that it is a "triumph of rhetoric over reason," being as "noble as it is incoherent" 
(p. 107).  He goes so far as to say that Śāntideva's "argument is fatal to the Buddhist path and to 
the bodhisattva's project of concern for others" (p. 107).  
Williams offers two different readings of premise (i): we can understand persons as 
fictions to mean that either persons do not exist at all, or that they exist only conventionally.  
Williams sees either reading as problematic for Śāntideva.  If we read premise (i) as negating 
only a real person and so allowing a person to exist conventionally, then Williams believes that – 
consequence (ii) – pains are indistinguishable based upon owners, does not follow, and then the 
argument for compassion does not work.  Williams (1998) argues that to assert a conventional 
 58 
self allows one to make a distinction between different selves and such a distinction, albeit a 
conventional distinction, provides a basis for someone to prioritize the needs of oneself above 
those of others, and thus is a basis for selfishness, not compassion (p. 110)  
For Śāntideva's argument to succeed, Williams argues, we must read Śāntideva in 
premise (i) to assert the complete non-existence of persons.  It would then follow that (ii) pains 
are indistinguishable based upon owners.  However, this reading, as Williams points out, would 
place Śāntideva at odds with fundamental Buddhist doctrines such as karma and rebirth that 
require persons to exist conventionally.  It also carries the added difficulty of explaining how 
subjectless pains and their removal could be meaningful.  
This dilemma proposed by Williams hinges on how to best understand the notion of 
"fiction" (mṛṣā) in the first premise.  The first horn of the dilemma requires that we understand 
fiction to mean conventionally existent, while the second horn of the dilemma takes it to mean 
non-existent.  Williams has argued that for Śāntideva's argument to work, persons, owners of 
pains, must be completely non-existent.  I will argue that Śāntideva's metaphysical position is 
clearly one that endorses a conventionally existent person, but that this is not fatal for the 
argument.  This is because premise (ii) requires revision: Śāntideva does not propose that we 
cannot distinguish pains based on their owners, but instead that we should not distinguish pains 
based on their owners.   
When Śāntideva describes owners of pains in the verses above, he does not describe them 
as non-existent, but uses the Sanskrit term "mṛṣā," which Williams translates as fictions, but 
might also be translated as "false" or "misleading."  This latter translation captures the 
epistemological connotation of the argument.  Śāntideva uses this term "mṛṣā" six other times in 
this text, and it is clear from these occurrences that he intends this term not to signify non-
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existent things, but to describe all ordinary phenomena from persons to pains.23  For example, it 
is evident from verse six of Chapter Nine that he considers both objects of thought as well as 
objects of sense perception to be false (mṛṣā).  Śāntideva states, “Even perception such as that of 
form [is established] through consensus, not from a valid source of knowledge.  It is false just 
like the consensus that [sees] pure things and the like in impure things” (IX: 6).24  Here 
Śāntideva describes even the perception of visual objects as "mṛṣā," so obviously this term is not 
meant to signify an ontological distinction between real perceptual things and unreal conceptual 
things.  So, in what sense does "mṛṣā" signify false, if not in the sense of real and unreal?  In the 
above verse, Śāntideva explains that perceptions such as those of visual forms are mṛṣā in the 
sense that they are not based upon a valid source of knowledge.  When Śāntideva refers to a 
"valid source of knowledge" (pramāṇa) here, he is using it in a narrow sense to refer to the 
perspective of a correct metaphysical understanding, one that sees all things including persons 
and pains to be empty of any essence.  Since these objects are misapprehended to have an 
essence, Śāntideva considers the perception of them to be false (mṛṣā).  It is in this way that both 
pains and persons are false, or to use Williams' language, fictions. 
For Śāntideva, simply because all ordinary phenomena are fictional in this sense does not 
mean that they do not exist.  Śāntideva follows the Madhyamaka, or Middle Way, metaphysical 
view of Nāgārjuna who in his most important metaphysical text, The Fundamental Wisdom of 
the Middle Way (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā), classifies deceptive phenomena (moṣadharma) as 
mrṣa and describes those deceptive things not as non-existent, but as compounded phenomena 
(saṃskāra) (XIII: 1).  For Nāgārjuna, ordinary phenomena like people and pains are not non-
                                                
23 See How to Lead an Awakened Life, II:12, IX:6, IX:89, IX:139, IX:140, IX:141. 
24 pratyakṣamapi rūpādi prasiddhyā na pramāṇataḥ | aśucyādiṣu śucyādiprasiddhiriva sā mṛṣā ||IX: 
6|| gzugs sogs mngon sum nyid kyang ni // grags pas yin gyi tshad mas min // de ni mi gtsang la sogs la // 
gtsang sogs grags pa bzhin du brdzun // (Toh. 3871, 31a). 
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existent, but exist in dependence upon their parts and causes.  They are described as false (mrṣa) 
because, although existing dependently, they appear to exist independently (XIII: 2).  Clearly, 
Nāgārjuna regards these false phenomena as existent in some way, for otherwise it would be 
meaningless to describe them as deceptive.  Candrakīrti also describes ordinary phenomena as 
false.  In the sixth chapter of his Entering the Middle Way (Madhyamakāvatāra), a commentary 
on Nāgārjuna's The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, he explains that all phenomena 
bear two realities (Tib. bden pa gnyis, San. satyadvaya), and that other than the ultimate reality, 
emptiness of essence, all phenomena although conventionally real, are seen in a false way.  
Again, the point here is not only metaphysical, but also epistemological.  Candrakīrti explains 
that things seen in a false way are divided by the world into existent and non-existent things (VI: 
24).  For Mādhyamikas such as Śāntideva, Nāgārjuna, and Candrakīrti, all ordinary things, 
including people and pains, are seen in a false way but this does not amount to their non-
existence.   
To interpret Śāntideva as committed to a view in which there are not even conventional 
persons forces him into an extreme of nihilism that in other parts of his text he is careful to 
avoid.25  While it is meaningless to talk about the characteristics of non-existent things, such as 
the size of a rabbit's horn, we can, however, coherently speak of the conventional criteria of 
things such as armies and persons.  For example, we can talk about the size of an army and the 
length of a row. Although they are constructions, they exist and are meaningful; they have 
properties and perform functions.  For Śāntideva, we can talk intelligently about owners of 
sensations; however, I will argue below that Śāntideva's point here is that simply because we can 
                                                
25 For example, in IX: 10: "Even an illusion will arise for as long as its collection of conditions remains. 
How could it be that sentient beings exist truly merely in virtue of the fact that they remain longer."  yāvat 
pratyayasāmagrī tāvan māyāpi vartate | dīrghasaṃtānamātreṇa kathaṃ sattvo ’sti satyataḥ ||IX: 10|| ji 
srid rkyen rnams ’tshogs gyur pa // de srid sgyu ma’ang ’byung bar ’gyur // rgyun ring tsam gyis ji ltar 
na // sems can bden par yod pa yin // (Toh. 3871, 31a). 
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distinguish between pains based on their owners does not give us a rational basis for prioritizing 
our own pains over others'.  First I will evaluate Siderits' proposed solution to Williams' 
dilemma.  
Siderits (2000) disagrees with Williams, arguing that we can understand that the fictional 
person in premise (i) does not deny the conventional existence of persons and still arrive at 
premise (ii), that pains are indistinguishable.  To do this, he argues, requires reading Śāntideva as 
making an ontological distinction between persons and pains.  Siderits claims, "What Śāntideva's 
argument does require is that pains also be ultimately real, but that persons are not" (p. 419).  
Siderits further proposes the Buddhist reductionist position that what is ultimately true is 
"completely impersonal: one can only speak of skandhas (or better yet, dharmas), not of the 
persons who are thought to 'have' these bodily and mental states" (p. 414). While persons do not 
exist ultimately, pains, he argues, do, and since persons only exist conventionally, then, from an 
ultimate perspective, pains are not distinguishable based on their owners.  Siderits states, "There 
is, ultimately, no one who suffers; there is just suffering, associated with this and that 
psychophysical element, occurring in this and that causal series" (p. 415).  He contends that the 
person who has pain only conventionally exists based upon the real existence of subjectless 
pains.  
If we accept that ultimate pains are bad and should be removed, Siderits argues, then 
persons, although not ultimately existent, are still a useful convention which can affect the 
ultimate level, the level that presumably counts, to reduce pain.  Siderits (2000) claims that, the 
thinking of "I" is just a "useful device for realizing the ultimate (impersonal) goal of maximizing 
overall welfare" (p. 416).  Although ultimately there is no one suffering, the convention of 
person helps to achieve the minimizing of suffering, since it is instrumental in the lessening of 
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pain in distinct causal series.  Importantly, although the convention "person" functions to 
eliminate pain in a distinct causal series, from the ultimate perspective, the idea of "my pain" is 
meaningless.  What is important is not whose pain is removed but how much total pain is 
reduced.  
Siderits argues that in Chapter Eight, Śāntideva recognizes that the me-convention can be 
improved upon so as to reduce the total amount of pain in the world.  This is a consequentialist 
reading of Śāntideva.  Here pains ultimately exist and an increase in well-being means the 
reduction of the total amount of pains in the world.  Siderits (2000) sees Śāntideva arguing that, 
"[i]t would be rational to persist in the practice of privileging self-interested concern only if it 
could be shown that this practice results in less overall suffering than any other" (p. 416).  
Siderits understands Śāntideva to be positing a better way to think about persons so as to 
maximize overall utility.  That better way is the bodhisattva path, one which takes on the 
responsibility to remove not just one's own pains, but all pains.  
If the me-construction is adjusted so that it identifies with and takes on the responsibility 
of removing others' pains, then this will result in a reduction of the amount of ultimately existent 
pains in the world.  Having made this argument, Śāntideva gives mental exercises, so that 
practitioners might improve their me-construction and develop the bodhisattva's attitude.  
Siderits (2000) explains, "just as the child can learn to identify with past and future elements in a 
causal series—to anticipate that future pain, to feel shame at that past action—so the aspirant to 
enlightenment can learn to identify with suffering occurring in distinct causal series" (p. 415).  
Siderits's account, while allowing for a conventional agent, still makes the case for a 
consequentialist reading on the grounds that the agent is of only instrumental value, since the 
moral significance of the agent derives from its usefulness in maximizing the good, which is the 
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reduction of real pains in the world.  In making his case for a consequentialist reading of 
Śāntideva, Siderits attributes positions to Śāntideva that seem to contradict the positions he takes 
up in other parts of his text.  While William's consequentialist reading of Śāntideva requires that 
he reject persons even conventionally, Siderits requires Śāntideva to posit real pains.  I will argue 
that Śāntideva does not make such an ontological distinctions between pains and persons, and I 
will demonstrate that Śāntideva focuses primarily on mental states rather than consequences, and 
that my reading has the advantage of being consistent with the metaphysical views Śāntideva 
expresses in the rest of his text.  
Siderits’ reading of Śāntideva, like those of Goodman and Williams discussed above, 
overlooks the primarily phenomenological concerns with which Śāntideva is occupied.  In doing 
so, Siderits reads Śāntideva as asserting pains to be ultimately existent, and consequently 
concludes that pains and persons exist on different ontological levels.  This focus on 
consequences and pains misses Śāntideva's main point, which is a phenomenological description 
of the mistaken way in which we think about ourselves and the irrational self-biases that this 
wrong thinking generates. 
Both Siderits’ argument and William's first argument require that pains are real in a way 
that persons are not.  They both necessitate a scenario in which pains and selves occupy different 
ontological levels.  Contrary to these interpretations, Śāntideva never argues that while selves are 
unreal, free floating pains exist.  To do this would require Śāntideva to take up an Abhidharmika 
spin on the two truths.  In the Abhidharma presentation, selves are fictionally existent wholes 
imputed on their really existent parts of body, consciousness, feeling, and other mental factors.  
For them, selves and pains are placed in ontologically different categories.  Selves are fictions 
while pains are real.  
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To read Śāntideva as asserting an Abhidharmika ontology, however, is incorrect.  His 
metaphysical position is outlined in Chapter Nine, and it is clear that Śāntideva holds the 
Madhyamaka position articulated by Nāgārjuna (and as interpreted by Candrakīrti) that all 
existent phenomena are on the same ontological level.  Sensations such as pain are fictions just 
like selves.  Further, Śāntideva in Chapter Nine explicitly argues that pains could not ultimately 
exist and also that subjectless pains are meaningless. He says, 
If suffering ultimately existed, then why does it not disturb those who are delighted? If 
pleasure [ultimately existed], then why do delicacies not delight those who are 
overwhelmed by sorrow? 
 
If that were not experienced due to being overpowered by something stronger, how could 
anything that is not in the nature of experience be a feeling? (IX: 89-90)26  
 
Śāntideva does not draw the ontological distinction between pains and persons that Siderits' 
argument requires of him.  In the above verses, Śāntideva argues against the idea of free-floating 
or essentially existent pains.  He uses the familiar Madhyamaka position that if things such as 
pains existed by way of their own essence, then they would never end, something that is contrary 
to our everyday experience.  He also argues that the very nature of pain requires that it be 
experienced by someone.  Siderits might argue here that Śāntideva's explanation is true 
conventionally but not ultimately; however, such an argument requires Śāntideva to accept 
subjectless pains ultimately, a position for which there is no textual evidence.  
This then brings us back to Williams' charge that to posit a conventional self gives us a 
reason to be selfish and undermines any argument that one should be compassionate.  Williams' 
concern is that positing even a conventional self allows one to discriminate between self and 
                                                
26 yady asti duḥkhaṃ tattvena prahṛṣṭān kiṃ na bādhate | śokādyārtāya mṛṣṭādi sukhaṃ cet kiṃ na rocate 
||IX: 89|| balīyasābhibhūtatvād yadi tan nānubhūyate | vedanātvaṃ kathaṃ tasya yasya nānubhavātmatā 
||IX: 90|| sdug bsngal de nyid du yod na // ci ste rab dga’ la mi gnod // bde na mya ngan gdung sogs la // 
zhim sogs ci ste dga’ mi byed // tobs dang ldan pas zil mnan phyir // gal te de myong ma yin na // gang 
zhig nyams myong bdag nyid min // de ni tshor ba ji ltar yin // (Toh. 3871, 34a). 
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other and, therefore, provides a foundation for selfishness.  It is precisely this position, however, 
at which these very verses in Chapter Eight of Śāntideva's text take aim.  Śāntideva is not 
arguing that because selves exist conventionally selfishness is impossible, but that it is irrational.  
His assertion is that neither the conventional existence of selves nor the personal experience of 
pains is a justification for selfishness.  
To appreciate Śāntideva's argument, we must distinguish the kinds of rationales that 
people use to justify prioritizing their own pains from the actual reasons that they prioritize their 
pain.  In Chapter Eight of his text, Śāntideva is responding to an opponent whose rationale for 
prioritizing his own pain ahead of others' is that he experiences his own pain, but does not 
experience the pain of others (VIII:97).  Śāntideva’s response to this argument is to then question 
the reason why the present self should be concerned with the future self’s pains, since the present 
self will not experience the future self’s pain.  Having pointed out the inconsistency in the 
opponent’s rationale for prioritizing his own pain, Śāntideva suggests that the real reason that 
one prioritizes one’s own pain is not the immediacy of the pain, but the grasping to self.  
He then turns his attention to the way we think about ourselves.  The way we think about 
ourselves plays an important role in how we prioritize which pains are to be removed.  We might 
think that we should prioritize our own pain because it is personal and immediate, but we also 
prioritize the pains of a future self above other pains even though they are neither personal to nor 
necessarily immediate to our present self.  This is because we prioritize pains based on the 
concept of the continuation of self.  The actual reason we choose to remove only some pains and 
not others, Śāntideva argues, is not because pain is personal and immediate, but due to the way 
we identify "me."  He then argues that there is no metaphysical obstacle to my having the same 
concern for others that I have for my future self.  
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Śāntideva thinks that removing pains because they hurt is a good idea.  However, he 
believes limiting the removal of pains to specific pains, such as "my" pains, is arbitrary and not 
justified.  The notion that my pain is more significant than anyone else's requires justification.  
For Śāntideva, this notion is without logical basis and is irrational.  The idea that the experiencer 
of the pain has a responsibility to remove his own pain seems, prima facie, reasonable, and 
accords with our natural responses.  Śāntideva uses this instinct to then argue that we have a 
responsibility to remove all pains.  
This might appear to be a stretch of logic, for it seems natural to question why I should 
remove others’ pains if I do not experience them myself.  Yet Śāntideva asks us a different 
question: why should it be morally right to prioritize my own pain?  In asking this, he questions 
the idea that moral responsibility should take such a narrow personal perspective of what is good 
for me.  The idea that we have a moral responsibility for only our own pain also runs counter to 
our commonsense notion of moral responsibility.  For example, one would not ignore a child in 
distress on the grounds that I don’t experience the child’s pain.  Śāntideva argues suffering 
should be a motivator for action regardless of whose pain it is. 
Śāntideva’s presentation of moral responsibility is founded on two concepts: (1) 
interdependence and (2) the rejection of an independent and fixed self.  The first is an 
appreciation of the interdependence that pervades the world in which we live, and the second 
underpins the Buddhist idea that the egoistic perspective ultimately leads us to suffer.  It is based 
on this view that Śāntideva challenges both the sentiment that it is morally right to prioritize my 
pains above others, and also the efficacy of self-interest to remove suffering.  Since there is no 
rational basis for prioritizing one's own pain, and no metaphysical obstacle to concern for the 
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pain of others, then, if we think pain should be removed because it is unpleasant, Śāntideva 
argues, there is no good reason not to work to remove all pains because all pains are unpleasant. 
Let us now turn to a close reading of this section of Śāntideva's text with the aid of the 
Tibetan scholar, rGyal tshab Dar ma Rin chen's (1364-1432) commentary in order to gain a clear 
understanding of this argument.  From the very beginning of these verses it is clear that 
Śāntideva is presenting a type of ethics that prioritizes mental states.  This ethical advice is given 
in the form of meditation instruction:  
Having considered the virtues of solitude in such ways as these, I will thoroughly pacify 
discursive thoughts and meditate on bodhicitta. (VIII: 89)27  
  
It is important to keep in mind that the verses to follow are advices on meditation, and that these 
meditations, since they are efforts at transforming the way one views and engages with the 
world, are themselves considered important ethical practices.  At the heart of moral development 
for Śāntideva is the transformation of how we think about others and their pains.  He continues,  
I will strive first of all to meditate on the equality of oneself and others. Since we are 
alike when in our regard for pleasure and pain, I will protect all others just as I do 
myself. (VIII: 90)28   
 
The first instruction is aimed at developing a foundation for relating to all others in a more 
intimate way by reflecting on how all beings are similar to oneself in wanting to be free of 
suffering and not wanting happiness.  Śāntideva, then questions the privileged place we give to 
our own suffering and happiness:  
Although the body has many parts, being divided into the hands and so forth, in terms 
being something to be protected, it is like a single thing.  Similarly, the variegated world 
of beings is the same in terms of having the nature of pleasure and pain. (VIII: 91)29 
                                                
27 evamādibhir ākārair vivekaguṇabhāvanāt | upaśāntavitarkaḥ san bodhicittaṃ tu bhāvayet ||VIII: 89|| de 
la sogs pa’i rnam pa yis // dben pa’i yon tan bsam byas nas // rnam rtog nye bar zhi ba dang // byang 
chub sems ni bsgom par bya // (Toh. 3871, 27a). 
28 parātmasamatām ādau bhāvayed evam ādarāt | samaduḥkhasukhāḥ sarve pālanīyā mayātmavat ||VIII: 
90|| bdag dang gzhan du mnyam pa ni // dang po nyid du ‘bad de bsgom // bde dang sdug bsngal mnyam 
pas na // thams cad bdag bzhin bsrung bar bya // (Toh. 3871, 27a). 
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After having considered that all beings share the common experience of wanting happiness and 
not wanting suffering, Śāntideva suggests that on that basis, although others are distinct and 
many, we can conceive of ourselves and them as a whole, much in the same way that we 
conceive of the many and distinct parts of the body as a whole with which we identify.  This 
notion calls for a dramatic shift in the way we experience ourselves and counters the exaggerated 
sense that we are the center of the universe.  This shift presents a much more accurate 
representation of our place in the world.   
At this point a natural objection arises that, since the nature of pain is personal and others' 
pains don't hurt me, and my pains don't hurt them, then it is incorrect to think of others' pains in 
the same way as I do of my own.  This objection reads,  
Even though my own suffering does not harm the bodies of others, nevertheless, that very 
suffering is unbearable for me due to attachment to self. (VIII:92)30    
 
Śāntideva challenges this objection, saying that whether or not a pain is considered mine is not 
based upon who experiences it, but on one's conception of self.  Just because pain is personal 
does not mean that you cannot conceive of others' pains as your own.  Śāntideva states,  
Similarly, even though the suffering of others is not felt by me, nevertheless that 
suffering of theirs is unbearable due to attachment to self. (VIII:93)31  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
29 hastādibhedena bahuprakāraḥ kāyo yathaikaḥ paripālanīyaḥ | tathā jagadbhinnam 
abhinnaduḥkhasukhātmakaṃ sarvam idaṃ tathaiva ||VIII: 91|| lag pa la sogs dbye ba rnam mang yang // 
yongs su bsrung bya’i lus su gcig pa ltar // de bzhin ‘gro ba tha dad bde sdug dag // thams cad bdag 
bzhin bde ba ‘dod mnyam gcig // (Toh. 3871, 27a).  I have followed the Sanskrit in my translation; 
however, the Tibetan differs particularly in the last half of the verse, which reads, “Likewise, the all 
beings, distinct in their pleasures and pains, are all one in terms of equally wishing for happiness, just like 
me.”  
30 yady apy anyeṣu deheṣu madduḥkhaṃ na prabādhate | tathāpi tadduḥkham eva 
mamātmasnehaduḥsaham ||VIII: 92|| gal te bdag gi sdug bsngal gyis // gzhan gyi lus la mi gnod pa // de 
lta’ang de bdag sdug bsngal de // bdag tu zhen pas mi bzod nyid // (Toh. 3871, 27a). 
31 tathā yady apy asaṃvedyam anyad duḥkhaṃ mayātmanā | tathāpi tasya tadduḥkham ātmasnehena 
duḥsaham ||93|| de bzhin gzhan gyi sdug bsngal dag // bdag la ‘bab par mi ‘gyur yang // de lta’ang de 
bdag sdug bsngal de // bdag tu zhen pas bzod par dka’ // (Toh. 3871, 27a). 
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Śāntideva maintains that the main reason we find our pain alone unbearable is due to our habit of 
grasping to self.  However, if we become accustomed to considering others as ourselves, even 
though their suffering may not strike us personally, we will feel it too as unbearable and as ours 
to remove:  
The suffering of others should be dispelled by me simply because it is suffering, just like 
my own suffering. The benefit of others too should be carried out by me, simply because 
they are sentient beings, just as I am a sentient being. (VIII: 94)32   
 
Śāntideva will argue that since our conception of self is arbitrary, then there is no rational 
foundation for the removal of only "my" pains.  If we wish to remove our pains because they are 
unpleasant, since all pains are unpleasant we should then work to remove all pains.  When rGyal 
tshab provides his commentary on this verse, he makes two arguments:  
[Locus (dharmin)] Consider the suffering of others: 
[Probandum (sādhyadharma)] I should dispel it  
[Reason (hetu)] because it is suffering. 
[Example (dṛṣṭāta] For example it is like the pain I experience. 
I should accomplish the benefit and happiness for others 
Because others are (also) sentient beings 
For example, it is like the way I accomplish comfort for my own body.33 
 
Here, Śāntideva’s argument is presented in the traditional Indian logical form.  The locus of the 
argument is the suffering of others.  Of this subject, it is predicated that is it something that I 
should dispel.  The reason given is that that the suffering of others is in fact suffering.  If the 
argument stopped here, it might be less persuasive. Simply because the suffering of others is 
suffering, not only is it the case that it should be dispelled, but I should be the one to dispel it.  
                                                
32 mayānyadduḥkhaṃ hantavyaṃ duḥkhatvād ātmaduḥkhavat | anugrāhyā mayānye ’pi sattvatvād 
ātmasattvavat ||94|| bdag gis gzhan gyi sdug bsngal bsal // sdug bsngal yin phyir bdag sdug bzhin // bdag 
gis gzhan la phan par bya // sems can yin phyir bdag lus bzhin // (Toh. 3871, 27a). 
33 sems can gzhan gyi sdug bsngal chos can/ bdag gis bsal bar rigs te sdug bsngal yin pa'i phyir/ dper nad 
bdag gi sdug bsngal bzhin no/ bdag gis gzhan la phan pa dang bde ba bsgrub par bya rigs te/ sems can 
pha rol po sems can yin pa'i phyir/ dper na bdag gi lus la bde ba bsgrub pa bzhin no/  (101a) 
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In order to convince the reader that this is so, rGyal tshab cites Śāntideva’s example that 
the suffering of others is like the pain that I myself experience.  This example personalizes the 
pain of others, bringing it by analogy into one’s first person experience. Just as we can 
immediately sense that we should work to dispel our own suffering simply because it is 
suffering, likewise, the pain of others is also suffering, and on that ground alone, we should work 
to dispel it.  Similarly, we should also work for others’ happiness just as we work for our own 
happiness.  Śāntideva continues to challenge the notion that for some reason our own pain and 
happiness is special: 
Given that the happiness of myself and others is held equally dear, what is so special 
about mine that strive for my happiness alone? 
 
Given that the suffering of both myself and others is dreaded and not held dear, what is so 
special about mine that I protect myself but not others? (VIII: 95-96)34 
 
Śāntideva questions the legitimacy of working to remove our own suffering alone.  Simply 
because we grasp to a self in a certain way does not deem our own pain to be somehow 
qualitatively more significant than the suffering of others.  rGyal tshab in his commentary on this 
verse drives Śāntideva's point home by asking rhetorically, "What is the justification [for 
egoism]?  It is unreasonable to strive for my happiness alone and not to strive for the happiness 
of others."35   Śāntideva here is directing his criticism not at some philosophical standpoint, but 
at the way in which we usually engage with the world.  Śāntideva acknowledges that we have 
this natural experience of prioritizing our own pains, and he is questioning its validity.  Śāntideva 
                                                
34 yadā mama pareṣāṃ ca tulyam eva sukhaṃ priyam | tadātmanaḥ ko viśeṣo yenātraiva sukhodyamaḥ 
||VIII: 95|| yadā mama pareṣāṃ ca bhayaṃ duḥkhaṃ ca na priyam | tadātmanaḥ ko viśeṣo yat taṃ 
rakṣāmi netaram ||VIII: 96|| gang tshe bdag dang gzhan gnyi ga // bde ba ‘dod du mtshungs pa la // bdag 
dang khyad par ci yod na // gang phyir bdag gcig bde bar brtson // gang tshe bdag daṅ gźan gnyi ga // 
sdug bsngal mi ‘dod mtshungs pa la // bdag dang khyad par ci yod na // gang phyir gzhan min bdag srung 
byed // (Toh. 3871, 27a). 
35 rgyu mthsan gang gi phyir na bdag gcig bu bed bar brtson par byed cing bzhan gyi bde ba la mi brtson 
pa mi rigs so / (101a-b) 
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points out that this feeling is not a rational position, and simply because something comes 
naturally to us does not make it right.  Often we rationalize prioritizing our own concerns based 
upon ownership and responsibility.  Since I own my own pain, I am responsible for the removal 
of my pain.  Since others own their pains, they are responsible for the removal of their pains.  
Here, ownership is related to the subjective experience of pain.  We have a sense of ownership of 
mental events because we experience them.  
Śāntideva next demonstrates the arbitrary nature of grasping to self and shows how this 
undermines any argument that attempts to legitimize prioritizing one's own pain simply because 
pain is personal.  
If I do not protect [others] since I am not troubled by their suffering, then why do I 
protect myself from future suffering which does not [presently] trouble me? 
 
This notion that, “At that [future] time also, it will be the same me,” is false, since it is 
one person who dies and quite another who is born. 
 
If one thinks, “Suffering is to be protected from only by he who possesses it,” then since 
the suffering of the foot does not belong to the hand, why should that one be protected by 
the other?  
 
If it is said that although that is unsuitable, in this case it occurs due to the conception of 
self, then with whatever strength one has, whatever is unsuitable should be dispelled, 
both for oneself and others. (VIII: 97-100)36  
 
Śāntideva further responds to the assertion that one's own suffering is special because this 
suffering is personal, by pointing out that if one accepts this position, then it would be incorrect 
                                                
36 tadduḥkhena na me bādhet yato yadi na rakṣyate | nāgāmikāyaduḥkhān me bādhā tat kena rakṣyate 
||VIII: 97|| aham eva tadāpīti mithyeyaṃ pratikalpanā | anya eva mṛto yasmād anya eva prajāyate ||VIII: 
98|| yadi yasyaiva yad duḥkhaṃ rakṣyaṃ tasyaiva tan matam | pādaduḥkhaṃ na hastasya kasmāt tat tena 
rakṣyate ||VIII: 99|| ayuktam api ced etad ahaṃkārāt pravartate | yad ayuktaṃ nivartyaṃ tat svam anyac 
ca yathābalam ||VIII: 100||  gal te de la sdug bsngal bas // bdag la mi gnod phyir mi bsrung // ma ‘ongs 
pa yi sdug bsṅal yang // gnod mi byed na de ci bsrung // bdag gis de ni myong snyam pa’i // rnam par 
rtog de log pa ste // ’di ltar shi ba’ang gzhan nyid la // skye ba yang ni gzhan nyid yin // gang tshe gang gi 
sdug bsngal gang // de ni de nyid kyis bsrungs na // rkyang pa’i sdug bsngal lag pas min // ci phyir des ni 
de bsrung bya // gal te rigs pa min yang ‘dir // bdag tu ‘dzin pas ‘jug ce na // bdag gzhan mi rigs gang yin 
te // ci nus par ni spang bya nyid // (Toh. 3871, 27a-27b). 
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to protect oneself from future pain, or for the hand to protect the foot.  Śāntideva does not appeal 
to an ontological distinction between pains and persons to make his point, but appeals to 
common sense.  rGyal tshab adds that prioritizing ones own pains "is very unreasonable. It 
would follow that it would be illogical to accumulate wealth during one's youth out of concern 
for the arising of suffering in old age."37  Śāntideva explains that it is because of grasping to a 
conception of self that we work to alleviate future suffering.  He refutes the notion that simply 
because two people are distinct entities, it is incorrect to maintain that either is obliged to remove 
the suffering of the other.  Thinking of yourself in a certain way is not a justification for 
selfishness.  That the self exists conventionally means that it is possible to extend our concern for 
ourselves to include others.  It is because others and their pains exist conventionally that it makes 
sense to endeavor to remove their pains just as we do our own.  rGyal tshab comments here that, 
"The grasping to the self of person is mistaken with respect to the referent object and produces 
all devastation."38 
Śāntideva is challenging the fundamental justification of prioritizing our own pains and 
our own welfare morally.  The objection is that we should prioritize our own pains because we 
are the ones that experience them, but we do not experience the pains of others.  Śāntideva 
argues that this is not the actual reason that we prioritize our pains and suggests that we 
emphasize our pains based on an internal bias in the way we view ourselves.  Since it is our 
conception of a fixed separation between self and other that is the foundation for our selfishness, 
an understanding of selflessness provides insight into this bias of self over other, and reveals how 
it is possible to think of others as oneself.   Śāntideva explains,  
                                                
37 de ni ches mi rigs te rgas pa'i tshe sdug bsngal byung dogs nas gzhon pa'i tshe nor gsog pa dang/ 
...'bad par mi rigs par thal/ (101b). 
38 gang zag gi bdag tu 'dzin pa zhen yul la 'khrul zhing des phung khrol thams cad bskyed pa'i phyir ro / 
(102a). 
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The continuum [of consciousness] and collection [of aggregates] are false like a row, an 
army, and so forth. The possessor of suffering does not exist. Thus, who will take 
ownership of it? 
 
All sufferings are in fact non-distinct in virtue of the fact that they are ownerless. It is 
only because of the fact that it is suffering that it should be removed. What is the use of 
any restriction in this regard? (VIII: 101-102)39 
 
It is here, Williams maintains, that Śāntideva's argument only works if he asserts the nihilistic 
position of the total non-existence of persons.  When Śāntideva says, "there being no (inherent) 
owner of suffering, there can be no distinction at all between (that of myself and others)," 
Williams (1998) reads him as arguing from the premise that there is no self whatsoever, to the 
conclusion that we cannot discriminate among pains (p. 106).  If Williams is correct that 
Śāntideva is indeed arguing here that because we cannot distinguish between pains based on their 
owners, then all pains should be removed, then Śāntideva’s system does seem to resemble the 
agent neutral approach of universalist consequentialism.  As I have demonstrated above, 
however, Śāntideva does in fact assert that selves, just like pains, exist conventionally.   The 
inference is hence instead from the premise that selves only exist conventionally to the 
conclusion that any discrimination among pains is merely conventional.  
The assumption that there is necessarily a fundamental conflict between one’s own 
interest and the interest of others ignores the fact that one’s own welfare is dependent on others’ 
welfare.  Goodman has pointed out that Buddhist ethical literature rarely examines the 
competition that arises out of limited resources.  He is right, and this is not because Buddhist 
ethicists such as Śāntideva were oblivious to these kinds of concerns.  Their efforts are simply 
                                                
39 saṃtānaḥ samudāyaś ca paṅktisenādivan mṛṣā | yasya duḥkhaṃ sa nāsty asmāt kasya tat svaṃ 
bhaviṣyati ||VIII: 101|| asvāmikāni duḥkhāni sarvāṇy evāviśeṣataḥ | duḥkhatvād eva vāryāṇi niyamas 
tatra kiṃ kṛtaḥ ||VIII: 102|| rgyud dang tshogs zhes bya ba ni // phreng ba dmag la sogs bzhin brdzun // 
sdug bsngal can gang de med pa // des ‘di su zhig spang bar ‘gyur // sdug bsngal bdag po med par ni // 
thams cad bye brag med pa nyid // sdug bsngal yin phyir de bsal bya // nges pas der ni ci zhig bya // (Toh. 
3871, 27b). 
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directed towards what they see as a more pervasive moral concern, the confused belief that my 
own welfare is more important than someone else’s welfare.  The seemingly natural self-centered 
notion that I am the most important person in the room is a product of a mistaken view of the 
world.  It is this confused self-interest that, far from helping us to remove our pain, engenders 
desire, aversion, and fear all of which according to Buddhism bring about our further suffering.  
Śāntideva is not moving from metaphysics to obligation, but from metaphysics to 
phenomenology.  The discussion of metaphysics is relevant because it informs the 
phenomenological experience of self and other.  Here Śāntideva is not calling on emptiness as if 
to invoke some demanding ethical imperative that exists beyond the conventional.  For 
Śāntideva, the work of ethics is done at the conventional level.  Śāntideva is also not, as 
Williams suggests, arguing for the "ought" of compassion because of the "is" of selflessness; 
instead, he is arguing against the assumption that the rationality of selfishness follows from the 
existence of a conventional self.  Śāntideva's point is not that we can't distinguish among the 
owners of pains, but that the distinction should not be significant for a bodhisattva who 
understands that pain is bad, and that it is bad no matter whose it is.  The mention of 
metaphysical topics here serves not to propose the non-existence of selves, but to demonstrate 
there is no impossible metaphysical gap that we are being asked to jump when we try to 
experience others' pains as our own.  He argues that we should eliminate all pain because it is 
experienced as unpleasant.   
Here, the understanding of selflessness is explained so that bodhisattvas might transform 
the way they see themselves, that their concept of self rather than excluding others includes 
them.  The understanding of the ultimate does not negate the conventional, but instead offers 
insight into the way the conventional has previously been misunderstood.  This transformation of 
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the way the bodhisattva sees the conventional world has real ethical implications.  It is an 
understanding of the emptiness of conventionalities that deconstructs the artificial boundary 
between myself and others, and provides the foundation for ethical practices such as compassion. 
There is a distinction between self and other, and it exists conventionally, not essentially.  
It is on that basis of an understanding of emptiness of self that the significance of the distinction 
is being questioned, not its existence.  Significance is a subjective psychological factor that has 
implications for the identification of self.  For example, when I consider an object such as a car 
as very significant, then the significance of the difference between myself and the car is 
diminished, and I begin identifying with the car strongly.  I appropriate it as mine, and even the 
"mine" and "me" start to blur, so that when someone hits my car, I say that he ran into to "me."  
When Śāntideva asks, in what way can pains be limited, he is asking why, since we can identify 
with other objects such as possessions, we cannot do the same thing with other people and their 
suffering.  Śāntideva appeals to our innate empathy and says that simply because they suffer, we 
should give others significance.  This attitude should reduce the importance of the difference 
between myself and others, so that we can identify with them more closely and naturally wish to 
remove their suffering.  
We do not have to understand Śāntideva either to be denying the existence of a 
conventional self or to be positing the existence of some ultimate pain.  Instead, we can read 
Śāntideva as recognizing powerful motivations that exist within our experience, such as the 
aversion to our own pain, or attachment to our future selves.  He not only questions the 
justification for selfish motivations, but also aids us in harnessing these powerful forces by 
providing tools to extend the scope of these emotions, transforming our experience and moral 
conduct from one motivated by self-concern to one centered on concern for others.  This 
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technique addresses our disturbing emotions not by repressing them, but by disarming them 
through extending their scope.  
As further evidence of the centrality of moral phenomenology in Buddhist ethical 
writings, we find ethical practices involving meditational devices that provide powerful counters 
to the experiential products of an incorrect view of reality.  The practices used to develop 
bodhicitta and the Tibetan blo sbyong instructions used to stabilize it often take extreme 
positions to counter our deluded self-importance.  Meditations on the idea that all beings have 
been our mother or that our sense of self might extend to include others are not employed to 
provide a rational argument concerning reality, but to transform our experience and reshape the 
way that we engage with the world.  Interestingly, although the metaphysical validity of the 
instructions may at times be called into question, the experiential results of the practice bring us 
closer to a correct view of the way things are, and thereby to a more morally mature 
place.  Buddhist ethical texts are best read as instructions through which to effect psychological 
changes in the reader, changes that are ethically significant.  This reading of Śāntideva does not 
require us to distort his metaphysical assertions about persons and pains, a problem that arises 
when trying to understand Śāntideva’s ethics as a form of consequentialism.  Reading Śāntideva 
on his own terms enables an appreciation of his ethical system as one with a unique structure 
differentiating it from any standard western ethical system.  It is a system that is primarily 
concerned with the way we perceive the world, wherein the morally immature are characterized 
by confusion about the status of self and its place in the world, and the morally mature are 
characterized by an accurate vision of themselves and their relation to the world. 
In this chapter, I have examined and responded to two different types of arguments for 
the claim that Buddhist ethics is a form of consequentialism.  To the argument that Śāntideva’s 
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metaphysics implies a consequentialist ethical system, I responded by explaining that his 
arguments are not meant to provide a metaphysical foundation for ethics, but instead highlight 
how epistemological errors – specifically confusion about ourselves in relation to the world and 
the causes for happiness and suffering – lead to immoral states.  The other main argument 
addressed in this chapter surveyed Buddhist ethical literature for examples of demanding 
activities and indications that Buddhist ethics is agent-neutral and is, therefore, not a type of 
virtue ethics, but a form of consequentialism.  I have instead argued that when Buddhist ethical 
texts are read on their own terms, without the presupposition that Buddhist ethics should 
conform to either a virtue ethics or consequentialist ethical system, it is apparent that the primary 
moral concern in Buddhist ethics is not the consequences of actions, but the mental domain of 
the agent.  In the next chapter, I will argue that although Buddhist ethical writings focus on the 
mental domain, they do not reveal an ethical structure that is compatible with the structure of 
virtue ethics.  This will then lay the foundation for the last two chapters, in which I will make a 
case for the centrality of moral phenomenology to Buddhist ethical thought.  
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Chapter Three: Buddhist Ethics and Virtue Ethics 
In the previous chapter, I argued that to interpret Buddhist ethics as consequentialist 
neglects the psychological domain that is emphasized as central in Buddhist ethical treatises.  An 
alternate approach to Buddhist ethics, one that highlights the psychological domain, is 
represented in the work of such scholars as Keown (1992), Cooper and James (2005), Tillemans 
(2012), Finnigan (2011), and Carpenter (2015), who have argued that Buddhist ethics is best 
thought of as a type of virtue ethics.  I agree that an accurate account of Buddhist ethics needs to 
move beyond a mere descriptive treatment of karma and its consequences, and the egoistic 
pursuit of merit.  Buddhist ethics should not be reduced to a set of strategies conceived by 
Buddhist thinkers for the purpose of constraining selfishness.  Rather, it emphasizes and includes 
a rich account of the development of virtues such as patience, love, and compassion.  
Nonetheless, I will argue in this chapter that a virtue ethics account of Buddhist ethics also 
misconstrues its structure.  I will further argue that the relationship between virtues and nirvana, 
and the explanation of moral choice and what constitutes a moral agent in Buddhism are distinct 
from those presented by virtue ethics.  
Since Keown has given the most detailed argument for Buddhist ethics as a kind of virtue 
ethics, and since he uses Aristotelian virtue ethics in making his case for this claim, I will first 
provide a broad outline of the main concepts and structure of Aristotle's virtue ethics.  I will then 
assess his arguments in which he makes the case for Buddhist analogues to the key features of 
Aristotle's virtue ethics, and I will argue that Buddhist ethics ultimately lacks these fundamental 
features.  I will also analyze Buddhist ethics in light of the critical structural features of virtue 
ethics more broadly to demonstrate that it also does not qualify as some non-Aristotelian variety 
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of virtue ethics.40  In doing so, I will argue that Buddhist ethicists are not primarily occupied 
with the cultivation of virtues and their relationship with leading a good life, but that the aim of 
Buddhist ethical practice is to effect a transformation in how we see the world.  
3.1 A Brief Account of the Structure of Aristotelian Virtue Ethics 
 The structure of virtue ethics can be elucidated by attention to Aristotle's theory. The 
Aristotelian structure has the following characteristics:  
(1) It maintains that there is a highest good. 
(2) It describes the content of this highest good by way of the function argument and 
looks to human nature to determine the human function. 
(3) It gives an account of virtues, which are necessary for a person to function well. 
(4) These virtues are classified into the two categories of moral virtues and intellectual 
virtues.  
(5) Finally, these virtues together with moral strength explain moral agency. 
3.1.1 The Highest Good 
  According to Aristotelian virtue ethics, although our actions are varied, there is a highest 
good to which we all aim.  Aristotle initiates his ethical examination with the observation that 
our "every action and decision, seems to seek some good" (trans. 1992, p. 1, 1094a1-3).  
Aristotle refers to this highest good as eudaemonia.  What qualifies eudaemonia as a highest 
good is that it is final (teleion) and self-sufficient (autarkēs) (1097b 14-20).  That eudaemonia is 
final signifies that it is not a means to some other goal, but is an end in itself.  It is desirable for 
its own sake alone.  For example, Aristotle notes that wealth clearly is not the highest good since 
                                                
40 For alternative critiques of Keown’s virtue ethics intepertation of Buddhist ethics, see for 
example, Garfield (2011), Goodman (2009, pp. 54-55, pp. 65-67), Gowan (2015, pp. 138-146), 
Harvey (2000, p. 50), Siderits (2003), and Todd (2013, pp. 30-37). 
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it is only useful as a means for some other end (1096a5).  In fact, Aristotle also argues that 
everything else is desirable for the sake of eudaemonia.  That eudaemonia is self-sufficient 
means that it is complete, being deficient in nothing.  There is nothing that could be added to this 
highest good that could make it better.  For example, Aristotle argues that a life filled with 
pleasure does not constitute eudaemonia since such a life could be improved upon and made 
more desirable through, for example, adding wisdom (1172b23–35).    
All systems of virtue ethics share the understanding that not only do virtues play a central 
role in morality, but also that there is necessarily a specific conceptual link between eudaemonia, 
or its equivalent, and virtues.  Based on verses in Nāgārjuna’s Garland of Jewels (Ratnāvalī), 
Carpenter (2015) argues for a form of Madhyamaka Buddhist ethics, in which there are two ends 
and two means to these ends.  Carpenter argues that Nāgārjuna, like Plato and, in some readings, 
Aristotle, refocuses our ordinary conception of happiness as the fulfillment of desires, towards a 
new conception of happiness, that of well-being, which is achieved through faith in virtuous 
living.  Then, after having reformed our idea of happiness, Nāgārjuna promotes a further higher 
or final good, liberation, which is achieved through wisdom.  Carpenter draws a link between the 
two ends in such a manner that virtuous living becomes a means for liberation.  The challenge 
for Carpenter in demonstrating that Madhyamaka Buddhist ethics is a form of virtue ethics is to 
demonstrate that for Nāgārjuna virtuous living as a means to liberation is not merely 
instrumental, but a constitutive means to liberation.  Similarly, Keown argues that eudaemonia is 
functionally and conceptually equivalent to nirvana, so the challenge for Keown is to 
demonstrate a similar structural link between nirvana and virtues.  For Aristotle, the link 
between virtues and eudaemonia is provided by his function argument, to which we will now 
turn. 
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3.1.2 The Function Argument 
 We now have a preliminary definition for eudaemonia: it is a state that is final and self-
sufficient, meaning that it is desirable for its own sake and lacking nothing.  However, this does 
not tell us about the content of eudaemonia.  Aristotle utilizes a function argument to clarify 
those types of actions that may be considered good actions.  This argument contends that what 
makes a thing good is that it performs its function (ergon) well.  For example, a knife can be 
considered a good knife if it cuts well.  Knives and all other things perform their functions well 
by virtue of possessing certain qualities.  In the case of a knife, the property of sharpness is what 
enables it to cut well.  These characteristics that enable a thing to perform its function well are 
called virtues.  On this reading, then, virtues are not necessarily moral, but instead are that which 
enables excellence in activity.  
 Following the function argument, then, the highest good of persons is closely related 
to how well they perform their function.  Aristotle states,  
For just as the goodness and performance of a flute player, a sculptor, or any kind of 
expert, and generally of anyone who fulfills some action, are thought to reside in his 
proper function, so the goodness and performance of man would seem to reside in 
whatever is his proper function. (trans. 1992, p. 16, 1098a25-30).  
 
The answer to what might be the function of a person, Aristotle suggests, can be ascertained by 
understanding the unique characteristics that distinguish humans (1097b20).  Aristotle's 
understanding of human biology divides the person into physical and mental parts.  The mental 
part, the soul, can be understood in a simplified manner to consist of emotions and rationality.  
This division becomes important for Aristotle, who suggests that we must have virtues relating to 
both the emotional and rational parts of the soul.  Importantly, from among these parts of the 
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soul, what distinguishes one as a human being, Aristotle argues, is the ability to be rational 
(1098a1-5).  Since the unique characteristic that distinguishes us as persons is reasoning, it then 
follows that for Aristotle the function of human beings is related to rationality.  Aristotle is 
careful to add here that we are not talking about the mere possession of rationality, but the 
performance of rational activity (1098a5).  The function of a person, then, is the activity of the 
rational part of the soul, and since to function well is enabled by specific virtues, eudaemonia, 
the highest good, is further described as activity guided by reason and in accord with virtues 
(1098a15, EE II.1, 1219a38-9).  
 Importantly, for Buddhist ethics to be a type of virtue ethics, it need not agree with 
Aristotle about the content of eudaemonia.  Buddhists might reject that the unique characteristics 
that distinguish humans might inform us about what it is to live a good life.  For example, it 
might be insight into the causes of suffering that Buddhists rely on to inform what it means to 
live well.  Keown argues that like Aristotle, Buddhists look to human nature to understand what 
it is to live a good life.  For Buddhists, he argues, this means looking in particular to the 
Abhidharma theory of dharmas.  In doing so, Keown maintains that within this theory of 
dharmas there is an equivalent concept to the Aristotelian notion of virtue.  In order to assess this 
claim, we will turn in the next section to an explanation of Aristotle’s account of virtue.   
3.1.3 Virtues 
  Virtues as described by Aristotle are the characteristics that cause persons to perform 
their function well and which render a person good.  Aristotle says, 
It must, then be remarked that every virtue or excellence, (1) renders good the 
thing itself of which it is the excellence, and (2) causes it to perform its function 
well.  For example, the excellence of the eye makes both the eye and its function 
good, for good sight is due to the excellence of the eye...  Now, if this is true of all 
things, the virtue or excellence of man, too will be a characteristic which makes 
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him a good man, and which causes him to perform his function well. (1106a10-
20) 
 
For Aristotle, there are two different categories of virtue related to the two aspects of the soul 
mentioned earlier.  Intellectual virtues concern the rational part of the soul, and moral virtues 
concern the emotional part of the soul.  For action to be constitutive of the final good, then, it 
must accord with both moral and intellectual virtues. 
3.1.4 Moral Virtues and Intellectual Virtues 
3.1.4.1 Moral virtues.   
Moral virtues are those virtues related to emotion; however, an important characteristic of 
virtues for Aristotle is that they are not the emotions (pathos) themselves, nor are they the 
capacities (dunamis) for emotions.  Instead, moral virtues are states or dispositions (hexis).  
Aristotle's argument for this distinction is that emotions are usually unintentional, passive rather 
than active, and so they are not the objects of praise (1113b3-5a3).  Similarly, merely having the 
capacity or potential to be generous is also not what is praiseworthy.  In saying that virtues are 
dispositions, it is evident that not all dispositions are virtues.  Aristotle describes moral virtues as 
dispositions toward appropriate emotions, and it is these that are praiseworthy (1105b25–6, 
1106a1-5). 
 The appropriateness of emotion and action is explained by the doctrine of the mean 
(mesotēs).  Aristotle explains that the appropriateness of emotions and moral activities is similar 
to skill in crafts, in which excesses and deficiencies are avoided, and that skill in choosing the 
mean represents good work.  The doctrine of the mean explains that excess and deficiency in 
emotions and actions are related to vice, and that the good lies in the mean between excess and 
deficiency.  Aristotle states, "some vices exceed and others fall short of what is required in 
emotion and action, whereas virtue finds and chooses the median" (1992, 1107a5).  Moral virtues 
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are more than knowledge of a skill since they deal with emotion, but they are similar in that 
virtue in both domains tends towards the mean.  Aristotle says that to "experience all this 
[emotion] at the right time, towards the right objects, towards the right people, for the right 
reason, and in the right manner—that is the median and the best course, the course that is a mark 
of virtue" (1106b5-20).  Each moral virtue then has its own specific domain.  For example, 
generosity has to do with giving money or gifts, and it is the mean that lies between the 
deficiency of stinginess and the excess of wastefulness (1107b10-11). 
3.1.4.2 Practical wisdom.   
To live well, according to theories of virtue ethics, requires that we develop dispositions 
through habits, so that our emotional aspect is guided by reason such that we are directed 
towards emotions and actions that are not excessive or deficient, but which represent a mean 
relative to us.  However, while moral virtues are dispositions towards particular ends, they do not 
actually inform us of the methods to achieve those ends.  For example, a good person might wish 
to be generous in a certain situation rather than being stingy or wasteful; however, this 
disposition does not guide the person with respect to the best amount to give.  It also does not 
indicate an effective way to go about giving.  These types of calculations involve not the 
emotional part of the soul, but the rational part of the soul, and so fall outside of the domain of 
moral virtues. 
 The knowledge that guides us in how we should go about achieving good actions comes 
out of deliberation by the rational part of the soul.  It is good deliberation with respect to these 
ends that Aristotle calls practical wisdom (phronesis).  According to virtue ethics, practical 
wisdom is a crucial element required of a person in order to be completely virtuous.  Aristotle 
says, "It is impossible to be good in the full sense of the word without practical wisdom or to be 
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a man of practical wisdom without moral excellence or virtue" (trans. 1992, 1144b30-35).  So 
while a good person might wish to be generous, a virtuous person additionally knows how to go 
about being generous in an effective way due to correct deliberation.  A completely virtuous 
person, then, has virtues of both the emotional and rational part of the soul, and these virtues are 
joined to guide action in a way that accords with living well. 
3.1.5 Choice and Moral Strength 
 The product of deliberation is choice (prohairesis), the decision to do something here 
and now to achieve the determined end (1113a 2-5).  Aristotle explains, "We may define choice 
as a deliberate desire for things that are within our power: we arrive at a decision on the basis of 
deliberation, and then let deliberation guide our desire" (1113a10).  The outcome of deliberation 
guided by practical wisdom is good choice.  Aristotle recognizes that actions are initiated by 
choice and that moral action is the product of good choice.  He says, “We may thus conclude that 
virtue or excellence is a characteristic involving choice, and that it consists in observing the 
mean... a mean that is defined by rational principle, such as a man of practical wisdom would use 
to determine it” (1106b35).  A virtuous person, then, is someone whose emotional and rational 
elements are in harmony, and who is thereby able to direct action in an appropriate and effective 
way.  Of course, a person's emotional and rational aspects might work in harmony towards some 
negative end, and this would be a case of vice, the moral opposite of virtue.  However, a 
complete account of virtue ethics requires a more nuanced description of the moral states of an 
agent than just virtue and vice, and this calls for the consideration of moral strength and moral 
weakness. 
 People are often emotionally pulled to do something that in some way they understand 
should not be done, or are emotionally reluctant to do something that they know they should do.  
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Aristotle's explanation of the mutual influence between knowledge and emotions is complex, 
however, he recognizes that there is often a tension between the emotion and rational parts of the 
soul.  This, he explains, might be due to the intensity of excessive or deficient emotion 
overpowering the inchoate habits of the morally immature, or because such emotion temporarily 
incapacitates reason.  A particular concern of virtue ethics, then, is the occurrence of occasions 
when emotion improperly deviates from the mean, and unlike in the case of vice, this 
inappropriate emotion is necessarily recognized by the rational aspect.  In the case of a morally 
strong person (enkrateia), not only is excessive emotion recognized, it is resisted, and the person 
abides by the strength of the rational.  In the case of morally weak persons (akrasia), they are 
overcome by the power of the emotion, so the rational yields to the emotional, and even though 
they know they should not pursue the action, they nevertheless do so (1146b20). 
 Moral strength is not a moral virtue like self-control, since it is a not a state in which the 
emotion aims at a mean.  A person who is morally strong is so because of resisting emotional 
excessiveness and deficiency, while the moral virtue of self-control is a state which emotionally 
aims for the mean with regard to a bodily pleasure.  For a morally strong person, there is 
necessarily tension between the emotions and the rational, but for a person of self-control, what 
one desires to do is in accord with what one knows to be right. 
The moral status of a person in virtue ethics is indicated by emotions, rationality, and 
action.  Action is directed by choice, and choice is guided by emotion and reason.  While moral 
virtues and practical wisdom guide action, in cases of emotional pull from what is right, when 
reason and emotions are in conflict, it is moral strength that is required as a counterforce to 
excessive or deficient emotion to ensure that activity accords with reason.  Moral strength, then, 
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is an important third component in addition to moral virtues and practical wisdom in describing 
the moral agent in virtue ethics. 
This discussion of Aristotelian virtue and moral choice identifies the three components to 
the structure of any virtue ethics system: eudaemonia, moral virtues, and practical wisdom.  
According to any system of virtue ethics, virtues play a central role in morality, and eudaemonia, 
or human flourishing, is a life lived in accordance with these virtues.  These virtues are 
considered dispositions to act in certain ways.  Moreover, a life fully constituted by virtue is 
informed by practical wisdom, a moral maturity that comes from lived experience and enables 
one to act effectively in a moral way.  For Buddhist ethics to be a kind of virtue ethics, it must 
have an equivalent to eudaemonia that is made good through being constituted of some Buddhist 
equivalents of virtues and practical wisdom.  Next we will examine Keown’s argument that the 
Buddhist explanation of mental dharmas provides equivalents of virtues and practical wisdom 
that constitute the Buddhist highest good, nirvana. 
3.2 Comparing the Structure of Buddhist Ethics with the Structure of Virtues Ethics 
  If Buddhist ethics is a type of virtue ethics, then we should be able to find within 
Buddhism these main features of the structure of virtue ethics as just outlined: 
(i) We would expect to find a Buddhist account of a highest good that is explained in 
terms of what it means for a person to lead a life well lived.  The content of this life well 
lived should be described in terms of the function of a person, which reflects the Buddhist 
understanding of what is unique and distinctive about being a person.  
(ii) If Buddhist ethics is in fact a type virtue ethics, then an account of virtues must be a 
central component of this system, presented as properties that enable a person to function 
well.  
 88 
(iii) We should further expect to find an explanation of a number of moral virtues 
described as necessary dispositions that ensure that our emotions are appropriately guided 
towards a mean.  
(iv) A place of importance should also be provided to a type of correct deliberation that 
enables us to know how to achieve our moral ends.  
(v) If Buddhist ethics is indeed representative of virtue ethics, then Buddhist ethical texts 
should give accounts of the moral agent that place importance on the themes of choice 
and moral strength in relation to action. 
I will argue that Buddhist ethics does not have these fundamental structural characteristics.  Of 
course, I am not arguing that Buddhist ethics would need to be descriptively the same as 
Aristotelian ethics to qualify as a type of virtue ethics.  Certainly, Buddhist ethics could maintain 
the structure and relation of a virtue ethics system while having very different versions of a 
highest good and moral virtues due to a distinct understanding of human nature, the human 
function, and so forth.  Instead, I aim to demonstrate that although Keown and others have 
theorized Buddhist parallels for virtue ethics concepts of arete (virtue), phronesis (practical 
wisdom), and eudaimonia, even if these Buddhist parallel notions were appropriate equivalents, 
the structural relationship between these concepts does not correspond to a system of virtue 
ethics. 
In his book The Nature of Buddhist Ethics, Keown offers (1992) the most detailed 
argument for understanding Buddhist ethics as a type of virtue ethics. He contends that, 
"Aristotelianism provides a useful Western analogue which will be of use in elucidating the 
foundations and conceptual structure of Buddhist ethics" (p. 196).  In comparing the structure of 
virtue ethics with Buddhist ethics, I will respond to Keown's two main arguments for their 
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resemblance.  In the first argument, Keown equates nirvana with eudaemonia, maintaining that 
both are described as highest goods, and that the nature of their relationship with moral and 
intellectual virtues is similar.  His second argument equates the Buddhist concept of cetanā with 
the Aristotelian concept of prohairesis, and on that basis Keown argues that moral choice in 
Buddhism operates the same way as in systems of virtue ethics. 
3.2.1 Describing the Highest Good: Nirvana, Eudaemonia, and 3.2.2 A Person's Function 
Let us first turn to Keown's argument based on the similarities between nirvana and 
eudaemonia.  Keown (2009) claims, "eudaemonia and nirvana are functionally and conceptually 
related in that both constitute that goal, end and summum bonum of human endeavor" (p. 195).  
As explained in (i), for nirvana and eudaemonia to be conceptually and functionally related in a 
way that demonstrates Buddhism to be a type of virtue ethics requires a clear structural link 
between the highest good and virtues.   
Keown argues that both nirvana and eudaemonia can be characterized as final and self-
sufficient.  Keown (1992) writes,  
Whatever else nirvana is, it is indisputably the summum bonum of Buddhism and 
may be characterized, like eudaimonia... (a) it is desired for its own sake; (b) 
everything else that is desired is desired for the sake of it; (c) it is never chosen 
for the sake of anything else. (p. 199) 
 
Surely the goals of many religious systems could be described in such a way as to qualify as a 
highest good in this sense.  For the purposes of a virtue theory, what is distinctive about the 
Aristotelian description of the highest good is not that it is a final and self-sufficient end, but that 
it is an expression of the human function, and further that it is accompanied by certain elements 
that enable a person to function well, namely virtues.  If nirvana is to be equated with 
eudaemonia in a way relevant to supporting the claim that Buddhist ethics is a species of virtue 
ethics, it needs to be demonstrated that it has a similar relationship to virtues.   
 90 
Eudaemonia is described as activity in accord with a function that relates to what is distinctive  
about being human (1098a15, EE II.1, 1219a38-9).  Nirvana, however, is never described 
as an activity, much less an activity relating to what is unique about being human.  It is 
described in terms of a negation, the absence of suffering and its cause.  The Buddha 
equated nirvana with the third noble truth, cessation, which he described in his first 
teaching as follows: "‘Now this, Bhikkhus, is the noble truth of the cessation of suffering: 
it is the remainders fading away and cessation of that same craving, the giving up and 
relinquishing of it, freedom from it, nonreliance of it’" (Bodhi, 2000, p. 1844).  Here 
nirvana is not described in terms of the function of a person, and, more importantly, there 
is no mention of it being constituted by virtues to qualify it as a life well lived.  Instead, it 
is described as a total and permanent cessation of suffering and its causes.  In the Pāli 
canon, the Buddha is recorded asking his student Sāriputta,   
"Friend Sāriputta, it is said, 'Nibbāna, Nibbāna.' What now is Nibbāna?"  
"The destruction of lust, the destruction of hatred, the destruction of delusion: this, friend, 
is called Nibbāna." (Bodhi, 2005, p. 1294; SN 38:1; IV 251–52).  
 
Moreover, nirvana is not described in terms of virtues either emotional or rational but is 
described as unconditioned.  The Buddha explains,  
"Monks, I will teach you the unconditioned and the path leading to the 
unconditioned.  Listen...  And what, monks, is the unconditioned?  The 
destruction of lust, the destruction of hatred, the destruction of delusion: this is 
called the unconditioned...  And what, monks, is the destination?  The destruction 
of lust, the destruction of hatred, the destruction of delusion: this is called the 
destination" (Bodhi, 2005, p. 364; SN 43:1–44, combined; IV 359–73).  
 
It is clear that nirvana is not an activity, but is a state consistently described in negative terms as 
a lack of suffering and the causes that lead to suffering.  Here there is the mention of the absence 
of vice, but there is no description of a conceptual link between virtue and nirvana.  
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Keown (1992) finds such descriptions of nirvana to be unproblematic.  He points out that 
the Buddha continued to engage in ethical practices after his awakening and is described not only 
as intellectually perfect but also morally perfect (p. 114).  While it is true that, having achieved 
enlightenment, the Buddha continued to engage in many activities including eating, sleeping, and 
so on, this does not mean that nirvana can be considered a type of activity.  Importantly, the fact 
that the Buddha is described as having engaged in activities while in the state of nirvana does not 
imply a necessary relationship between nirvana and virtues.  These activities, and specifically 
virtues, are not necessary constituents of nirvana.  Nirvana is described as uncompounded and 
permanent, so it would be strange to characterize nirvana by these mundane activities simply 
because they happen to accompany it. Nirvana is the mere absence of suffering; it is a state that 
may be accompanied by moral acts, but should not be equated with them.   
Moreover, Keown is referring to the first of two types of nirvana, nirvana with remainder.  
Nirvana with remainder refers to an arhant who has eliminated the causes of future suffering but 
still possesses a body and the other four aggregates.  The second type of nirvana, nirvana without 
remainder, occurs when the arhant passes.  It is the second type of nirvana, not the first type, that 
represents the final goal of the Buddhist path.  So the nirvana Keown is referring to could not be 
the highest good as it is not final (teleion).  
In order to provide a link between virtues and nirvana, Keown turns to the Buddhist 
account of mental dharmas.  He argues that the Buddhist understanding of the mental elements of 
human nature can be reduced to two basic components: the emotional and the rational, and so 
that the Buddhist account has the same form as the Aristotelian.  He claims that nirvana 
represents the perfection of these two aspects.  Keown writes,  
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The goal or terminus of human perfection described as eudaemonia or nirvana is 
conceived of as embracing a bilateral perfection. The parameters of the goal are 
determined by the facts of human nature and its potential for development. (p. 195) 
  
Here, Keown argues that the highest good in Buddhism appeals to human nature to determine its 
content, and is thus similar in nature to the Aristotelian account.  Although Keown attempts to 
relate the highest good in Buddhism to human nature, his account is nevertheless devoid of the 
most important feature found in the Aristotelian presentation of the human good: an account of 
human function based on the unique characteristics that distinguish humans.  The reason for 
Aristotle's examination of human nature in book one of Nicomachean Ethics is that he believes 
the unique and distinguishing properties of human nature can inform us about the human 
function, which he equates with the human good.  However, the uniqueness of human function is 
not relevant to the Buddhist goal.  The absence of suffering is not related to the distinctive 
feature of a person or any form of sentience.  The highest good in Buddhism is the same for all 
creatures.  Actually, for Buddhists to be born is to suffer, so nirvana constitutes the complete 
opposite of the distinguishing feature of ordinary existence.  While Aristotelian ethics describes 
the final good in terms of action and function in an attempt to describe what it is to live well, the 
Buddhist ethical approach attempts to solve the problem of suffering.  The solution to the 
problem of suffering requires an investigation into the causes of suffering and how to remove it 
rather than an investigation into the unique qualities and function of a person.  For this reason, 
nirvana is described in these terms: the absence of the suffering and its causes, ignorance and 
craving.  
Although Keown focuses on the Theravāda tradition, it might be thought that the 
Mahāyāna goal of Buddhahood, rather than the nirvana of an arhat, provides a better analogue to 
eudaemonia, since Buddhahood is described not only as a freedom from suffering, but also in 
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positive moral terms.  While this might offer a solution to the present problem relating to 
activity, it does so only to present those in favor of a virtue ethics reading of Buddhist ethics with 
a different but equally problematic obstacle.  As I have explained, for Aristotle the highest good 
is necessarily a final good.  It could be argued that Mahāyāna Buddhahood is not a final good 
since Mahāyāna enlightenment is desirable for the sake of another goal, the elimination of the 
suffering of all beings.  
Moreover, like nirvana, Mahāyāna enlightenment is unrelated to the distinctive features 
of humans and, as will be discussed next, the virtues that are associated with Mahāyāna 
enlightenment are unrelated to the function of humans.  Finally, as will be discussed in later 
chapters, virtues in Mahāyāna Buddhism are not considered good unless they are accompanied 
by a particular way of taking up the world, a correct metaphysical view.  Part of my argument for 
Buddhist ethics being a kind of moral phenomenology rather than a kind of virtue ethics, is that 
this view of the world precedes excellent virtue, and that this virtue is contingent upon this 
correct metaphysical view, and does not constitute it. 
Carpenter (2015) argues that Nāgārjuna provides us with two ends: happiness 
reconceived as well-being, which is gained through good conduct, and liberation, the highest 
end, which is gained through wisdom and which is a sufficient means.  However, by pursuing 
well-being through good conduct, one naturally comes to the wisdom required of the highest end.  
Pursuing happiness leads to the highest good. Carpenter observes, 
 
This gradual leading from one [i.e., well-being] into the other [i.e., liberation]… is 
possible because the normative ground all along—for which pleasures and pains are to be 
pursued and avoided, and when; for which behaviors are to be encouraged or repudiated; 
for what is good practice consists in—is determined from the first by whatever it is that 
beings situated as we are need to do in order to be led to wisdom, and to a desire for 
definite goodness itself.  In this sense the two ends are not independent, but rather related, 
and the one dependent upon the other. (p. 39) 
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Carpenter understands the wisdom that leads to liberation as the ultimate good in virtue of which 
other virtues are made good.  On this reading, virtuous actions may lead us to the final good, but 
it is not the virtues that make the final end good.  Instead, it is the final end that makes virtues 
good.  I suggest that this reading of Nāgārjuna’s ethics is moving in the direction of an 
appreciation of the centrality of moral phenomenology to Mahāyāna ethics because it 
understands wisdom, a metaphysically accurate way of seeing the world, to be the ultimate good.  
In Chapter Five, I will argue that Mahāyāna ethics is best conceived of as a kind of moral 
phenomenology, by drawing on the ethical writings of two other Mādhyamika thinkers, 
Āryadeva and Śāntideva, and also the Perfection of Wisdom literature, which is regarded as the 
primary source for Nāgārjuna’s philosophical position.  
3.2.3 Aristotelian Virtues and Buddhist Virtues 
Keown (1992) argues that not only do Buddhist ethics and Aristotelian virtue ethics share 
a commitment to life aiming at a highest good, they also have a common program for the 
"furtherance of human potential through the medium of certain practices known as virtues" (p. 
193).  He relates Buddhist virtues to Aristotelian virtues as follows: "The Abhidharma ethical 
classifications are readily intelligible in terms of one of the oldest and most influential concepts 
in Western ethics - the concept of a virtue" (p. 59).  Keown argues that, 
the Abhidharma posits two classes of mental forces which produce either defilement or  
purification of the mind. I described these forces as virtues and vices in accordance with 
Western ethical terminology since they perform a similar role in respect of promoting or 
inhibiting the attainment of the final good. (p. 81-82)  
 
We must ask, however, whether or not these qualities are virtues in the Aristotelian sense. I have 
argued that Keown's claim that nirvana is a highest good in the Aristotelian sense is incorrect 
because it does not provide a clear explanation of the highest good in terms of function, which is 
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the distinguishing feature of the human good in Aristotelian ethics.  It also follows that if 
the highest good in Buddhism is not related to function, then its account of virtues must 
also diverge from an Aristotelian account of virtues, which specifically defines them as 
properties that enable excellent functioning.  Moreover, for Buddhist ethics to be considered a 
kind of virtue ethics, these mental qualities described in the Abhidharma literature need to 
characterize human flourishing.  
The foundation of Buddhist psychology is the theory of dharmas as found in the 
Abhidharma texts, the most important of which in the Sanskrit tradition are 
Vasubandhu's Treasury of Higher Knowledge (Abhidharmakośa) and Asaṅga's Compendium of 
Higher Knowledge (Abhidharmasamuccaya).  The Abhidharma theory of dharmas endeavors to 
give a complete account of mental functions, and included among the typical classification of 51 
mental functions are lists of positive and negative mental qualities.  It is true that fundamental to 
Buddhist ethics is the removal of dysfunctional mental processes (kleśa) from one's mental 
continuum (santāna) and the cultivation of positive ones.  This process of elimination and 
cultivation when complete results in the achievement of the final state, that of a Buddha, an agent 
described as complete in virtue and without vice at all.  These are, however, virtues only in the 
general sense that they represent a positive moral condition. They are not virtues in the specific 
sense utilized by Aristotle to refer to particular dispositions that enable excellence in rational 
activity.  
If Buddhist ethics is in fact a type Aristotelian virtue ethics, we should expect to find an 
explanation of a number of moral virtues described as necessary dispositions guided by right 
reason which ensure that our emotions are appropriately guided towards a mean.  Yet the 
positive mental events discussed in the Abhidharma literature are neither described as states of 
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character, nor are they said to be necessarily guided by correct reason.  Rather than dispositions, 
these mental events presented in the Abhidharma literature are described as closer to impulses.41  
Moreover, the positive mental events outlined in the Abhidharma literature are not 
dispositions that aim towards a mean between excess and deficiency.  These mental events are 
often described in terms of an absence of something.  For example, non-delusion (amoha) is 
listed as a virtue, and it would be strange to suggest that there could be an excess of non-delusion 
that should be avoided.  Another virtue is non-hatred (adveṣa), and again, for Buddhists, since 
hatred is grounded in confusion, to say that this virtue stands between an excess and deficiency 
of an absence of hatred would be absurd.  When Buddhist texts describe virtues such as love, 
compassion, and joy in a positive way, it is often advised to cultivate them immeasurably 
(apramāṇa).  
That Buddhist virtues do not correspond to Aristotelian virtues does not disqualify 
Buddhist ethics from being a different kind of virtue ethics.  Yet, when it comes to virtues, the 
reason that Buddhist ethics is incompatible with any system of virtue ethics is that Buddhist 
virtues do not have the conceptual relation with the Buddhist idea of what it is to lead an 
excellent life that is necessary for such ethical systems.  The reason that this is the case will now 
be explained. 
The Abdhidharma discusses the dharmas in the context of the Buddhist understanding of 
dependent arising.  Buddhist psychological texts describe a complex web of interdependent 
mental functions, some of which are described as virtuous, some as vicious, and others as 
morally neutral.  While the Buddhist ethical project aims at the cultivation of positive mental 
activities and the elimination of negative mental activities, it does so based on the premise that it 
                                                
41 It might be argued that the seeds of these mental events (vāsanā, bag chags) could be thought of as 
states, however, being potentials they resemble capacities more than virtues. 
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is a misunderstanding of the nature of ourselves and our relationship to the world that gives rise 
to negative mental activities, and a correct understanding of ourselves and our place in the world 
that gives rise to positive mental activities.  For this reason, Buddhist ethical writings express a 
central concern with the correction of the mistaken way in which we see ourselves in relation to 
others instead of the direct cultivation of virtues.  
In Buddhist traditions, moral cultivation is aimed foremost at a transformation of the way 
we see the world rather than the cultivation of virtues.  This sets Buddhist ethics apart from 
virtue ethics.  In virtue ethics, the primary focus is on dispositions to act.  A person’s character is 
admired if he or she is consistently moved by virtuous impulses and if the person knows how to 
act on those impulses.  While virtues are important in Buddhist ethics, the main focus is not on 
the dispositions to act, but on the dispositions to perceive.  Individuals are admired because their 
actions are guided by an accurate view of the world and their place in it.  Just as Buddhist ethics' 
recognition of the moral importance of the consequences of acts does not make it 
consequentialist, the fact that we can find an emphasis on virtues does not make Buddhist 
ethics areteic.  Nor does the fact that the goal of Buddhism is a state of perfect virtue make it so.   
Another necessary attribute of virtues in Aristotelian ethics is that they not only enable 
excellence of function, but that they themselves are also constitutive of the highest 
goal.  An areteic ethics is distinguished by its commitment to the constitution of the final goal by 
a life lived in accordance with virtues.  Keown (1992) explains,  
What is distinctive about the virtues is that they participate in and constitute the 
end... The virtues are the means to the gradual realization of the end through the 
incarnation of the end in the present. (p. 194) 
 
Keown further argues that the nature of the relationship between nirvana and virtue is 
Aristotelian since it is through the medium of virtues that the two aspects of human nature are 
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transformed into their perfected state, nirvana.  Since for virtue ethics, the relationship between 
virtues and the perfected end must be constitutive rather than contingent, a virtue ethics reading 
of Buddhist ethics must view moral virtues on the path to be not merely instrumental, but rather 
directly participatory in the resultant state of nirvana.  
The case for Buddhist ethics as virtue ethics, therefore, rests on the claim that moral 
virtues are qualitatively equivalent at both the causal and resultant state.  Indeed, this is what 
Keown (1992) asserts when he writes, "The difference between the Buddha's perfection and that 
of someone still following the Path – profound though it may appear – is only one of degree" (p. 
113).  Although it is certainly the case that moral virtues are necessarily present at the stage of 
the path and also at the resultant state of Buddhahood, it is not the case that they are qualitatively 
the same.  To reduce the distinction to one of degree misconstrues the role of wisdom in the 
Buddhist account of moral choice, and also overlooks the fundamental Buddhist soteriological 
differentiation between ordinary and awakened experience.  A Buddha has moral virtues, to be 
sure, but a Buddha's moral virtues are spontaneous and need not be arrived at through 
deliberation or to be supported by mindfulness and introspection like the virtues of those on the 
path.  As will be discussed in Chapter 5, Mahāyāna ethical writers such as Śāntideva do not 
consider a virtue such as generosity to be perfected unless it is accompanied by a correct 
metaphysical outlook.  
3.2.4 Moral Choice and Cetanā 
If Buddhist ethics is a type of virtue ethics, it should accord importance to deliberation as 
a means to coming to know how to achieve our moral ends.  Keown (1992) acknowledges that 
Buddhism does not have a precise explanation for moral choice, but suggests that a version of 
Buddhist moral choice can be "fabricated" by "depicting the faculties of Buddhist psyche in 
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terms of the Aristotelian framework" (pp. 210-211).  It is certainly a setback for a virtue ethics 
interpretation of Buddhist ethics that such central components of the system as choice and moral 
strength should need to be "fabricated."  That we can engage in the exercise of construing the 
terms of one system to accord with aspects of another system is scarcely evidence that the former 
system is a version of the latter.  Nonetheless, Keown has faith that this project provides insight 
into an unexpressed but implicit aspect of Buddhist ethics from his understanding that the 
Buddhist concept of cetanā, is very close to choice in Aristotelian ethics, prohairesis (p. 
213).   This argument is important to Keown because he is arguing that Buddhist ethics is a type 
of virtue ethics because nirvana, the highest good in Buddhism is constituted by the perfection of 
both the rational and emotional parts of human nature. 
Keown (1992) assigns Buddhist concepts to the Aristotelian categories, and then gives an 
account of moral choice in Buddhism by way of the Aristotelian model.  He identifies feelings 
(vedanā) with appetite (ores), and explains that feelings give rise to impulses to act, which then 
bring about deliberation.  While acknowledging that "Buddhism has no single term which is the 
equivalent of phronesis," Keown equates sañña with reason (dianoia, logos) from which the 
functional equivalents of deliberation and practical wisdom can be derived (p. 211).  In this 
process of deliberation, reason is said to evaluate the non-rational drives inspired by feelings 
with regards to ends.  The outcome of this deliberation, the meeting of reason and emotion, 
results in choice, a decision to engage in some kind of action to achieve a particular end.  Here 
Keown identifies choice (prohairesis) with the Buddhist concept of cetanā, usually translated as 
"intention."  I will now examine these Buddhist concepts to argue that they don't do the work 
required of them to map onto an Aristotelian ethical structure. 
 100 
Keown (1992) seeks to understand the Buddhist notion of cetanā in terms of the 
Aristotelian faculty of moral choice, or prohairesis. He writes,  
Cetanā is very much like prohairesis and stands at the crossroads of reason and 
emotion... cetanā is best pictured as a matrix in which the push and pull of the rational 
and emotional aspects of the psyche are funneled in the direction of moral choice. (p. 
213)  
 
Keown translates cetanā as choice and argues that it is the outcome of the process of reasoning 
which takes in the situation at hand, reflects upon it, and comes to an intellectual resolution to 
bring about the end (pp. 212-213).  However, the function of cetanā as described in Buddhist 
psychological text is quite unlike the function of prohairesis as described by Aristotle.  Cetanā is 
not described as a choice based on rational evaluation, but is more accurately thought of as an 
impulse that directs the mind towards a certain object.  In his Examination of the Five 
Aggregates (Pañcaskandhakaprakaraṇa), Vasubandhu defines cetanā as follows: “What is 
cetanā?  It is mental action, which impels the mind towards good qualities, flaws, and that which 
is neither” (trans. Anacker, 2005, p. 67).  In the Compendium of Higher Knowledge, Asaṅga 
gives another definition of cetanā:  
What is intention (cetanā)? It is construction by the mind, mental action. It has the 
function of applying the mind to virtuous, non-virtuous, or neutral [objects].42  
  
Here, there is no mention of beliefs or desires, nor is cetanā described as a product of rational 
deliberation; instead, it is depicted as a component of experience that directs other mental 
activities towards a particular object.  Cetanā directs the mind towards a given object, but is not 
necessarily the result of choosing one thing over another, and it is also not concerned with means 
to determined ends.  Cetanā is often motivated by desire or aversion towards a given object, 
without any rational deliberation interceding.    
                                                
42 sems pa gang zhe na/ sems mngon par 'du byed pa yid kyi las te/ dge ba dang mi dge 
 ba dang lung du ma bstan pa rnams la sems 'jug par byed pa'i las can no/ (Abhidharmasamuccaya, 
D4049, 48a-48b). 
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While choice is something that we voluntarily engage in on specific 
occasions, cetanā accompanies the mind in every moment and is considered involuntary.  For 
example, even in the moment we fall asleep, a mental event not usually associated with an 
intentional act, cetanā plays an important role as our mind’s withdrawal from attending to the 
external world.  While for Aristotle, prohairesis is denied to animals and even children, for 
Buddhists, cetanā is an important component of every moment of experience for every sentient 
being.  In his Commentary on the Thirty Verses (Triṃśikābhāṣya), Sthiramati (6th century), 
comments on the role of cetanā in the shaping of consciousness, describing it as the activity of 
setting the mind in motion.  He describes cetanā as the mental activity whose presence causes 
the mind to flow toward an object, like the movement of iron filings caused by a magnet.43   
Buddhist psychology explains consciousness as intentional; to be aware is to have an object of 
awareness, and to have an object of awareness requires cetanā whose function both directs the 
mind towards the object and shapes the experience of the object.  The Buddhist account of 
cetanā demonstrates that it is not a suitable parallel for Aristotle's moral choice, which mediates 
between the push and pull of the rational and emotional aspects of the psyche.  
For Aristotle moral choice (prohairesis) is the outcome correct deliberation.  Correct 
deliberation requires the faculty of practical wisdom (phronesis) which is initiated by desire, 
evaluates them against moral goals, and selects right means towards these good ends.  If 
Buddhist ethics is indeed a form of virtue ethics, we would expect to see a Buddhist equivalent 
of practical wisdom outlined in Buddhist psychological texts and its central role in moral choice 
explained in Buddhist ethical texts.  However, we find neither.  While prohairesis guided 
by practical wisdom brings about right action, there is no textual evidence to suggest 
                                                
43. cetanā cittābhisaṃskāro manasaś ceṣṭā yasyāṃ satyām ālambanaṃ prati cetasaḥ praspanda iva 
bhavaty ayaskāntavaśād ayaḥpraspandavat / (Buescher, 2007, p. 58).  
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that cetanā provides a necessary intermediary link between right reasoning and right action in 
Buddhism.  Cetanā is not described as specifically related to intellectual virtues that choose a 
best course of action or moral virtues that regulate emotion.  
Keown (1992) also attempts to draw a parallel between cetanā and prohairesis by 
arguing that cetanā too is a fusion of two complimentary processes, one cognitive and the other 
affective.  Keown imputes to Buddhist psychology a division between the rational and affective 
domains by invoking the two mental functions of samjñā (ascertainment, sañña in Pāli) and 
vedanā (feeling).  He suggests that, "it may be helpful to regard the categories of sañña and 
vedanā respectively as denoting the cognitive and non-cognitive dimensions of psychic life" (p. 
67).  Keown further identifies two sets of three mental functions from the Buddhist psychology 
literature, which he describes as "twin intellectual and emotional operations," which are 
"complementary process fused in cetanā" (p. 211).  He identifies the affective faculties as 
courage (viriya), joy (pīti), and desire (chanda), which initiate the impetus to act.  The 
implementation of this impetus then depends upon the cognitive aspect of cetanā, which he 
describes a three stage process of (1) attention to the matter at hand (vitakka), (2) leading to 
reflection (vicāra), and (3) ending in a resolution or decision (adhimokkha).  
However, it is not as though courage, joy, and desire are regarded in Buddhist 
psychology as having a special link with feeling (vedanā), or attention, reflection, and resolution 
with ascertainment (samjñā).  This is an arbitrary cherry picking of mental factors from the 
traditional list of 51 and forcing the intellectual-emotional framework of Aristotle onto Buddhist 
psychology.  In Buddhist psychology, there is no Buddhist categorizing of mental acts into 
emotional and intellectual; samjñā and vedanā do not serve as categories dividing operations of 
the mind, but are themselves just two mental events among many.  
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Moreover, like cetanā, both samjñā and vedanā are considered to be operating in every 
moment.  It is true that samjñā and vedanā are featured as prominent in Buddhist psychology, 
but their importance is derived not from their being components of moral choice, but from their 
fundamental role in shaping each moment of experience.  In Buddhist psychology, samjñā refers 
to ascertainment rather than a type of rational deliberation.  In the Compendium of Higher 
Knowledge, Asaṅga defines ascertainment: 
What is the defining characteristic of ascertainment (samjñā, 'du shes)? [Its] 
characteristic is recognizing upon assembling. [It is an] entity which apprehends signs 
and apprehends marks in accordance with which [one] assigns designations to objects of 
vision, hearing, differentiation, and consciousness.44 
 
Samjñā is not described as evaluating two options like rational deliberation, but as functioning to 
identify an object and categorize it based on its unique characteristics.  Samjñā allows us to 
distinguish between objects, and also associates them with pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral 
feelings.  When we become aware of an object, we identify it and also experience a feeling 
associated with it.  Feeling (vedanā) refers to the simple experience of something as pleasant, 
unpleasant, or neutral.  Vasubandhu defines feeling in the Examination of the Five Aggregates as 
follows: “What are feelings? They are experiences, and are of three kinds: pleasure, pain, and 
that which is neither pleasure nor pain” (trans. Anacker, 2005, p. 66).  Pleasant and unpleasant 
feelings function to give rise to the mental factors of desire and aversion respectively, giving 
feeling an important role in our intentions and actions.  One important distinction to make is that 
while in Western psychology the words feeling and emotion are sometimes used 
interchangeably, in Buddhism feeling is narrowly defined, forming its own separate category, 
and is differentiated from mental states that would normally fall into the Western category of 
                                                
44 /'du shes kyi mtshan nyid ci zhe na/ 'dus te shes par byed pa'i mtshan nyid de/ mtshan mar 'dzin par 
dang/ bkra bar 'dzin pa'i ngo bo gang gis ji ltar mthong ba dang thos pa dang bye brag phyed pa dang/ 
rnam par shes pa'i don rnams la tha snyad 'dogs 
pa'o/ (Abhidharmasamuccaya, D4049, 45b). 
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emotion.  The results of virtuous and non-virtuous actions are pleasant and unpleasant feelings 
respectively, which function to give rise to the mental events of desire and aversion.  This gives 
feeling an important role in our subsequent intentions and actions.  Feeling works not against, 
but in tandem with ascertainment. 
If an object is accompanied by a pleasant feeling, our minds are attracted towards the 
object, and it is identified by ascertainment as a pleasant object.  Regarding it as a pleasant 
object, we develop desire for it, based upon which we may engage in negative activities in order 
to acquire it.  Similarly, with regards to objects experienced and associated with unpleasant 
feelings and identified as unpleasant objects, we may engage in negative activities to avoid them.  
The moral problem for Buddhist ethicists is that ascertainment and feeling both are founded on 
confusion with regard to the world and our place it.  If this confusion is addressed, then 
ascertainment and feelings are accorded with what we might think of as moral mental functions 
such as generosity.  Thus, what is needed is not a type of practical reasoning that evaluates 
emotions, but a wisdom that removes metaphysical confusion about our self in the world and 
thus supports positive mental states both emotional and cognitive.  
Keown (1992) argues that in Buddhist ethics both moral and intellectual virtues constitute 
nirvana, the Buddhist perfected state.  This would give him the necessary link between virtues 
and nirvana that would be required for Buddhist ethics to conform to the structure of virtue 
ethics.  He also argues that moral choice in Buddhist ethics is similar to that in Aristotelian ethics 
as further evidence for Buddhist ethics as a type of virtue ethics.  As explained above, however, 
the Aristotelian explanation of moral choice is not transferable to the Buddhist psychological 
account.  Moreover, we do not find in Buddhist ethical thought a structure that accords with that 
of virtue ethics.  It is a correct metaphysical view that constitutes nirvana.  Positive mental 
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activities are a product of this correct metaphysical view; however, they are not constitutive of 
nirvana.  Buddhist ethical texts prioritizes the transformation of the way we see the world over 
virtues, and it is this correct metaphysical view that is the defining characteristic of the Buddhist 
moral state, not virtues. 
There is a final important structural difference between Buddhist ethics and virtue ethics 
in relation to the fundamental problem of moral choice.  As discussed above, for Aristotle, the 
moral problem can be described as a tension between emotion and reason.  Emotion challenges 
reason to direct the course of an agent's action, and moral agents are assessed in terms of their 
strength of reason to overcome this counterforce of emotion.  A moral self is a person who is 
able to do what accords with reason.  Those who are unable through reason to counter the force 
of emotion fall into vice.  The moral solution, then, is to develop strength of will, so that 
emotional responses are managed and circumstantially appropriate.  
Once again, in this account we see the central role of virtues in Aristotle’s ethical 
account.  If Buddhist ethics is also a system of virtue ethics, we would expect to see a similar 
description of how the cultivation of dispositions to act is the solution to vice.  Instead, the 
response to vice in Buddhist ethical texts involves an investigation into whether one is seeing the 
situation correctly.  For example, in his Guide to Awakened Living, Śāntideva’s strategy for 
overcoming anger is to examine the nature of its causes. He says,  
If the nature of the foolish is to cause harm to others, my anger toward them is not 
appropriate, just as [it would be inappropriate to have anger] toward fire for its nature of 
burning. (VI.39)45   
                                                
45 yadi svabhāvo bālānāṃ paropadravakāritā | teṣu kopo na yukto me yathāgnau dahanātmake ||VI.39||  
gal te gzhan la ‘tshe byed pa // byis pa rnams kyi rang bzhin ni // de la khro ba mi rigs te // sreg pa’i rang 
bzhin me bkon ‘dra // (Toh.3871, 16a). 
 106 
Here, Śāntideva explains that we can and should eliminate anger not through the cultivation of 
virtue, but through an adjustment in how we perceive the person who is the object of our anger.  
This adjustment is effected through an inquiry into the nature of the person. 
While the emotional-rational division is a fundamental framework in systems of virtue 
ethics, one of the distinctive features of Buddhist psychology is that there is no category termed 
"emotion."  This is quite striking, given the importance placed on categorizing mental states by 
Buddhist philosophers, as evidenced by the comprehensive lists found in the Abhidharma 
literature.  In fact, despite the frequent appearance of the English term "destructive emotion" in 
works treating Buddhist psychology, there is no Sanskrit or Tibetan word that corresponds 
directly to the word "emotion."  The fact that such an important category for Western psychology 
is altogether missing from Buddhist descriptions of the topography of mental events points to an 
important difference in the approaches of Buddhist and Western psychology towards the mind.  
Of course, Buddhists psychological texts do recognize mental states such as happiness, 
sadness, compassion, and anger, etc.; however, they understand their nature and function in a 
very different way, a way that does not lead to them being categorized as distinct from other 
mental functions that Western psychology might consider cognitive.  This different perspective 
can be appreciated by comparing the etymologies of the Sanskrit term karuṇā with the 
etymology of the English term it is most commonly translated as, "compassion," which would be 
regarded as an emotional virtue in a system of virtue ethics.   
The term "compassion" comes from Latin and is a combination of the prefix "com-" (an 
archaic form of the preposition and affix cum which means "with") and "passion" (which is 
derived from the stem patī, meaning to suffer or endure).  When combined, they have the sense 
of "to suffer together with."  The meaning and etymology of compassion is also related to the 
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noun "patient," meaning one who suffers.46  The word compassion, then, has the sense not of 
something we do or engage in, but something that happens to us.  As mentioned, the Western 
category of emotion includes mental states that are often conceived of as having the potential to 
overcome our power of will. By contrast, the Sanskrit term karuṇā, although translated as 
compassion, carries a very different sense than the passivity connoted by the English term 
compassion.  Karuṇā comes from the root kṛ whose primary meaning is, "to do, to make, 
produce, cause, engage in," conveying a distinctly active sense.  In fact, one of the meanings of 
karuṇā is "an action, holy work."47  So, while a system of virtue ethics views emotions as passive 
in the sense of happening to us, or overcoming us and requiring mediation by practical wisdom, 
Buddhist psychology understands these same mental events to be active states, with the 
wholesome ones to be intentionally cultivated.  
It is important to note as well that the term kleśa, often translated as "passion" or 
"destructive emotion," has a very different sense than these English words connote.  In the 
Treasury of Higher Knowledge, under the category of kleśa, Vasubandhu places certain mental 
states that in the West might be considered emotions, such as covetousness (abhidhyālu) and ill-
will (vyāpanna-citta), but he also includes some that would instead be considered cognitive, such 
as wrong view (mithyā-dṛṣṭi).  
Rather than a distinction between emotive and cognitive states, Buddhist psychological 
texts divide the mental world at the most basic level into those mental functions that contribute to 
ordinary experience and suffering, and those that contribute to awakened experience and 
happiness.  In these two categories of positive and negative mental states, no distinction is made 
                                                
46 See: Brown (2002) The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, also: Eric 
Partridge (1966) Origins: A Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English. 
47 See the neuter form of the word in Monier Williams Sanskrit-English Dictionary, 2008, p. 255 and pp. 
300-301. 
 108 
between cognitive and emotive.  For example, under the positive mental functions, we find faith, 
embarrassment, and shame, grouped together with effort, conscientiousness, and non-ignorance. 
In the category of the primary negative mental states, we find desire, anger, and pride, grouped 
together with ignorance, doubt, and wrong views.  Negative states are experienced as unpleasant 
or lead to unpleasant experiences; positive states are either experienced as pleasant or lead to 
pleasant experiences.  They are all considered mental actions, and as such they are morally 
significant.  The Buddhist practice and its goal is to eliminate those mental states that fall into the 
negative category and to cultivate those that fall into the positive category.   
The moral problem for Buddhists is not a tension between emotional demands and 
rational knowledge.  Where Aristotle sees moral tension, the Buddha sees an important 
interdependent relationship between the way we understand the world and the way we 
experience it.  The moral problem in Buddhism, then, is that viewing the world in an inaccurate 
way cultivates negative mental states, which not only feel bad and encourage harmful actions, 
but also reinforce the wrong views that originally fostered them. Central to the way we see the 
world is how we see ourselves in it as agents, the topic to which we will now turn.  
3.2.5 The Moral Agent 
In virtue ethics, the account of moral choice provides the foundation for the account of 
moral agency.  Since the virtue ethics account of moral choice does not find a parallel in 
Buddhist ethics, the account of the moral agent also differs.  The moral agent in virtue ethics is 
described in relation to the choices she or he makes.  Because of this, ideas like moral strength 
and practical wisdom, which are less emphasized in Buddhist ethical texts, are central to the 
ethical discussion on moral persons in virtue ethics.  Instead, the Buddhist ethical framework 
begins with the understanding that virtue and vice arise from an accurate and inaccurate view of 
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the world, respectively.  Thinking about ourselves in an incorrect way leads to a self-centered 
view that encourages vice.  The solution for dealing with vice is not to rely on moral strength and 
correct deliberation, but is a correction in the way we think and, therefore, feel about ourselves 
and those we encounter.  It is the moral agent’s view of the world that is of primary importance 
in Buddhist ethical writings.   
The moral tension for Buddhists is better described as a tension between two experiential 
states, those with inaccurate views described as ordinary experience and those with accurate 
views described as awakened experience.  Viewing the world in an inaccurate way leads to 
negative mental states, which not only feel unpleasant, but which also reinforce the wrong views 
that originally fostered them.  The Buddhist moral solution, then, is the development of wisdom, 
which undermines confusion about the world and engenders positive mental states.  This wisdom 
(prajñā) that is so important in the Buddhist resolution of the moral problem is more closely 
related to sophia, a concept that plays a lesser role in the Aristotelian model of moral choice.  For 
a system of ethics that understands virtues to play a central role in morality, the knowledge of 
how to act in accord with those virtues in a particular situation is more useful than knowledge of 
metaphysical facts.  However, in Buddhist ethical thought, according to which the confusion 
about the ontological status of oneself and others constitutes the primary moral problem, such 
practical knowledge is less useful, while knowledge of metaphysical facts is essential to the 
moral solution. 
While the Aristotelian model of moral choice prioritizes practical wisdom over 
theoretical wisdom (sophia), the transformation of vision so important in Buddhist ethics is 
brought about by a metaphysically accurate wisdom.  In Buddhism, excellence is not achieved 
through virtues that regulate the rational and emotional parts of ourselves, but through awareness 
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of the unconscious drivers such as confusion, fear, and selfishness that bring about unpleasant 
mental experiences which constitute our continued suffering.  Moral agents too are described 
quite differently.  They are not evaluated by way of their moral choices or strength of will, but 
with respect to their metaphysical perspectives.  In Buddhism, an inaccurate view of the world 
accompanies vice while an accurate view of the world accompanies virtue and is what makes 
someone praiseworthy. 
 Buddhist ethics as moral transformation derives from the insight found in the Four Noble 
Truths, that the cause of suffering and its solution are based on the interdependent relationship 
between confusion, the experience of negative mental states, and action.  For Buddhists, then, 
common Western ethical concerns, such as determining the morally preferred action, defining 
duties, and describing welfare, all become secondary concerns.  As Carpenter (2015) notes, 
“liberating insight remains the ultimate good by which the goodness of practices and dispositions 
is measured” (p. 40).  The primary concern is not with dispositions to act, but with a type of 
phenomenology; what it means to become ethical is the development of a more accurate 
metaphysical vision of the world, so as to bring about positive mental states and actualize 
awakened experience. 
Conclusion  
In response to Keown, I have argued that Buddhist ethics is structurally incompatible 
with Aristotelian virtue ethics.  Yet one may object that for Buddhist ethics to be a form of virtue 
ethics, it need not take the form of ethics that Aristotle outlined.  Still, even modern versions of 
virtue ethics, which differ considerable from Aristotle’s version, emphasize the relationships 
between virtue, practical wisdom, and some equivalent to eudemonia.  As I have argued, 
Buddhist ethics is not primarily occupied with an investigation into virtues and how they 
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constitute human flourishing.  Virtues ground the structure of virtue ethics, yet Buddhist ethics is 
grounded not in virtues, but in a concern for the accuracy with which we view ourselves in 
relation to the world.  The moral problem in Buddhism is not some failure to live in accordance 
with virtue, but is a confused way of seeing the world and our place in it.  
Buddhist accounts of morality and psychology emphasize the importance of specific 
mental activities in contributing to how we come to perceive our world, and, importantly, how 
we incorrectly superimpose exaggerated qualities onto objects and events.  Ordinary suffering 
experience is conditioned by a wrong way of thinking about ourselves and the world, such as 
regarding impermanent things as permanent, considering dependently existent things to exist 
essentially, and not understanding the destructive nature of unhealthy mental states.  By contrast, 
awakened experience can be described as an insight into the nature of ourselves and the world.  
This insight is an accurate experiential understanding of phenomena, including a recognition of 
their qualities of impermanence and selflessness, and also awareness of the destructive nature of 
unhealthy emotions.  
It is true that virtues arise from seeing the world in a correct way, but the transformation 
of vision emphasized in Buddhist ethical writings is not good because of its relationship with 
virtues; it is good because it is metaphysically accurate.  It is this moral outlook, not virtues, that 
is emphasized as foremost in Buddhist ethics, and this is why Buddhist ethical thought is more 
accurately understood as a kind of moral phenomenology rather than as a form of virtue ethics.  I 
will argue that evidence for this position can be found explicitly in the Mahāyāna text tradition, 
in which virtues such as generosity are not considered perfected until they are accompanied with 
a correct metaphyscial view.  
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In the next two chapters, I will argue that it is our view of the world that constitutes the 
good in Buddhism.  First, I will explain how many of the mental activities identified by Keown 
as morally significant, such as cetanā, feeling, and ascertainment are indeed morally relevant, 
but their moral relevance is unrelated to regulating virtues.  Instead, an understanding of the way 
they function together supports a reading of Buddhist ethics as a kind of moral phenomenology.  
This is because they play an important role in how we take up the world. 
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Chapter Four:  
Buddhist Theories of Perception and Experience and their Relation to Ethics 
In this chapter, I provide an account of the basic structure of experience as described in 
the Buddhist psychological texts of Vasubandhu, Asaṅga, and Buddhaghosa, which I propose 
provide the first step in appreciating Buddhism's unique approach to ethics – an approach 
distinguished by its phenomenological emphasis.  I have argued that, although the immediate 
consequences of our actions are important considerations in Buddhist ethical writings, they are 
not the primary concern, and because of this, it is a mistake to consider Buddhist ethics to be a 
type of consequentialism.  I have also argued that, although the primary concern in Buddhist 
ethical writings is the mental aspect of the agent, Buddhist psychology and ethical thought  
markedly differ from the structure of virtue ethics.  
The moral tension in Buddhist ethical writings is best described as a tension between two 
experiential states as opposed to the regulation of the rational and emotional parts of ourselves.  
Moreover, the moral solution relies on the relationship between how we understand the world 
and the way we experience it, rather than the development of moral strength or practical wisdom.  
Having thus differentiated Buddhist ethics from consequentialism and virtue ethics approaches, 
the central claim in this chapter is that fundamental and unique to Buddhist ethics is the moral 
emphasis it places on the cognitive manner with which agents take up their world: how they 
perceive themselves, others, and events.  
I will first argue that for Buddhists, perception is not a passive process; instead, it is 
always accompanied by other mental activity, which makes it part of an active interpretive 
process.  I will then argue that this interpretive function is morally significant.  Agents perceive 
the same persons, objects, and events in often drastically divergent ways.  Whether we see 
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someone as a friend, an enemy, or a stranger, I will argue, is ethically significant according to 
Buddhist moral theories.  I will also argue that the way a person engages with the world 
determines the moral status of that individual.  A morally mature person sees the world in a 
specific way. 
4.1 Two Perspectives on Perception: Buddhist Psychology and Buddhist Epistemology  
Several of the most important treatises on Buddhist psychology were written in the fourth 
century.  In the Sanskrit Buddhist tradition, two of the most influential authors of this era were 
Vasubandhu and Asaṅga, while around this same time Buddhaghosa left a profound mark on the 
Pāli tradition.  Each of these three Buddhist philosophers played a significant role in shaping the 
Buddhist literary landscape, and most notable here is that each wrote influential treatises treating 
psychology, outlining the various types of mental actions and their functions.  
The Abhidharma project of these Buddhist philosophers was an attempt to systematize 
the array of diverse teachings of the Buddha found in the collection of sūtras into a single 
coherent presentation.  The methodology employed was to assemble key concepts into common 
categories and explicate their definitions and functions.  There are many ways one might 
construct and organize the type of lists (mātṛkā) found in the Abhidharma texts, and the choices 
these authors made in terms of what they chose to include as well as the relationships between 
categories that they chose to emphasize can tell us as much about their philosophical views as the 
actual content of the lists.  
At first glance, these texts might seem to be primarily concerned with reducing 
phenomena to their essential components, so as to produce a type of ontological hierarchy.  On 
closer inspection, however, we find that these texts provide much more than a system of 
metaphysical classification.  Abhidharma texts categorize and describe the complex relationships 
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among mental phenomena, showing particular concern with assigning each mental phenomenon 
a moral value, even when that moral value is determined to be neutral.  With this in mind, we can 
understand that these texts were produced with the intention of not only providing metaphysical 
knowledge, but also offering psychological and moral insights. 
The concepts defined in these texts would become foundational not only to those 
Buddhist philosophers who emphasized psychologically based systems, such as Sthiramati and 
Dharmapāla, but also to the founders of the Buddhist epistemological tradition, such as Dignāga 
and Dharmakīrti, who developed their system based upon important Abhidharmic terms, such as 
svalakṣaṇa (specifically characterized) and sāmānyalakṣaṇa (generally characterized), which 
became fundamental in differentiating sources of knowledge.  
While the psychological and epistemological treatises all address the mind and 
perception, they diverge in their perspective, emphasis, and agenda in discussing this domain.  
The epistemological texts are concerned with developing a shared vocabulary for resolving 
epistemological and metaphysical disagreements by describing the mechanics of perception and 
inference, and also determining valid sources of knowledge.  By contrast, the psychological texts 
of Vasubandhu, Asaṅga, and Buddhaghosa emphasize the mapping of the mind and 
contextualize different mental states and mental activities within a soteriological framework.  For 
these earlier authors, the primary intent in describing mental actions and their functions was to 
explicate how they contribute to or alleviate suffering.  To this end, instead of deriving an 
explanation of the structure of the mind from an established metaphysical position, these texts 
take a phenomenological approach, often describing the various mental events and their 
functions from the perspective of first person experience. 
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In this chapter, I will be drawing primarily on the Buddhist psychological texts rather 
than those of the epistemological tradition, since it is the Buddhist psychological treatises that 
are explicitly ethical.  Their ethical account is linked with a first person account of mental 
activity.  They outline the basic structure of experience wherein perception is clearly explained 
as an active rather than passive process.  These texts offer a description of an experience of that 
mental activity, not merely a technical account.  They explain not only what the mental event is 
like, but what it is like for the experiencer.  
For instance, when describing pride or joy, the subject matter is the experience of pride 
and joy, or as Nagel might put it, "what is it like" to be prideful or joyful?  To give just a few 
examples, when Asaṅga explains pride (māna, nga rgyal) in his Compendium of Higher 
Knowledge, he describes it as an experience of the "inflation (khengs pa) of the mind."48  When 
he explains the experience of sleep he describes it as a withdrawal (sdud pa) of the mind and 
categorizes it as a type of dullness.49  Here, Asaṅga clearly describes mental events not only as 
actions, but also speaks from an experiential perspective.  Vasubandhu takes a similar 
experientially descriptive approach, and when discussing the different kinds of mental events in 
the Examination of the Five Aggregates, for example, he describes the mental event of 
constructive effort (vīrya, brtson 'grus) as a mind that is delighted (spro ba) with respect to 
virtue.50  He describes equanimity (upekṣā, btang snyoms) as an evenness (mnyam pa nyid) of 
mind, remaining in a natural and effortless state.51  This type of phenomenological emphasis has 
a long history in Buddhism, tracing all the way back to the Buddha's description of experience as 
suffering (duḥkha).  
                                                
48 'jig tshogs la lta ba la brten nas sems khengs pa  (D4049: 49a). 
49 sems sdud pa gti mug gi char gtogs pa (D4049:52a). 
50 gde ba la sems mngon par spro ba'o (D4059:13a). 
51 sems mnyam pa nyid dang / sems rnal du 'dug pa dang / sems lhun gyis grub pa yang thob pa (D4049: 
12B). 
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While Dignāga, the founder of Buddhist epistemology, describes perception simply as 
"that which is free from conceptualization (kalpanā),"52  and maintains that perception takes only 
real particulars (svalakṣaṇa) as its object, from the perspective of the Buddhist psychological 
texts, such an explanation is merely a theoretical distinction since we never actually have an 
experience of sense data alone.  Instead, perception is always accompanied by other mental 
activities that shape the context of our experience.  We never experience raw sensations in 
isolation, and there is never a moment in which experience is characterized by a completely 
objective representation of the specific characteristics of a given phenomenon. 
 Candrakīrti criticizes the Logicians’ description of perception (pratyakṣa) because it 
strays from that of worldly convention, since such analysis of a sense object perceived devoid of 
conception is not found in ordinary experience.53  To take perception and isolate it from other 
mental actions, such as feeling, is to venture into the realm of the purely hypothetical.  
Perception is complemented by memories of past experience, regrets, feelings, interests, hopes, 
and desires.  These mental activities influence the way in which we intend different properties of 
the object, and in doing so, shape the way we see persons, objects, and events.  From this 
perspective, seeing should not be thought of as the eye passively receiving whatever it comes 
into contact with, like a mirror reflecting whatever happens to be in front of it.  Instead, seeing is 
enriched experience influenced by our emotions and other cognitive capacities.  Perception is 
part of an interpretive process, and is just one piece of the jigsaw puzzle that makes up 
experience.  
I will next argue that the way in which we perceive matters morally, through an 
explanation of how the basic structure of experience includes a number of mental activities 
                                                
52 Pramāṇasamuccaya 1.3c: pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham. See reconstruction of Chapter One of the 
Pramāṇasamuccaya by Steinkellner, 2005, p. 2. 
53 See Prasannapadā, Ruegg, 2002, pp. 119-30. 
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operating simultaneously.  These include functions such as categorization and affective valence, 
which make the very act of perception morally significant. 
4.2 The Basic Structure of Experience: A Buddhist Perspective 
The Buddhist psychological texts outline in intricate detail the important mental 
components of experience, explicating a range of different mental activities that together provide 
a topological description of our experience.54  In his Compendium of Higher Knowledge, Asaṅga 
outlines 51 important mental activities, and this same list of 51 is provided by Vasubandhu, with 
some changes to the order and definitions, in his Examination of the Five Aggregates.55 Here, 
these mental actions are classified into six groups:  
1. Five Constantly Operative Mental Processes (sarvatra-ga, kun 'gro) 
2. Five Determined Mental Processes (viniyata, yul nges)  
3. Eleven Constructive Mental Processes (kuśula, dge ba) 
4. Six Main Destructive Mental Processes (mūlakleśa, rtsa nyon) 
5. Twenty Secondary Destructive Mental Processes (upakleśa, nye nyon) 
6. Four Variable Mental Processes (aniyata gzhan 'gyur) 
It is the first group, the constantly operative mental processes, that is of particular importance for 
the present discussion on the basic structure of experience.  This list outlines the five types of 
mental activity that accompany every moment of awareness, which are the building blocks of 
experience.  In his Examination of the Five Aggregates, after enumerating 51 mental activities, 
                                                
54 Not included in these lists are mental activities that were to become important to Mahāyāna schools 
such as generosity (sbyin-pa), ethical discipline (tshul-khrims), patience (bzod-pa), love (byams-pa), 
and compassion (snying-rje). 
55 In the Abhidharmakośa, Vasubandhu provides a similar list of mental activities, but includes only forty-
six. In the Theravāda system, the Abhidhammattha-sangaha by Anuraddha also outlines fifty-one 
subsidiary awarenesses. 
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Vasubandhu explains that the first five "are always active,"56 and identifies the five constantly 
operative mental processes as: (1) feeling (vedanā, tshor ba), (2) ascertainment (saṃjñā, 'du 
shes), (3) intention (cetanā, sems pa), (4) contact (sparśa, reg pa), and (5) attention (manaskāra, 
yid la byed pa).57  Asaṅga provides the same list of five in his Compendium of Higher 
Knowledge,58 and the Enumeration of Phenomena (Dhammasaṅgaṇi), a foundational 
Abhidharma text found in the Pāli Canon, also gives a similar list of five mental activities that 
always accompany consciousness.59 
These five constantly operative mental processes provide us with the basic description of 
experience. In Vasubandhu's Thirty Verses (Triṃśikā), he specifically highlights how these five 
mental activities accompany all types of awareness, stating that while each apprehension of the 
six types of objects (visible, auditory, tactile, olfactory, taste, and mental) may be associated with 
a variety of different mental activities, they are always accompanied by the five constantly 
operative mental processes (7- 8ab).60  In his commentary on these lines, Sthiramati adds that 
"The five dharmas of contact, attention, and so forth, accompany all moments of mind, and thus 
they are constantly operative.”61  Not only do the constantly operative mental processes 
accompany all types of awareness, but they are also present regardless of the subtlety of mind.  
                                                
56 Shastri, 1955: eteśāṃ pañca sarvatragāḥ (29); D4059: de rnams las lnga ni kun tu 'gro ba'o/ (12b) 
57 In his Abhidharmakośa Vasubandhu gives a list of ten constantly operative mental processes, however 
this is not his own position, but is according to the Vaibhāṣika text tradition. 
58 See Boin-Webb, 2001, p. 75. 
59 The first four in this list are the same as found in Vasubandhu and Asaṅga's lists; however, here rather 
that attention (manaskāra), the fifth mental activity, is listed as conscious awareness (citta). Heim notes 
that in the Pāli tradition the list later expanded to also include attention, vitality, and oneness of mind. See 
Heim, 2014, p. 92. 
60 yatrajastanmayairanyaiḥ sparśādyaiścārhato na tat / na nirodhasamāpattau mārge lokottare na ca // 
Tvk_7 // dvitīyaḥ pariṇāmo 'yaṃ tṛtīyaḥ ṣaḍvidhasya yā /. 
61 te punaḥ sparśamanaskārādayaḥ pañca dharmāḥ sarvacittam anugacchantīti sarvatragāḥ |. (Tvbh, 
Buescher 2007: 72). 
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In verse three of the Thirty Verses, Vasubandhu explains that these five mental activities are 
required even for very subtle states in which awareness is not fully conscious.  He states, 
Its appropriations, states, and perceptions are not fully conscious, 
Yet it is still always connected with contact, attention, knowledge, ascertainment, and 
directing thought.(3) (trans. Anacker 2005, p. 186)62   
 
In his commentary on this verse, Sthiramati notes that here "knowledge" refers to feeling, and 
adds that the term "always" refers to the fact that for as long as there is ordinary existence 
(specifically here he mentions as long as the store-consciousness exists), it is connected with 
these constantly operative mental processes.63  
It is clear, then, that for these Buddhist psychologists, these five mental activities are 
essential properties of awareness, and without all five, experience would be incomplete.  These 
constantly operative mental processes provide us with the basic structure of experience, and a 
detailed understanding of this structure, I suggest, is crucial for Buddhist ethics.  An appreciation 
of how contact, feeling, ascertainment, intention, and attention operate to create our experience 
of the world reveals how the way we take up the world is central to Buddhist ethical practice.  
How Buddhists explain the intentional and subjective nature of awareness and its ethical 
implications will now be explained in further detail as we examine each of these mental 
activities.  
4.2.1 Contact  
Contact (sparśa, reg pa) is an important component of perceptual etiology in Indian 
philosophy.  For an object to be taken up as the content of a perception, there needs to be a 
causal link between that object and the sense faculty; this causal link is termed "contact" (sparśa, 
reg pa).  In Buddhist psychological texts, contact is explained as the coming together of an 
                                                
62 asaṃviditakopādisthānavijñaptikañ ca tat | sadā sparśamanaskāravitsaṃjñācetanānvitam | 3 (Tvbh 
Buescher 2007, p. 54)  
63  Buescher, 2007, p. 10. 
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object (artha, yul), sense faculty (indriya, dbang po), and consciousness (vijñāna, rnam shes).  
Although described as a "meeting," there is a causal relation at work, with the meeting of the 
object and the sense faculty, giving rise to consciousness in the following moment.  This 
explanation raises some interesting questions and themes that will continue throughout this 
discussion on the basic structure of Buddhist experience.  For example, contact is said to be 
always operative, and yet in this explanation, it would seem that there is contact only when a 
sense faculty interacts with an object that is present.  What role, then, does contact play in 
hallucination or perceptual illusions?  
We might also wonder about the relationship between contact, memory, and perception.  
For example, from past experience, I know that roses are fragrant; so, whenever I see a rose, 
even though it may be too far away to smell, part of the content of that experience of perceiving 
the rose has to do with its fragrance.  In this example, the content having to do with fragrance 
cannot come from contact with the present object but must be derived from recollection of a 
previous contact event.  The causes of perception, such as that of a rose or a perceptual illusion, 
appear to be much more complex than merely the meeting of a sense object and sense faculty.  
A more complete picture of the causes for perception will emerge from the progressive 
explanation of the other four constantly operative mental processes and their interaction.  At this 
point in the discussion, it is important to note that contact does not refer merely to the interaction 
between a sense faculty and an object, but also refers to the mental event that arises from the 
meeting.  It is not simply the enabling conditions for consciousness, but rather a mental activity 
in and of itself.  In his Examination of the Five Aggregates, Vasubandhu says,  
And what is contact? It is the distinguishing which comes after the three (sense-organ, 
object-of-sense, and corresponding consciousness) have met together.” (trans. Anacker, 
2005, p. 67, emphasis added) 
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The inclusion of contact as one of the constantly operating mental activities indicates a 
recognition both that perception is causally produced and that consciousness has an intentional 
structure.  Contact provides the foundation for the Buddhist understanding that our experience of 
the world is causally produced, constructed by a complex and interdependent array of mental 
functions.  It is important to note that in this explanation of the causes for perception, there is no 
requirement for an agent that perceives, and the ethical implication of this type of “agentless 
perception” will be taken up later in Chapter Five.  At this point we will continue to examine the 
structure of the experience that arises with contact.  The basic description of consciousness given 
by the Buddha in the sūtras as clear and knowing (gsal zhing rig pa) explains that consciousness 
involves subjective awareness and is always directed towards an object.64  Here, clarity refers to 
the mind's ability to take an object, and knowing represents the mind's subjective quality.  To be 
a mind is to be aware, and to be aware is to be aware of something.  It is this psychological 
structure of knowing (rig pa) and clarity (gsal), representation and subjectivity, that grounds the 
mental activities central to Buddhist moral phenomenology.  This basic aspect of knowing is 
fundamental for the mental activity of ascertainment, and the subjective aspect that is engendered 
by contact is important as a basis for feeling.  In his Commentary on the Thirty Verses, 
Sthiramati explains that contact's "action is to serve as support for feeling."65  We will now turn 
to investigating these mental activities to highlight their role in Buddhist moral phenomenology 
starting with feeling. 
 
 
                                                
64 See, for example, the Sutra of the Questions of Vimalaprabha (Vimalaprabha-paripṛcchā sūtra) 
65 Sanskrit: sparśaḥ… vedanā saṃniśrayadāna-karmanaḥ / (Buescher, 2007, p. 9); Tibetan: reg 
pa… tshor ba’i rten byed pa’i las can no / (Toh. 4064: 150B); See also Vinitadeva’s Triṃśikāṭīkā: reg pa 
ni tshor ba’i rten gyi dngos par ‘gyur te / ‘di ni ‘di’i las so / (Toh. 4070: 17A). 
 123 
4.2.2 Feeling 
Another inextricable aspect of experience is feeling (vedanā, tshor ba).  In Buddhist texts, 
feeling is commonly described as an experience (anubhava, nyams su myong).  Commenting on 
the Thirty Verses, Sthiramati states, "Feeling has experience as its essential nature."66  Here, 
feeling does not refer merely to physical sensations,67 or to moods such as excitement or 
boredom.  Instead, it refers primarily to an active way of relating to objects.  Feeling here refers 
to the affect with which we take up an object.  Buddhist psychologists identified affect as an 
important component of every experience.  As we experience things, we have a positive, neutral, 
or negative valence in conjunction with our experience of objects.  To experience the world is 
not simply to capture a representation of it, but to relate to it in some way, to feel something 
associated with what we perceive.  Buddhist psychologists, such as Vasubandhu and Asaṅga, 
often use movement as a device to give phenomenological accounts.  For example, a positive 
valence is explained as attraction towards an object of experience, whereas negative valence is 
explained as wanting distance from an object of experience.  Feeling is ethically significant 
because it provides the underpinnings for the mental activities of desire and hatred, two of the 
three “poisons” that are said to motivate immoral action and cause suffering.  
 Vasubandhu defines feeling in his Examination of the Five Aggregates as follows:  
What are feelings? They are experiences, and are of three kinds: pleasure, pain, and that 
which is neither pleasure nor pain” (trans. Anacker, 2005, p. 66).68   
 
In his definitions of pleasure and pain, Vasubandhu describes feeling as an internal relationship 
between subject and object.  Feeling is explained as a type of mental posturing either towards an 
                                                
66 Sanskrit: vedanā anubhavasvabhāvā | (Buescher, 2007, p. 10); Tibetan: tshor ba ni myong ba'i rang 
bzhin no (Toh. 4064: 151A). 
67 That Buddhists conceive of feeling as not necessarily related to the body or form is apparent from 
Buddhist cosmology, which includes formless realm beings who also have feeling related only to thought. 
68 atha vedanā salakṣaṇaprabhedā vedanā katamā / trividho 'nubhavaḥ / sukhaḥ duḥkhaḥ 
aduḥkhāsukhaśca // 20 //.  
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object or away from the object.  Pleasure (sukha) is described by Vasubandhu in this same text as 
something that a person wants to experience again after it has ended, while pain is something 
that a person wants to separate from once it has arisen.69  A neutral feeling (aduḥkhasukha) is 
obviously not an experience of nothing, nor is it a type of mental numbness; rather, it is a way of 
experiencing an object in which we are not concerned with whether or not the experience 
continues.  Although feeling is generally categorized in these three ways, it actually refers to a 
spectrum of experience from pain to pleasure with neutral feeling as the midpoint along the 
spectrum of feeling.  
The Buddhist understanding of feeling is not a passive experience, a type of mental state 
that overcomes us.  Instead, it is said to arise through its own power (rang stobs kyis).  Feeling 
causes us to act, in that we pursue things based on pleasant feelings, and avoid other things due 
to unpleasant feelings.  This has broad ethical implications.  In the first turning of the wheel, the 
Buddha said that the cause of suffering is acting out of craving, and, as Śāntideva tells us, 
"craving has its cause in feeling" (IX.47).70 It would be wrong to interpret the Buddhist 
description of feeling as simply a response to the characteristics of the object of experience.  
Although feeling arises based on contact with a particular object, and although we crave objects 
that we associate with pleasant feelings and wish to avoid objects that we associate with 
unpleasant feelings, Vasubandhu describes the pleasantness or unpleasantness of feeling as 
determined by karma, and not by the characteristics of the object.  Feeling is a way of taking up 
an object that has more to do with our own psychology than with the characteristics of objects.  
In his commentary to Vasubandhu's Thirty Verses, Sthiramati states, “Experience is that by 
which individuals experience the ripening of the result of virtuous and non-virtuous action 
                                                
69 ibid. 
70 Sanskrit: vedanāpratyayā tṛṣṇā vedanaiṣāṁ ca vidyate| 
 125 
(karma).”71  To say that feelings arise from karma is a recognition that one object may give rise 
to a range of different feelings in dependence upon the subject.  Different people at different 
times in different contexts may experience an object in very different ways.  Rather than 
experiencing a particular property of the object, feeling might best be thought of as a particular 
way of intending an object.   As Geshe Rabten (1992) explains,  
Pleasure and pain are not the objects of feeling.  They are the feeling or experience itself.  
Thus they are the nature of consciousness and arise in dependence upon the mind's 
coming into contact with its various objects.  Feeling is therefore the inherent quality of 
experience present in every mental state. (p. 110) 
 
The objects of the world are given to us accompanied by a certain feeling; however, this feeling, 
while arising from contact with the object, is not an external feature of the object with which we 
are engaged.  Feeling is not created through the passive reception of information from an 
external world.  Rather, feeling is a mental activity that intermingles with perceptions to give us 
our experience of the world.  Feeling helps to give meaning to an object.  What it is like to 
perceive a friend is experientially different from what it is like to perceive an enemy, and 
Buddhist ethical texts describe this experiential difference as a closeness that we feel with friends 
and a distance that we feel with strangers and enemies.  Although this distinction is described in 
terms of distance, it is not something that we can account for in objective, measurable terms.  
Such an experience of closeness and distance is indicative of a phenomenological account.  
Feeling has a particularly close relationship with ascertainment (saṃjñā) in producing our 
perceptions; before moving on to this next mental activity, it is useful to understand the mutual 
influence these two activities have on each other.  For instance, when ascertaining that a 
particular car is "my car," there is a range of feelings that can color it, from the pleasant feeling 
                                                
71 Sanskrit: śubhāśubhānāṃ karmaṇāṃ phalavipākaṃ pratyanubhavanty anenety anubhavaḥ | (Buescher, 
2007, p. 54); Tibetan: las dge ba dang, mi dge ba rnams kyi 'bras bu rnam par smin pa 'dir myong bar 
byed pas myong ba (Toh. 4064: 151A) 
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of "my new car" to the very different experience of "my car after it has been badly damaged in 
an accident."  The interdependent relationship between ascertainment and feeling, and their 
important roles in influencing how we perceive our world is perspicuously demonstrated by a 
variety of neurological disorders called delusional misidentification disorders.  Perception can be 
understood as based not only on the identification of physical features, but also on an affective 
quality that the person feels towards the person or thing.  This is evidenced in the Capgras 
delusion and the Fregoli delusion, in which the affective and cognitive aspects of recognition are 
respectively inhibited.  
 The Capgras delusion in which the affective aspect of recognition is inhibited was 
identified by Capgras and Reboul-Lachaux. This delusion demonstrates the problems that arise 
when the aspect of feeling, here an experience of closeness, is absent when encountering 
someone we know well.  The Capgras delusion was originally referred to as the "L'illusion des 
sosies," since the person affected by the neurological disorder believes that someone close to 
them, such as a spouse, parent, or close friend, has been replaced with a double, an impostor.  
The afflicted person would admit that the "impostor" looked identical to their close acquaintance 
and even acted the same, that they had the same mannerisms and also used the same language.  
Such an individual, however, would insist that there was something different about the person in 
question, and that the person simply did not feel like their acquaintance and must therefore be an 
impostor.  
Ramachandran (1998) and later Young (2008) studied cases of Capgras delusion and 
demonstrated that, while people who are shown a picture of someone close to them, such as their 
mother, will generally exhibit a strong galvanic skin response (GSR), which is used to measure 
an affective response, those with Capgras syndrome, show very little change in GSR.   In other 
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words, they were able to identify the person as looking like someone they were close to, but they 
showed little of the emotional response normally associated with seeing a close acquaintance.  
These cases highlight the importance of a feeling of closeness or familiarity, which accompanies 
the physical identification of a close acquaintance.  Without the "right" feeling, the person is 
identifiable but not recognizable.  Although the world is understood through ascertaining the 
characteristics of things, equally important is the way we understand the world through how we 
feel about that which we encounter.  
We also find the opposite case wherein some individuals possess an affective response 
toward someone, a sense of familiarity, but are unable to identify the person.  Patients with this 
disorder, known as prosopagnosia, are unable to identify what should be familiar faces, although 
they exhibit a strong galvanic skin response indicating a semblance of recognition on an 
emotional level (Bauer, 1984).  A more extreme example of an affective recognition without 
identification is the Fregoli delusion, also known as a delusion of doubles.  Individuals with 
Fregoli delusion experience a strong emotional reaction to strangers (Mojtabai, 1994).  While 
they cannot identify the person, they have a strong sense that they know them.  This leads to the 
delusion in which the individual believes that a single person takes on a variety of appearances or 
disguises.  These cases demonstrate the cognitive dissonance that can arise when the two 
different aspects of perception, cognitive and affective, are not in accord.  Moreover, they 
highlight the important role that both ascertainment and feeling play in how we make sense of 
the world. 
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4.2.3 Ascertainment 
Saṃjñā ('du shes), sometimes problematically translated as discrimination, perception, or 
cognition,72 is perhaps best understood as ascertainment, a specific type of mental activity that 
assigns meaning (tha snyad 'dogs pa) to a particular object through apprehending ('dzin pa) the 
identifying characteristics (nimitta, mtshan ma) of that object.73  It is involved in all moments of 
consciousness, whether conceptual or non-conceptual, correct or mistaken, and it forms the basis 
for higher levels of mental activity that assign names, compare, identify, and categorize 
objects.74  Sthiramati, in his commentary on the Examination of the Five Aggregates, explains 
that to apprehend identifying characteristic means to discern, for example, that something is blue 
or yellow.75  In his Commentary on the Treasury of Higher Knowledge (Abhidharmakośa-
bhāṣya), Vasubandhu explains that ascertainment apprehends not only basic qualities such as 
blue or yellow, but also relative qualities such as long or short, and classifications such as female 
or male, friend or enemy, and so on.76 In this section, I will lay the foundation for an argument 
that ascertainment is ethically significant because the way we think about the world has moral 
implications.  
Ascertainment and feeling are identified as two of the most important mental activities 
that determine the quality of our experience.  They are considered so important in the Buddhist 
understanding of the components and influencers of experience that, when Buddhist 
psychological treatises explain the mental domain, they separate these two mental activities and 
                                                
72 Saṃjñā, 'du shes, is translated as perception by Boin-Webb (2001, p. 1), cognition by Anacker (2005, p. 
65), discrimination by Hopkins (1996, p. 239), and sensation by Guenter (2011, p. 39).  
73 In the case of conceptual consciousness which does not have mtshan-nyid, the outstanding feature 
(bkra-ba) of the appearing object is what is distinguished. 
74 During the time of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, the complex Buddhist theory of conception and how we 
distinguish different objects apoha / gzhan-sel had not yet been put forward and as such should not be 
confused with this explanation of distinguishing. 
75 See Engle, 2009, p. 271. 
76 Commenting on Abhidharmakośa I.14c2-d. 
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give them their own classification as two of the five skandhas, the divisions of all conditioned 
phenomena.  The reason for this, Vasubandhu explains in the Commentary on the Treasury of 
Higher Knowledge, is that feeling and ascertainment are identified as the main causes for the 
unsatisfactory nature of ordinary experience (saṃsāra) and for the “two roots of dispute,” since 
feeling causes clinging to desires (kāma-adhyavasāna) and ascertainment brings about clinging 
to wrong views (dṛṣṭi-adhyavasāna).77   In the last section, we dealt with how feeling was the 
basis for craving, and now we turn to the way in which ascertainment is a cause for wrong views.  
Perceiving the world involves the process of giving meaning to it.  Ascertainment is not 
only representation, but also identification.  As Vasubandhu mentions, we not only discern blue 
and yellow, but also long and short, friend and enemy.  We assign subjective values to objects, 
and then define them by this subjective evaluation.  For example, when we say, “the movie was 
long,” or “time flew,” ascertainment gives objects a sense of time and space that transcends any 
objective measurement.  
The process of assigning meaning to things is an important component of the way we 
experience them.  It is not only that we superimpose meaning onto experience, but that to 
experience is to make meaning.  In making meaning, ascertainment often instills in our 
experience misinformation and certain biases, of which we are often unaware.  These biases 
influence our actions which has obvious moral significance for Buddhists, who understand that a 
misunderstanding of the things and events in one's world leads to harmful behavior.  Here, 
harmful behavior refers to actions that create suffering for ourselves and others in the future.  
Often in Buddhist texts, cognitions are described as valid (pramāṇa, tshad ma) or invalid.  It 
might seem strange to describe a cognition in this way; however, it refers to the reliability of the 
cognition, in terms of it creating more or less confusion.   
                                                
77 See Abhidharmakośa I.21 and commentary. 
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Buddhist texts are filled with references to mirages and illusions to demonstrate how we 
often misapprehend our world and how this confusion is the cause of much of our suffering.  As 
Jan Westerhoff (2010) explains,  
The Buddhist texts state that there is a close connection between the existence of illusion 
and the existence of suffering. According to the Buddhist worldview, the existence of 
suffering is neither a necessary feature of the world nor the consequence of a specific fact 
about the past (such as the fall of Adam), but is rather due to an intellectual error that is 
mistaken about the way things exist. (p. 7)  
 
Optical illusions, being perceptual rather than conceptual, illustrate quite well how ascertainment 
is a fundamental component in shaping and sometimes distorting our world at a perceptual level. 
As mentioned, ascertainment is the mental action of assigning meaning to an object 
through apprehending its identifying characteristics; the Zollner Illusion below simulates the 
struggle of ascertainment to experience the given stimuli in a meaningful way:  
 
Figure 1. Zollner Illusion 
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This illusion also demonstrates the anticipation that accompanies perception.  Here, the mind 
expects to makes sense of the stimulus, and the unsuccessful struggle to do so creates an 
uncomfortable experience.  This uncomfortable experience might make us averse to the object 
and look away, or we might look even harder at the object to attempt to discern why these 
parallel lines appear otherwise.  Here, we see the interaction between ascertainment and feeling 
at work to produce action in response to the stimulus.  
Ascertainment not only interprets, but also constructs, as it tries to make sense of the 
world, which is demonstrated by another optical illusion, the Hermann Grid Illusion:  
 
Figure 2. Hermann Grid Illusion. 
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Here the dots at the center of each intersection seem to shift between white and black, 
demonstrating that sometimes, through trying to make sense of an object, the act of 
ascertainment causes us to see things that are not there.  This also has obvious implications for 
actions taken on the basis of such ascertainment.  The Buddhist teachings are grounded in the 
principle that suffering is rooted in a mistaken experience of the world.  They emphasize that our 
suffering is largely the result of the maladjusted constructive efforts on the part of our 
perception.  We suffer, and we cause suffering to others because we relate to the world based 
upon the distorted perspective we bring to it.  As we try to make sense of the world with 
conceptual constructs, we fall for the illusions created by our own hypostatization. 
As Sponberg (1985) notes, Mādhyamika scholars such as Candrakīrti are fond of 
recounting a discussion between the Buddha and a disciple regarding how to deal with desire 
towards an illusory woman (p. 23).  The discussion comes from the Dṛdhādhyāṣayaparipṛccha 
Sūtra, wherein the Buddha describes a scenario in which a man attends a magic show.  At the 
show the magician conjures an apparition of a beautiful woman for whom the spectating man 
begins to develop desire.  The man, concerned about the arising of desire in his mind, decides to 
leave the show and contemplate the impurity of that woman.  
The Buddha then queries his student, "Now what do you think, O Son of Good Family, 
has that man done the right thing, or has he done the wrong thing?" (Sponberg, 1985, p. 23).  The 
answer would appear to be quite obvious.  As noted earlier in the section on feeling, one of the 
first teachings the Buddha gave was that suffering arises from craving.  To remove oneself from 
the conditions that give rise to craving and make efforts to develop an opposing emotion is the 
type of response we might expect from a monk or dedicated Buddhist layperson.  However, the 
student responds, "Lord, anyone who contemplates the impurity of a nonexistent woman... has 
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done the wrong thing" (Sponberg, 1985, p. 23).  The Buddha sanctions his answer, saying, "O 
Son of Good Family, in this [same way] whatever monk or nun, or layman or laywoman 
contemplates the impurity of an entity that has never arisen and never existed... has made a 
similar [mistake].  I would not say that such a foolish person is practicing the path" (Sponberg, 
1985, p. 23).  
The above discussion indicates that merely analyzing the surface level content of an 
appearance is not that helpful for resolving the harmful emotions associated with them.  While it 
is true that Buddhist philosophers such as Śāntideva have instructed monks to meditate on the 
"impurities" of the female form so as to lessen desire, this is understood as only a temporary 
solution.  To wrestle with the appearance of an attractive woman as if to manhandle it into the 
appearance of an unattractive woman is considered not only difficult but largely unproductive 
work.  It is similar to staring at one of the perceptual illusions illustrated above, concentrating on 
all the different elements, in the hope that the illusion will go away.  
The Buddha points out that this attempt at a solution, an analysis of the object's 
characteristics, approaches the problem from the wrong side.  For instance, if we approach a 
perceptual illusion, such as a mirage, not through analyzing the content of the appearance, but by 
understanding how it is constructed, appreciating that the appearance of water is actually due to 
the play of light, then this dramatically changes our experience of the phenomenon and also our 
actions in relation to it.  Similarly, the understanding that the content of our experiences is not a 
mirror representation of an external world, but rather is constructed in part due to mental events 
such as feelings, memories, desires, etc., can influence the manner in which we engage with the 
world. The solution, however, is not simply an intellectual correction; additional information 
alone will not resolve the problem, since the error is not purely intellectual. 
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It is important to distinguish between an intellectual insight and an experiential insight 
into the way appearances are misleading.  The intellectual understanding of the mechanics of 
perception alone is not enough for a complete transformation of a person's experience.  As 
Westerhoff (2010) points out,  
The mere intellectual insight into its falsity does not mean that the illusion goes 
away... an illusion is not something that does not exist, but something that is not 
what it seems...  The aim of the Buddhist enterprise is therefore not just to show 
that all things are like illusions because the way they appear is different from the 
way they are.   Its aim is to bring about a complete change in how we perceive 
and conceptualize phenomena.   In this way ignorance is cleared away and, one 
hopes, suffering will completely disappear. (pp. 7-8)  
 
The content of our experiences, although constructed, does exist.  Understanding that these 
things are constructed does not instantly undermine their misleading appearance.  It is less like 
the explanation of a card trick, which instantly dispels the mystique of the trick, and more like an 
explanation of a rainbow as light refracting through water droplets – the rainbow still remains 
after the explanation.  An intellectual solution only takes us so far, for, as Śāntideva reminds us, 
even magicians sometimes fall in love with their illusions.78  
In order to transform the way we see the world, it is said that we must understand not 
only intellectually or theoretically the degree to which the mind constructs our world, but 
experientially, in real time, from a first person perspective.  It is held that this phenomenological 
perspective has the power to fundamentally transform the content of our experience.  How might 
this work?  Here, the explanation differs from the example of a perceptual illusion.  Perceptual 
illusions, like mirages, derive their misleading appearance from particular external 
circumstances.  As mentioned, knowledge of these causal factors usually does not change their 
appearance.  For example, the two lines in the Muller Lyer Illusion (below) look to have 
different lengths even after we know they are equal in length.  
                                                
78 See Guide to Awakened Living, IX:30-31. 
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Figure 3. Muller Lyer Illusion. 
 
However, a considerable part of our experience that is determined by the constructing mental 
factors, such as feeling and ascertainment, contains a certain plasticity that allows for the 
transformation of the way they appear simply through familiarization with their constructed 
nature.  
The continual reflection on the constructed condition of a certain phenomenon affects 
those very mental conditions responsible for the constructed experience, and, in doing so, 
changes the way in which that particular object appears to us.  For instance, familiarization with 
how certain feelings, such as aversion, are in part responsible for the experience of someone as 
an "enemy" can actually lead to a change in the way you feel towards that person and thereby 
transform your experience of him, quite possibly in such a way that you no longer experience 
him as an enemy.  
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This analysis in terms of illusion is not a rejection of an external world, but an 
understanding that our experiences of the world are largely constructed.  The experience of 
friends, family, and strangers is intimately connected with our feelings, ascertainment, and many 
other mental factors, and in a very real way these objects of our experience can themselves be 
transformed though the knowledge of their constructed nature.  The development of an 
experiential rather than intellectual insight into the constructed nature of our experience is 
achieved partly through the work of meditation, which could be described as a training or 
familiarization in this different way of seeing.  It is this transformation of vision, then, that 
guides our actions of speech and body.  
Even though this understanding of ascertainment demonstrates the way in which much of 
our experience is constructed, the fact that it is a construction does not necessarily mean that it 
should be discounted.  The perception of a friend is a construction; however, this does not mean 
that we do not have friends.  Actually, ascertainment has the potential to not only distort the way 
we see the world, but also to serve as an aid for arriving at the correct view.  In fact, it is 
ascertainment that is utilized by Buddhists along with mindfulness and introspection to 
counteract perceptual biases.  
On a practical level, ascertainment is a necessary part of life.  When we see a car, for 
example, we might additionally see it as an expedient means of transportation, or in another 
context we might see a car as something in our way, blocking the road, and if we own the 
particular car, we will "see" the car as "my car."  Our ascertainment is often influenced by 
context, past history, our desires, and our fears, which, while beneficial in some cases, can also 
lead to distortions.  The larger problem is not that we make distinctions, but that we confuse the 
generalizations we ascertain with actual qualities of the object.  The subjective and relational 
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constructions such as friend and enemy, or long and short, are taken as absolute characteristics of 
the object, and this wrong view is considered to be a source of our dissatisfaction and suffering.   
The important Tibetan Mahāyāna ethical text, The Thirty-seven Practices of a 
Bodhisattva (Rgyal sras lag len so bdun ma) highlights how ascertainment has an ethical value.   
In verse fifteen, Thogmay Sangpo says, 
Even if in the midst of a crowd of people,  
Someone exposes your faults and insults you, 
Through the ascertainment of that person as a virtuous friend, 
Respectfully pay homage; this is the practice of a Child of the Victor. (Verse 15)79 
Here, what is emphasized is not physical restraint, but mental activity.  This verse demonstrates 
the potential to exercise a particular kind of ascertainment and directly relates this specific type 
of ascertainment to a certain level of moral development, that of the bodhisattva.  The way you 
"see," or ascertain a person is not only considered ethical activity, but it is also descriptive of the 
ethical status of the moral agent.  The possibility for the transformation of the way we ascertain 
people and events is at the heart of Buddhist moral development. 
4.2.4 Cetanā 
Cetanā has often been translated as volition or intention; however, the use of cetanā in 
Buddhist texts has a much larger semantic range than the term "intention" as used by a modern 
Western philosopher.  In particular, when Buddhist texts describe cetanā, there is no mention of 
beliefs or desires, nor is it described as a product of rational deliberation; instead, it is depicted as 
constructing experiences through arranging and directing other mental activities towards a 
particular object.  Moreover cetanā, as one of the constantly operative mental processes, is 
always present and has an important function during mental states which modern philosophers or 
psychologists would consider unintentional.  For example, even at the moment we 
                                                
79 'gro mang 'dus pa'i dbus su 'ga' zhig gis / mtshang nas 'brus shing tshig ngan smra na yang / de la dge 
ba'i bshes kyi 'du shes kyis / gus par 'dud pa rgyal sras lag len yin /. 
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unintentionally fall asleep, the mental activity of cetanā is operating, directing the mind towards 
the state of sleep.  
The question of an accurate translation for cetanā has been a matter of contention for 
some time.  Herbert Günther (2011) has taken issue with the translation of cetanā by "volition," 
since volition to him suggests only a choice to do something.  He maintains that such a 
translation overlooks the fact that cetanā both arouses and sustains activity.  Such a translation, 
Günther insists, does not convey the sense of drive, the impetus to put the choice into effect 
implied by cetanā, and he comments that,  
the translation of cetanā by 'volition,' is against all evidence and has probably 
been adopted only on account of the fact that the translators of the Abhidharma 
texts did not understand these texts, and also did not know the meaning of the 
English word volition... [Volition] rarely suggests the determination to put one's 
decision or choice into effect. Volition is thus the very reverse of cetanā which 
everywhere is said to put something into effect. (pp. 43-44)   
 
Recently, Karin Meyers (2010) has suggested that, rather than intention, "an intending" is a 
preferable translation for cetanā.  She argues and, I think, with good merit that intention is not 
something one has, but something one does, and that "intending" better captures the verbal 
connotation of cetanā.  Meyers describes cetanā as "a mental activity directed towards an object 
or end and so is something like an intention or, more precisely, 'an intending'" (p. 139).  While 
this captures the directing nature of cetanā, it still does not represent its constructive nature.  We 
should also not confuse cetanā with intention in the sense of choice, will, or a motivational state.  
Vasubandhu, Asaṅga, and Buddhaghosa clearly differentiate cetanā from mental activity that is a 
determined decision, based on belief and desire, to participate in a specific activity.  They give a 
separate classification to this type of mental activity, called chanda.  In his Compendium of 
Higher Knowledge, Asaṅga defines chanda as follows: “What is chanda?  It is the desire-to-
do (kartṛ-kāmatā) which is in direct relation to the desired object.  Its function consists of giving 
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a basis to vigor” (trans. Boin-Webb, 2001, p. 9).  Chanda ('dun pa in Tibetan) refers to a mental 
effort and is also often translated as intention.  Since chanda is related to desire and also an effort 
to engage in action, it seems more closely aligned with the modern use of the term intention than 
the definitions given for cetanā.  Chanda refers to the striving after a particular object, whereas 
cetanā refers to the directed movement of the mind and functions to give cognition its intentional 
nature.  Vasubandhu defines chanda as "a desire for action,"80 highlighting its motivational 
character, and considers it to be present only at certain times rather than always operating like 
cetanā.  This is consistent with a typical Western understanding of intention as a variable mental 
function.81  
While chanda is episodic, cetanā accompanies every moment of experience.  Cetanā is 
equally present at times when we have a strong sense of purpose in the activities we are 
undertaking as well as at times of inadvertent action.  Moreover, Buddhist psychological treatises 
make no mention of different levels of intensity of cetanā.  Just as cetanā is present when 
someone murders motivated by a strong passion, it is equally in attendance when someone 
accidently kills a stranger in a car accident.  Certainly, for Buddhists, there is an ethical 
difference between these cases, and an important part of this difference has to do with 
motivation.  
If asked what the motivation of a murderer was, we would not answer by referencing 
cetanā alone.  Instead, we might question whether the motive was rooted in anger or jealousy.  In 
identifying the motivation, it is sufficient to say anger (khong khro) or jealousy (phrag dog), 
                                                
80 Abhidharmakośabhāyṣa: cchandaḥ karttṛkāmatā / 
81 Indicating the importance of chanda in Buddhist thought, Vasubandhu includes it in the 
Abhidharmakośa as the fourth of ten constantly operative mental processes, according to the Vaibhāśika 
perspective.  This is a variation from his presentations of five such mental actions which exclude chanda.  
Abhidharmakośa II.24: vedanā cetanā saṁjñā cchandaḥ sparśo matiḥ smṛtiḥ| manaskāro'dhimokṣaśca 
samādhiḥ sarvacetasi ||24|| 
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since in Buddhist psychology these emotions are viewed less like passions that overcome us and 
more as actions in which we participate.  Cetanā is clearly distinguished from the harmful mental 
activities, such as jealousy and anger, which in Buddhist psychology are accompanied by cetanā, 
but are distinct from it.  We might still ask whether something was done on purpose or not, as in 
the examples above, in which the murderer had intent to kill, while the person responsible for the 
car accident did not.  As discussed above, however, this idea of acting with purpose is a more apt 
description of chanda than cetanā.  
There is a subtle distinction that can be made among events based on cetanā.  Imagine 
that John lives on the top floor of a ten-story apartment building, and one day, without realizing 
it, he knocks a potted plant off his balcony, and it falls, hitting someone on the head, and kills 
them.  Here, there was clearly no motivation to act violently, such as anger, and John being 
oblivious to all these events, of course, did not have intent or make an effort (chanda) to knock 
down the plant.  At all times, cetanā is directing the movement of John’s mind, yet his mental 
activity was never directed towards either the potted plant or the person who was killed.  In this 
way, we can say that there is no mental karma accumulated with respect to these objects.  There 
is still physical action, which is directly connected to the potted plant; however, this then 
becomes a question of whether or not physical karma would arise from this situation.  
Cetanā is given a moral tone in Buddhist texts.  The moral significance of cetanā 
includes not only its work of directing our physical and verbal action, but also its function of 
directing and organizes all our mental activities.  Vasubandhu begins his discussion on karma in 
his Treasury of Higher Knowledge by explaining that cetanā is a type of karma, in that it directs 
our actions and influences the way we experience the world.  The opening lines of the fourth 
chapter of the Treasury of Higher Knowledge read,  
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The variety of the world arises from action (karma).  [Action (karma)] is cetanā and what 
it produces.  Cetanā is mental action: it engenders bodily and vocal actions. (IV.1)82  
 
Here, Vasubadhu clearly explains that cetanā is a type of karma and that its moral importance 
pertains to how our experience of the world is affected by action.  From this verse, however, 
cetanā has been misunderstood to have an ethical value derived from the assumption that cetanā 
here refers to a type of motivation for actions of body and speech that resembles a decision or 
choice among a number of alternative actions.  This implies that since we choose our actions, we 
are morally responsible for those actions we undertake.  Moreover, it assumes that somehow 
karma is sensitive to this special relationship between voluntariness and moral responsibility, and 
it follows that this sensitivity is an important factor in determining the quality of the karmic 
ripening (vipāka) or karmic fruit (phala).  However, as has already been discussed, such a 
determination based on a belief and desire is a more suitable account of chanda than cetanā.   
The impulse that directs the mind towards an object and the sense of "movement" of the 
mind is referred to as cetanā.  Based on feeling, we have an impulse to mentally "move" towards 
those objects that we associate with pleasant feelings and away from those objects that we 
associate with unpleasant feelings.  The idea that the mind moves is a common theme in 
Buddhist theories of cognition.  In fact, the "all going" or "going everywhere" is the direct 
translation of the Sanskrit sarvaga and Tibetan kun 'gro, which is the name given by 
Vasubandhu in his Examination of the Five Aggregates to these constantly operative mental 
processes that attend every moment of awareness.  
This description of mental activity as a type of movement is reflected in Sanskrit 
terminology.  For example, among the definitions of the verb root √gam which generally means 
"to go," one also finds meanings pertaining to movement of the mind, such as "to think of" and 
                                                
82 las las 'jig rten sna tshogs skyes, de ni sems pa dang des byas/ sems pa yid kyi las yin no, des bskyed lus 
dang ngag gi las/ (Toh. 4089: 10b). 
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"to remember," and when used explicitly with reference to the mind it can also mean, "to 
observe," or "to perceive" (Apte, 1965, p. 648; Monier Williams, 2002, p. 347).  Moreover, the 
past passive participle form of this root, gata, commonly means "known" or "understood" (Apte, 
1965, p. 648; Monier Williams, 2002, p. 347).  The mind "moving" from one life to another is of 
course a fundamental part of the Buddhist notion of rebirth.  
In his Examination of the Five Aggregates, Vasubandhu defines cetanā as follows: “What 
is cetanā? It is mental action, which impels the mind towards good qualities, flaws, and that 
which is neither” (trans. Anacker, 2005, p. 67).  Cetanā is clearly explained here as an activity.  
The mind moving from one object to another is considered a type of mental action; however, the 
activity of cetanā is understood to be much more than directing the mind from one object to 
another.  As it directs the mind towards an object, it also arranges the other mental activities in 
relation to that object and in doing so shapes the experience of attending to this object.  
This constructive function of cetanā missing in Vasubandhu's definition is filled out by Asaṅga's 
explanation of cetanā in his Abhidharmasamuccaya as follows: “What is intention (cetanā)?  It 
is construction by the mind, mental action.  It has the function of applying the mind to virtuous, 
non-virtuous, or neutral [objects].”83  Asaṅga describes cetanā as mental action (manaskara) and 
also as construction by the mind (cittābhisaṃskāra) (trans. Boin-Webb, 2001, p. 8).  The mind is 
directed by cetanā to its object, which may be virtuous (kuśala, dge ba), non-virtuous (akuśala, 
mi dge ba), or neutral.  Put simply, wherever we go physically influences our experience; 
                                                
83. sems pa gang zhe na/ sems mngon par 'du byed pa yid kyi las te/ dge ba dang mi dge ba dang lung du 
ma bstan pa rnams la sems 'jug par byed pa'i las can no/(D4049, 48a-b).  In the context of defining the 
aggregate of compositional factors, Asaṅga further comments: "The six groups of 
volition (cetanā): volition aroused by contact with the eye, volitions aroused by contact with the ear, nose, 
tongue, body and mental organ, by means of which one aims for a good state, one aims for impurity or 
one aims for the discrimination of states (avastbābheda)" (p. 8). 
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likewise, wherever our mind goes and whatever objects it interacts with play a role in shaping 
our experience.  
The constructing function of cetanā is also emphasized by Buddhaghosa who, in his 
commentary on the Dhammasaṅgaṇī, defines cetanā as follows: 
Cetanā is what intends (cetayati), which means that it puts together (abhisandahati) with 
itself its accompanying factors as objects.  Its characteristic is what is intended (cetayita), 
which means that its characteristic it its nature of intention (cetanābhāva).  Its function is 
accumulating (āyūhana). (trans. Heim, 2014, p. 103) 
 
Cetanā need not be thought of as a choice in order to understand how it figures in ethical theory.  
Commenting on Buddhaghosa's position, Heim (2014) argues, "Moral agency is not a choice or 
decision but a moment when our minds put together and arrange our mental factors to experience 
the world in the particular and distinctive ways that we do" (p. 83).  We should think of cetanā 
not as a result of a deliberation, or as a preference to act in a specific way, but as a mental 
activity that is interdependent with other mental activities and which coordinates and directs 
these other mental factors, which then results in our distinctive experience of the world.  It is for 
this reason that cetanā plays a central role in the treatment of Buddhist ethical concepts like 
karma.  
The moral significance of cetanā is linked with that of the mental activities of feeling and 
ascertainment.  These three mental activities work together to direct our attention towards or 
away from objects of our experience, and they are also responsible for engaging the other 
variable mental activities.  Just as contact supports the four other constantly operating mental 
activities, cetanā supports the other 50 mental activities, and in doing so, coordinates the 
construction of our experience.  The moral valence accorded cetanā is, therefore, derived not 
only from its directing capacity, but also from its role in constructing our experience of our 
world. Heim (2014) explains,  
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cetanā is a factor of the mind that coordinates, rallies, and marshals other factors to 
produce the objects of conscious awareness and thus generate action in the world...  
[Cetanā] produces its object by its own work, which means that through its activity this 
property of the mind makes the objects of our experience. (p. 105) 
 
Buddhaghosa explains cetanā to be like a landowner who takes 55 other workers, representing 
the other mental factors, and then coordinates their workers as well as working alongside them.84  
How we mentally orient ourselves in the world influences how we experience it and then also 
what we go on to say and do.  Peter Harvey (2000) describes this relationship between karma and 
the world as follows:  
Out of the mass of sense-data, one only ever gets 'edited highlights' of what lies around 
one. Some people tend to notice pleasant things, while others tend to notice unpleasant 
things; these differences are said to be due to karma. (p. 23) 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, in his Commentary on the Thirty Verses, Sthiramati explains 
how cetanā shapes our experience through an analogy of the pull of a magnet on iron filings.  He 
says, “Cetanā is that movement of the thought which shapes the mind. When this is present, 
thought flows toward an object, just as iron is pulled towards a magnet.”85  Here, Sthiramati 
describes cetanā not as an underlying motive or agenda that directs physical action, but as a 
movement of the mind towards an object which leads other mental activities to engage with a 
particular object simply because they accompany this directed thought.  It is similar to how the 
movement of a body of water in a river carries debris and other objects. Also, just as the 
directional flow of the river is determined not only by the force of the body of water, but also by 
many conditions such as the lay of the land, similarly, although cetanā is described as guiding 
other mental activities, the direction of cetanā can also be influenced by these mental activities, 
including, for example, feeling and ascertainment.  There are also certain mental activities that 
                                                
84 For more on this simile see Heim (2014, p. 104).  
85 cetanā cittābhisaṃskāro manasaś ceṣṭā yasyāṃ satyām ālambanaṃ prati cetasaḥ praspanda iva 
bhavaty ayaskāntavaśād ayaḥpraspandavat /. (Buescher, 2007, p. 58). 
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work against the directional current of cetanā, which can co-opt it.  These mental activities, such 
as mindfulness and introspection, become important in Buddhist ethical practice, including 
meditation and they will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.  
In How to Lead an Awakened Life, Śāntideva highlights the importance of the mental 
activities that accompany an act in determining the moral status of the agent: “‘If I give it away, 
then what will I have to enjoy?’  This thinking concerned for oneself is the way of ghosts.  ‘If I 
enjoy this, then what will I have to give?’  This thinking concerned for others is the way of gods” 
(VIII.125).86  Here, Śāntideva does not emphasize the acts of giving and consuming themselves, 
but rather the experience, and particularly the feelings, associated with the acts.  The moral status 
of the agent here is represented by the form of birth, birth as a god representing a higher moral 
status than birth as ghost.  Śāntideva does not make his case for morality based upon obligations 
or by referencing the collection of merit.  Instead, he directly relates the experiential aspect of 
these actions with ways of taking up the world, which have obvious moral overtones. 
Cetanā helps construct our experience through directing our attention towards objects as 
well as through recruiting other mental activities to engage with the object.  It is morally 
significant given its fundamental role in determining how we engage the world, which in turn 
determines our actions.  The way we perceive a beggar in the street matters morally because it 
influences our mental and physical responses, which can be compassionate, indifferent, or 
averse.  
 
4.2.5 Attention  
                                                
86 yadi dāsyāmi kiṃ bhokṣya ity ātmārthe piśācatā | yadi bhokṣye kiṃ dadāmīti parārthe devarājatā 
||125|| gal te byin na ci spyad ces // bdag don sems pa ‘dre yi tshul // gal te spyad na ci sbyin ces // gzhan 
don sems pa lha yi chos // (Toh. 3871, 28b). 
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While cetanā orients our mind towards a general object, it is the mental action of 
attention (manaskara, yid la byed pa) that directs the mind towards a specific object.  In his 
Examination of the Five Aggregates, Vasubandhu defines attention as follows: “And what is 
mental attention? It is the entering into done by a citta” (trans. Anacker, 2005, p. 67).  Attention 
works in tandem with ascertainment and acts like the focus of a camera, accounting for the 
different levels of intensity with which we can take up an object.  Attention also apprehends and 
holds the mind on a specific object, and is the basis of memory as well as the important 
meditation tools of mindfulness and recollection.  So, here attention functions less like a laser 
pointer directing us to some important point in a projected presentation and more like the focus 
of a camera.  Right now, as you read these words, although you might be aware of your 
surroundings without relying on previous memories, your description of your surroundings 
would be quite vague.  By contrast, you could give a much more descriptive account of the paper 
and the words you are reading.  
That attention also acts as a filter of information is powerfully demonstrated by the 
"invisible gorilla" selective attention test in which, by directing their attention to the number of 
times a person in white passes a basketball, many people miss the person dressed in a black 
gorilla suit walking past in plain sight (Simons & Chabris, 1999).  Where we place our attention 
is morally significant because, while cetanā generally directs our experiential focus, it is 
attention that specifically focuses on particular objects and their characteristics.  For example, 
when we meet or think of someone, it is attention that determines the characteristics we choose 
to focus on and those that we choose to ignore.  In this way attention works with ascertainment 
and feeling, and given the constructive nature of those mental activities, what we attend to are 
not only objective characteristics of an object.  
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Mistaking constructed qualities for objective characteristics of objects is an important 
part of the confusion that defines the immoral state in Buddhist thought.  How we direct our 
attention has a significant impact on the content and quality of our experience, and, if 
phenomenology is central to Buddhist ethical thought, then how attention operates is ethically 
significant.  Not only is the way we direct out attention morally significant, but it is also 
something over which we can gain control.  We now turn to a discussion of examples of 
Buddhist ethical practices to demonstrate ways in which Buddhist moral practice aims to 
influence these mental factors in order to transform the way we see and engage with the world. 
4.3 The Application of Psychological Building Blocks of Experience  
in Buddhist Ethical Practice 
The ethical significance of the way that these five mental processes contribute to 
constructing our experience of the world is exemplified in the way in which we categorize other 
people into the three divisions of friends, enemies, and strangers.  I will now examine an ethical 
exercise that is used in Buddhist practice to deconstruct the way we categorize people, which 
makes explicit the link between Buddhist psychology and Buddhist ethics.  This exercise reveals 
not only the confused way in which, according to Buddhist ethicists, we ordinarily conceive of 
others, but also offers an alternative way of engaging with the world that is founded upon an 
accurate understanding of our relations with others, which in turn provides a stable basis for the 
development of wholesome qualities.  Moreover, this Buddhist ethical practice of transforming 
the way we see and experience the world provides evidence that phenomenology is central to 
Buddhist ethical thought. 
We think about others in a number of ways.  Some people we consider as good, some as 
bad, and others as innocuous.  We regard some people as helpful, some as hindrances, and as 
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others as neither.  We also think of some people as friends, some as enemies, and others as 
strangers.  These ways of classifying the people in our lives appear closely connected to the 
characteristics that we believe define these people.  We would like to believe that our judgments 
of others are founded not on our subjective feelings, but on some objective characteristics that 
we take the person to possess.  To have our assessment of others founded upon subjective states, 
such as feelings, might imply that these assessments are irrational and unstable.  For example, we 
justify our classification of John as a bad person not because of the way he makes us feel, but 
because we view him as possessing certain vices.  Similarly, our friends are friends, it would 
seem, because of certain natures they have, or because of certain positive qualities they possess.  
We might also reference the negative qualities we assign to others in order to justify why we 
consider certain people enemies.  And, strangers are strangers, it would seem, simply because we 
have yet to come to know their natures so as to categorize them as a friend or an enemy.  
Buddhist psychological texts, such as those of Vasubandhu and Asaṅga, maintain that our 
attitudes towards others are colored by a particular type of confusion in which we mistake the 
things that we bring to our experience for things that are given to it.  From a Buddhist 
perspective, the concepts such as friends, enemies, and strangers are not viewed as categories to 
which people are assigned based on their characteristics, like the biological classification of 
species based on their unique features.  Instead, these concepts are understood as embedded in 
the way we experience the world.  They are the result of the way we interpret and feel about the 
temporary situations in which we find ourselves.  As discussed above, according to a Buddhist 
perspective, both feeling and ascertainment play fundamental roles in the construction of 
experience.  
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Importantly, we can influence these psychological factors, and we see this at work in 
Buddhist ethical practices.  The aim of these ethical practices is not explicitly the cultivation of 
virtues, but the cultivation of an accurate way of experiencing the world.  Buddhist ethicists 
understand that seeing the world accurately is morally significant; for example, accurately 
understanding the nature of our relationship with others, whether a person is our friend or enemy, 
depends primarily on circumstances rather than the person’s qualities is morally significant.  This 
knowledge changes the way we are in the world.  
Buddhist ethical practices recommended in the writings of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist 
writers such as Śāntideva and Kamalaśīla, as well as later Tibetan authors such Tsongkhapa and 
Patrul Rinpoche, lead one to scrutinize the accuracy and reliability of one's attitudes and feelings 
towards others.  It is suggested that important ethical insights arise from these investigations and 
that these insights can change the way in which we see the world and relate to others, bringing 
about a more morally mature state.  As an example, I will focus on the practice called seven-step 
cause and effect method for developing bodhicitta (rgyu ‘bras man ngag bdun) and, in particular, 
the first of the seven steps, the practice of developing immeasurable equanimity (apramāṇpekṣā, 
tsad med btang snyoms).87  This practice looks specifically at the way we think and feel about 
                                                
87 Equanimity (upekṣā, btang nyoms) is an important ethical quality comprising a number of different 
mental activities and practices.  First, there is the equanimity of feeling (vedanopekṣā, tsor ba btang 
nyoms): this refers to the neutral feeling, a point between pleasant and unpleasant feeling, that was 
described in the previous chapter.  Then there is equanimity the mental factor (saṃskāropeksā, 'du byed 
btang nyoms) described in the psychological texts as an evenness of mind important for developing high 
levels of concentration in meditation.  Here, we are talking about immeasurable equanimity.  There is an 
immeasurable equanimity included in the practice of the four immeasurables (catvāri 
brahmavihārāḥ, tshangs gnas bzhi) in which an attitude that wishes all others to be free from attachment 
and hatred is cultivated.  The immeasurable equanimity developed in this exercise is a similar attitude, but 
in this case the quality of overcoming attachment and hatred towards others is developed within 
ourselves.  Equanimity, in the end, is the overcoming of egocentricity in experience, the development of 
an open attitude towards others, independent of how their welfare or woe affects our narrow self-interest. 
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others and examines the causes of these thoughts and feelings in order to transform the way we 
perceive others.  
The meditation for developing immeasurable equanimity is a foundational ethical 
exercise in which one analyzes the attitudes and feelings held with respect to friends, enemies, 
and strangers.  This analysis forms the preliminary practice for the seven-step cause and effect 
method for developing bodhicitta.  As Kamalaśīla explains in his Stages of Meditation 
(Bhāvanākrama), 
From living beings’ viewpoint, all equally want happiness and do not want suffering.  
Therefore, it is inappropriate to hold some close and to help them, while keeping others at 
a distance and harming or not helping them…  From my viewpoint, if I have 
continuously been reborn since beginningless time, all beings have been my friends 
hundreds of times. To whom should I be attached?  To whom should I be hostile?88  
 
Here, the practitioner begins by considering how, from the perspective of others, oneself and 
others are equal in not desiring suffering and in desiring happiness.  Next, one contemplates the 
way in which the categorizing of different people and the feelings connected with these 
categories of friend and enemy is arbitrary, given the continually changing nature of 
relationships.  
Similarly, the seven-step cause and effect method for developing bodhicitta begins with 
the practitioner calling to mind three different people in his life: a friend, an enemy, and a 
stranger.89  Here, the idea is to work with real feelings, and the practitioner is asked to bring to 
mind actual people in his life rather than a fictional person.  The aim at this initial point is to 
                                                
88 As cited in Tsongkhapa, 2004, p. 37. 
89 Within the different Buddhist traditions, there are slight variations in this exercise. For example, the 
Nyingma Teacher Patrul Rinpoche (1808-1887) instructs us to first think about an enemy, then a stranger, 
and finally a friend. The Gelug teacher Tsongkhapa (1357-1419) instructs us to first think of a stranger, 
then a friend, and then finally of an enemy. According to another oral tradition, it is suggested that we 
bring to mind all three individuals simultaneously.  In all these cases the point of the exercise is the same: 
the goal is to notice and then examine the feelings that arise in relation to the three different 
classifications of persons. 
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simply notice the feelings that arise in relation to the three different classifications of persons.  
There is a qualitative difference between the experience associated with the perception of a 
friend and that of an enemy.  The practitioner becomes familiar with the feeling of aversion that 
arises in relation to an enemy, the feeling of attachment that arises in relation to a friend, and the 
feeling of indifference that arises in relation to a stranger.  Here the practitioner's goal is to 
observe the changes in the quality of experience that are the result of changes in classifications 
made by ascertainment.  As discussed above, we ordinarily categorize people on the basis of the 
characteristics we attribute to them.  Here, the practitioner is guided away from this habitual 
pattern and shifts his awareness away from a connection between classification and characteristic 
to classification and feeling.  The focus is on the feeling that arises in relation to a particular 
category of person.  
The next step in this exercise is to examine these feelings, focusing in particular on their 
causes.  This formula, in which one trains first in developing a clear and stable perception of the 
object of examination before analyzing it, is a common feature of these ethical exercises and 
Buddhist meditation in general.  When thinking of an enemy, one is instructed to notice the 
aversion that arises, and then also to investigate the causes for that aversion.  Here, again the 
emphasis is not on the causes for the classification, but the causes for the feeling.  When thinking 
of a friend, one is instructed to notice the attachment that arises.  One is then asked to investigate 
the causes for that attachment.  Similarly, when thinking of a stranger, one is instructed to notice 
the feeling of indifference that arises, and in turn investigate its causes.  
In this exercise, we are not asked to justify our attitudes, but to connect these attitudes 
with feelings and then examine the feelings.  We focus on the feelings not to justify them, but to 
appreciate how these feelings arise.  The way we feel and ascertain can tell us more about 
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ourselves than the object.  Buddhist philosophers stress that the categorization of friends, 
enemies, and strangers tells us less about what the other person is "really" like and more about 
the circumstances in which we have found ourselves in relation to another.  The experience of a 
person under the category of friend, enemy, or stranger derives not from actual characteristics of 
the person, but from the perciever’s desire, hatred, and ignorance respectively.  
It does not appear to be a coincidence that when we see a friend, we often feel joy, or that 
when we happen to encounter a rival, we might feel dread.  These external events and internal 
feelings seem causally related.  It is this intuition, that people possess certain natures that 
mysteriously have the power from afar to produce specific feelings within us, that the insights 
produced from this examination aim to counteract.  Buddhist ethicists explain that upon closer 
examination of her feelings, the practitioner will discover that those feelings are not the direct 
result of encountering a person with certain enduring characteristics, but instead come about 
primarily because of the way we interpret the temporary circumstances in which we find 
ourselves in relation to others.  
The way we think about someone influences how we feel toward them, but the way we 
feel towards someone also influences the way we think about them.  By failing to understand the 
mutually reinforcing relationship between the way we interpret circumstances and the feelings 
that result from these circumstances, we experience confusion masquerading as an accurate 
representation of the world.  The method to unravel this confusion is to identify and test the 
assumptions that inform the way we think and feel towards others to see if they are accurate and 
reliable.  For example, upon investigation, we find that we sometimes consider our feelings to be 
passively arising within us based upon contact with the characteristics of others; yet we also have 
an intuition that feelings are subjective and that we should not justify our categorization of 
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people based on our feelings towards them.  These Buddhist ethical examinations are structured 
not only to reveal this confusion, but also to guide us out of this confusion towards a more 
accurate understanding of the relationship between our feelings and the way we construct our 
experience of the world.  In moving from a state of confusion to a state of clarity, we move from 
an unethical state to an ethical state. 
The final step in this ethical exercise is to examine and familiarize oneself with the nature 
of these relationships.  In this part of the exercise, one attempts not only to develop an 
understanding of how his or her feelings arise, or how they relate to our ascertainments, but also 
to understand the nature of one's relationships with others.  The nature of our relationships with 
others is impermanent and uncertain because these relationships are contingent upon 
circumstances.  Friends become enemies, enemies becomes friends, and strangers can become 
either. When introducing this part of the exercise, Tsongkhapa (2004) instructs the practitioner as 
follows: 
Take the example of your enemy becoming a friend.  At first, when you heard 
even the name of your enemy, fear arose.  Later you were reconciled and became 
such close friends that when this new friend was absent you were very unhappy.  
This reversal resulted from familiarizing your mind with a new attitude. (p. 52) 
 
Tsongkhapa notes here that one's relationships with others often change and that this comes 
about through familiarization with a new attitude.  This change in attitude is determined by the 
change in situation, rather than a change in some inherent characteristics of the other person.  If 
one understands that given different circumstances an enemy may become a friend, this changes 
the way of conceiving one's relationship with this person.  Familiarization with this exercise 
provides the practitioner with a new perspective, one in which he accurately understands that 
one's attitudes towards others are not based upon some inherent and stable qualities that others 
possess, but are dependent upon temporary circumstances and events.  
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This understanding also transforms the way one views these relationships: instead of 
conceiving of relationships as permanent and founded upon fixed qualities one has ascribed to a 
person, one understands the nature of these relationships as impermanent, and as arising based on 
a flux of many causes and conditions.  When one's interpretation of what it is to have an enemy 
or a friend is transformed, the resulting feelings are also transformed.  This demonstrates how 
insight into the nature of one's relationships provides a different vantage point from which to 
view and relate with the world. 
This is not only a more accurate view of the world; it is also a view of the world that 
provides a basis for the development of moral qualities.  Tsongkhapa (2004) asserts that 
familiarizing oneself with a more accurate perspective of one's relationship with others has an 
important moral dimension.  He says, "think about how friends and enemies can quickly change. 
By thinking this way, stop both hostility and attachment" (p. 37). Patrul Rinpoche (1998) also 
states, "It is only because we take these fleeting perceptions of 'friend' and 'enemy' as real that we 
accumulate negative actions through attachment and hatred" (p. 197).  Here, Patrul Rinpoche 
directly relates an inaccurate way of seeing with an immoral state.  Since confusion with regard 
to the nature of these relationships is responsible for negative mental activities, clearing away 
this confusion lays the foundation for more positive mental activities.  
An understanding of the nature of these relationships enables the clearing away of the 
confusion that is responsible for the biased way in which we treat friends, enemies, and 
strangers, and this transformation in turn changes our experience from one characterized by 
attachment and aversion to one that is even-minded.  Tsongkhapa (2004) describes immeasurable 
equanimity as "being even-minded yourself after you have become free of attachment and 
hostility toward living beings" (p. 36).  It is this even-mindedness that provides a foundation for 
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the development of unbiased positive qualities and ethical action.  When love and compassion 
are built upon the foundation of the even-mindedness of immeasurable equanimity, they are said 
to be more stable and unbiased in the sense of favoring certain people over others.  The purpose 
of the development of immeasurable equanimity is to provide an even foundation for the 
development of positive qualities like love and compassion.  
The morally immature, confused about the nature of their relations with others, impute a 
world which is fixedly divided between friends and enemies upon a world of constantly changing 
circumstances.  This distorted attitude engages the mental activities of attachment and aversion, 
which favor some people and ignore others.  Moreover, the morally immature develop 
expectations for someone labeled as a friend, for instance, to always faithfully fulfill that role, 
and when this does not happen, disappointment ensues.  The superimposition of these fixed 
categories blinds such persons to the actual nature of their relational circumstances, leading them 
to believe that what is impermanent is enduring, so that they are surprised when things change.  
Instead of correcting their understanding of the nature of relationships when someone regarded 
as a friend becomes an enemy, the morally immature attempt to come to terms with this change 
by adding more superimposition.  Instead of recognizing the temporary nature of relationships, 
they instead believe that the person's qualities have changed and re-engage with this person in a 
different but equally mistaken way. 
The morally mature person, understanding that the designations "friend" and "enemy" are 
dependent upon temporary circumstance, does not let these designations dictate her relationships 
with others. Patrul Rinpoche (1998) points out that "the great beings of the past whose lives we 
can read about, consider all friends and enemies as the same" (p. 198).90  It is noteworthy that 
                                                
90 Patrul Rinpoche (1998) in his text Words of My Perfect Teacher explains the etymology of the Tibetan 
Tang nyom as follows: “Impartiality (tang nyom in Tibetan) means giving up (tang) our hatred for 
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Patrul Rinpoche does not say that the sign of the morally mature is that they have no friends or 
enemies.  The point is that even though they may have friends and enemies, the morally mature 
do not single out friends for favor or exclude enemies.  As Tsongkhapa (2004) points out, 
In this context your contemplation requires you to make the distinction between friend 
and enemy.  It is not the notion of friend or enemy that you need to stop but the bias that 
comes from attachment and hostility, which are based on the reason that some people are 
your friends and others your enemies. (p. 37) 
 
The aim of this exercise is not to be friendless.  The goal is to transform the way we experience 
friends, enemies, and strangers, so that we correct the cognitive bias that favors some people 
over others.  This provides the foundation for developing stable, positive qualities and clears the 
way for an unbiased way of engaging with others.  
The morally mature state is not a passive state withdrawn from the world.  Aversion and 
desire are not the only ways of actively engaging with others.  The morally mature not only 
disengage from unhealthy ways of relating to others, but also reengage with the world in a 
constructive way based on an accurate understanding of the nature of one's relationships.  The 
morally mature person relates to others based not on temporary circumstances, but on an 
understanding of the human condition, in particular, the characteristic the Buddha first pointed 
out, that life is suffering.  Specifically, in Buddhist Mahāyāna practice, the understanding that 
others are suffering just like oneself directs the way in which one engages with others.  
Kamalaśīla provides an approach for developing this moral attitude in his Stages of Meditation:  
From living beings’ viewpoint, all equally want happiness and do not want suffering. 
Therefore, it is inappropriate to hold some close and to help them, while keeping others at 
a distance and harming or not helping them.91  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
enemies and infatuation with friends, and having an even-minded (nyom) attitude towards all beings, free 
of attachment to those close to us and aversion for those who are distant” (p. 196). 
91 As cited in Tsongkhapa, 2004, p. 300 
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From this perspective, we relate to others not as a source of our own happiness or suffering, but 
with a fellow feeling based on the common ground of enduring the suffering condition.  This 
engenders a close bond that applies equally to all others, and this bond is grounded in 
equanimity.92  
Conclusion 
When Buddhist philosophers like Vasubandhu, Asaṅga, and Buddhaghosa provide us 
with lists of different categories of mental phenomena, it would be a mistake to consider them to 
be merely organizing and classifying.  It is significant that these philosophers listed and 
categorized over 50 different kinds of mental action and then commented on the moral tone of 
each of them.  This categorization tells us something about the way these philosophers thought 
about ethics; their ethical focus was primarily directed toward the mental sphere, and how mental 
actions shape our experience of the world.  If we understand these lists as an outcome of both a 
phenomenological and ethical inquiry, then we can appreciate how a list of five mental activities 
grouped together because they are always present provides an account of the basic structure of 
experience and how this is ethically significant.  
Buddhist psychological theory recognizes that there can be no experience without 
contact, feeling, ascertainment, intention, and attention.  The function of contact is not simply to 
provide the impetus for bare sensory perception, but to provide the ground for feeling.  Feeling 
gives experience an affective dimension.  Every moment of experience is colored as pleasant, 
neutral, or unpleasant, which gives rise to the most basic form of psychological motivations 
described in Buddhist texts as the movement of the mind to or away from objects.  That we are 
attracted to some things and repulsed by others things has obvious implications for Buddhist 
                                                
92 Since Buddhas do not suffer, it is clear that this type of ethical practice is representative of the path and 
not the result of Buddhist practice. 
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action theory and ethics.  These feelings are not simply reactions to pre-existing characteristics; 
they help form and are formed by ascertainment.  Ascertainment, the way we think about objects, 
involves a process of interpretation and classification.  The way we think about objects and the 
way we feel about the contents of our experience affects where we place out intention and 
attention.  These five mental activities form the foundation of experience, which determines how 
we engage in the world.  Perception is inextricably linked with these five mental activities, which 
are both active and interpretive.  These mental activities shape the quality of our experience, so 
that we perceive friends, strangers, and enemies, as opposed to merely shapes and colors, or 
generic persons.  In this way, the mental domain is described not only as subjective and 
intentional, but also as morally significant.   
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Chapter Five: Buddhist Moral Phenomenology 
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that in the Buddhist psychological treatises of 
authors such as Vasubhandu and Asaṅga, when mental states are presented, they are always 
assigned an ethical value, whether positive, negative, or neutral. In this chapter, we will turn to 
Mahāyāna Buddhist ethical writings, in particular, to the works of two of Indian Mahāyāna 
Buddhism’s most important ethical thinkers, Āryadeva and Śāntideva.  An examination of the 
ethical system represented in these works, together with the larger Mahāyāna Buddhist scriptural 
tradition of the Prajñāparamitā literature, will reveal that the first person experience of the moral 
act is prioritized in such a way that Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist ethics is best conceived as a type 
of moral phenomenology.  
 I will first outline the way in which Āryadeva, in his 400 Stanzas, positions the correct 
view of the world as the foundation for his Mahāyāna Buddhist ethics.  In his account, seeing the 
world in an accurate way charaterizes the experience of the morally mature. To this end, 
Āryadeva maintains that confusion pervades vice, and, conversely, a correct view undermines 
vice and accords with virtue.  Moreover, in his discussion of the vices related to confusion, he 
identifies these primarily with mental states.  Having identified the moral problem as confusion, I 
will then look to both Āryadeva’s and Candrakīrti’s treatment of the primacy of mental states as 
the determinant of moral significance.  They make clear that it is the mental state accompanying 
any action that determines its ethical value; moreover, it is the unique mental state of a 
bodhisattva that combines wisdom that correctly understands the nature of reality with the 
motivational component of compassion, which is the defining characteristic of excellent virtue.  
Following this, I will turn to Śāntideva’s How to Lead an Awakened Life to highlight how he too 
prioritizes the mental state of the agent as the determinant of the moral value of an action.  Here, 
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I will discuss his reinterpretation of the notion of a field of merit whereby he devalues the object 
or recipient of actions, and even the actions themselves in determining moral significance, 
instead prioritizing the mental attitude of the agent.  
 Having laid the groundwork of identifying the fundamental moral problem of confusion 
and isolated the mental domain of the agent as the primary determinant of the moral value of 
actions, I will then turn to the moral solution: experiencing the world informed by accurate 
metaphysical knowledge.  Since confusion is the mental state that pervades and fosters vice, both 
the epistemological and moral antidote is wisdom, accurate metaphysical knowledge.  This 
understanding of a transformation of view as the moral solution for these Mahāyāna ethical 
writers will be explored on the basis of the writings of both Āryadeva and Śāntideva. 
 In order to provide further evidence that the ethical program of the Mādhyamika 
Mahāyāna authors highlighted here may be understood as a type of moral phenomenology, I will 
survey the moral language utilized in their works.  First, I will highlight how the language they 
use to speak of the morally mature and the morally immature is aligned with labels signifying 
intellectual or mental development, whereby the morally mature are referred to as wise and the 
morally immature as foolish, or childish.  I will then engage in a more general survey of these 
works to demonstrate the consistent alignment of important Buddhist ethical terms with mental 
states.  In my final stage of exploring this strand of Buddhist ethics as moral phenomenology, I 
will look to the Perfection of Wisdom sūtras, which were paramount sources for Āryadeva, 
Candrakīrti, and Śāntideva.  Here, I will demonstrate that the Heart Sūtra and Diamond Cutter 
Sūtra in particular provide evidence of the seeds of the ethical system of these later writers, 
consistently prioritizing view and mental states in the context of ethical action. 
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5.1 The Foundation of a Phenomenological Ethics: How Confusion Pervades Vice 
While Śāntideva’s How to Lead an Awakened Life is well-known as one of Mahāyāna 
Buddhism’s most prominent ethical texts, Āryadeva’s 400 Stanzas (Catuḥśatakaśāstra) is best 
known as a commentary on Nāgārjuna’s seminal Madhyamaka treatise Fundamental Wisdom of 
the Middle Way.  Yet, Āryadeva’s treatise, like Śāntideva’s, is also a guide for how to live an 
awakened life.  This is indicated in the title of Candrakīrti’s commentary on the work, 
Commentary on the 400 Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of a Bodhisattva (Bodhisattvayogācāra-
catuḥśatakaṭīkā).  According to Candrakīrti, the 400 Stanzas can be divided into two sections, 
the first eight chapters treating the subject of purification, and the last eight chapters addressing 
the subject the of essencelessness of phenomena.93  These first eight chapters deal explicitly with 
ethical material and demonstrate that Āryadeva’s primary ethical concern is the mental domain, 
specifically, how we see the world.  
The first four chapters set out the basis of Āryadeva’s ethical program.  As Candrakīrti 
explains, these chapters take up the nature of worldly things.94  In particular, Āryadeva focuses 
on how an ordinary person misperceives the nature of the things of the world and the ethical 
implications of this.  Here, he addresses four ways of misunderstanding ourselves and the world, 
                                                
93 The [first] eight [chapters] treat the subject of purification. After that, the next eight demonstrate the 
subject of the essencelessness of phenomena. That is the summarized meaning of the Four Hundred 
Stanzas.  
de la rab tu byed pa dngabargyad pa yongs su sbyong ba'i rab tu byed pa’o / de'i 'og tu rab tu byed 
pa brgyad kyis chos rnams kyi rang bzhin med pa nyid bstan to zhes bya ba ni bstan bcos bzhi brgya pa'i 
bsdus pa'i don to / (Toh. 3865, 31a-31b). 
94 Of these [sixteen chapters], the subject explained by the first four is the way in which worldly things 
exist. 
de la rab tu byed pa dang po bzhis ni 'jig rten pa'i dngos po ji ltar gnas pa yongs su gsal bar bya 
ste/ (Toh. 3865, 31a). 
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which are known as the four illusions (viparyāsa), or four confusions: (1) conceiving 
impermanent things as permanent, (2) conceiving unpleasant things as pleasurable, (3) 
conceiving impure things as pure, (4) and conceiving what is selfless to have a self.  These four 
confusions are found in Abhidharma literature and correspond closely with the well-known three 
characteristics of existence (trilakṣaṇa): that things are impermanent (anitya), suffering 
(duḥkha), and selfless (anātman).  These four ways of misunderstanding ourselves and the world, 
characterize the experience of the ethically immature.  Their relationship to vice, together with 
the means to correct them, are respectively addressed in these first four chapters.  
According to Āryadeva, it is confusion that is the fundamental cause of suffering, 
afflictive mental states, and immoral actions.  In each of these first four chapters, Āryadeva 
explains how the mistaken perspective engenders vice, and how upon reflection we will come to 
understand our error and adjust our way of taking up the world, which will bring us to a morally 
mature state.  As Tom Tillemans (2012) explains, “[Āryadeva and Candrakīrti] try to show that 
the world’s superficial attitudes on these matters are in conflict with its deep-seated intuitions – 
if the world reflected, it would recognize the four illusions as indeed illusions” (p. 365).  In the 
first chapter, having described the problem of viewing impermanent things as permanent, 
specifically with regard to one’s own life, Āryadeva explains the absurdity of our sense of 
immortality and attachment to this life.  He concludes the chapter by describing the experience of 
one who has corrected this misunderstanding, linking it to the abandonment of the vice of 
attachment.  Āryadeva writes,  
Whoever has the certainty in the thought ‘I will die,’ since that person completely 
renounces attachment, how could they fear even death itself? (25)95  
 
                                                
95 bdag ni 'chi'o snyam sems pa // gang la nges par yod gyur pa // de ni chags pa yongs btang phyir // 'chi 
bdag la yang ga la 'jigs // (Toh. 3846, 2b-3a) 
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It may seem surprising that insight into our own impermanence is said to lessen attachment to the 
self rather than increase it; attachment, however, is grounded in the confusion of conceiving any 
object of attachment to be permanent.  With the mistaken view of something as permanent comes 
the expectation that it will endure.  When that object is ascertained as pleasing, then with the 
expectation that it will endure comes attachment to it remaining as such.  Yet, when that object’s 
impermanent nature is understood, this realization undermines any expectation that it will endure 
and, thus, eliminates the basis for attachment to it.  For this reason, Āryadeva suggests that 
understanding our own impermanence brings to light the irrationality of attachment to a 
permanent self that does not exist.  
Freedom from attachment leads naturally to freedom from fear, since the object we may 
previously have been attached to and thus feared to lose – a permanent self – has been 
understood not to exist.  The mental states of non-attachment and fearlessness characterize the 
morally mature, who possess this variety of correct view regarding impermanence.  Conversely, 
the morally immature are characterized by the vice of attachment, which is intertwined with the 
incorrect vision of impermanent things as permanent. 
 In the second chapter, Āryadeva describes the confusion of conceiving a source of 
suffering to be a source of pleasure.  He moves from discussing the impermanence of one’s own 
life to how we perceive our own body.  He takes aim at the way we see this impermanent body 
as a source of physical pleasure.  Here, he demonstrates that impermanent things cannot be a 
genuine and lasting source of pleasure, and to see them that way is not only incorrect, but a 
source of vice.  Because it is impermanent, the body is not merely inadequate as a source of 
pleasure, but is actually in the nature of disintegration and suffering.  Āryadeva concludes this 
chapter by stating that whatever is impermanent is a source of suffering:  
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Impermanent things are definitely harmful, and whatever is harmful is not pleasurable.  
Therefore, everything that is impermanent is called suffering. (50)96  
 
Here, Āryadeva highlights the vulnerability of things brought about through causes, whose 
impermanent nature necessitates their disintegration, which is experienced as suffering. 
Having deconstructed our misconception of permanence and pleasure in the previous 
chapter, in the third chapter, Āryadeva addresses the misconception that impure things are pure.   
Now, he moves from our own body to objects toward which we have desire, such as other 
people’s bodies.  Conceiving other objects, which are impermanent and in the nature of 
suffering, as pure and worthy of our desire, is identified a third type of mistaken view.  He 
argues that, upon reflection, we will see that the “purity” of desired objects is our own mental 
construction and not the nature of these objects.  This is demonstrated by the fact that the morally 
mature are free of desire toward these same objects:  
Whatever object with respect to which one develops freedom from desire, it is 
inappropriate to call that pure.  There exists no object whatsoever that is truly the cause 
of desire. (74)97   
  
In this verse, Āryadeva emphasizes that desire consists in a misunderstanding of an object’s 
nature as being pure. 
 In the fourth chapter, Āryadeva moves from objects of desire to the self, addressing the 
misconception that grasps to a self, to “I” and “mine.”  He specifically links this type of 
confusion which does not understand selflessness with the mental state of pride:  
What supreme person in existence becomes arrogant with the thought of “I” and 
“mine”?  Since all objects belong equally to all embodied beings. (76)98   
 
                                                
96 mi rtag pa la nges par gnod // gang la gnod yod de bde min // de phyir mi rtag gang yin pa // thams cad 
sdug bsngal zhes byar 'gyur // (Toh. 3846, 4a).  
97 gang du 'dod chags bral skye ba // de gtsang zhes byar mi rigs la // nges par 'dod chags rgyur gyur ba'i 
// dngos de gang na'ang yod ma yin // (Toh. 3846, 4b-5a). 
98 bdag gam bdag gi snyam dregs pa // srid par dam pa su la ‘gyur // gang phyir lus can thams cad la // 
yul rnams thams cad mtshungs phyir ro // (Toh. 3846, 5a). 
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Throughout this chapter, Āryadeva explains that by correcting the misconception that grasps at a 
self and through understanding selflessness, one arrives at a more accurate understanding of 
ourselves whereby vices such as pride are undermined. 
In these opening chapters, Āryadeva lays the conceptual groundwork for an ethics that 
focuses on the mental domain by explaining four important characteristics of things that the 
morally immature incorrectly perceive:  
In summary—impermanence, uncleanness, suffering, and selflessness—All four of these 
occur within a single thing. (75)99  
  
In ordinary experience, these four qualities are misperceived as permanent, pure, pleasurable, 
and essentially existent.  These four misperceptions are the source of vices such as fear, 
attachment, desire, and pride.  According to Āryadeva, it is through correcting this confusion that 
one overcomes vice:  
Just as tactile sensation pervades the body, confusion pervades all [afflicted mental 
states]. Thus, through overcoming confusion, all mental afflictions are also overcome. 
(135)100   
 
Developing an experience characterized by the correct view of things as impermanent, painful, 
impure, and selfless is the antidote to the four confusions.  With this verse, Āryadeva emphasizes 
that it is the confusion pervading the emotions, and not the emotions themselves, that is the 
fundamental ethical problem.  Based on confusion with regard to the four qualities of things 
discussed by Āryadeva in these first four chapters, one’s experience is not a true representation 
of the external world, but rather a constructive interpretation that builds in at the ground level 
one’s feelings and discriminative biases, which then influence one’s actions.  The fact that this 
process is not immediately apparent has caused Buddhist ethicists like Āryadeva to describe our 
                                                
99 mdor na mi rtag mi gtsang dang // sdug bsngal ba dang bdag med ces // bya ba bzhi po thams cad ni // 
gcig nyid la ni srid par 'gyur // (Toh. 3846, 5a). 
100 lus la lus dbang ji bzhin du // gti mug kun la gnas gyur te // de phyir nyon mongs thams cad kyang // gti 
mug bcom pas bcom par ‘gyur // (Toh. 3846, 7b). 
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existence as fundamentally confused, and the fact that this confusion is responsible for 
destructive emotions has led them to consider it an ethical issue.  
 
 
5.2 Mental States as the Determinant of Virtue and Vice 
Having explained the moral problem as experience characterized by a wrong way of 
seeing the world in the first four chapters of his 400 Stanzas, in the fifth chapter entitled 
“Bodhisattva Deeds” (byang chub sems dpa’i spyod pa), Āryadeva looks at what distinguishes 
the experience of the morally mature from those of the morally immature.  This distinction is not 
based on their respective actions, but on their respective mental states.  Within the first few 
verses of this chapter, Āryadeva states,  
When the mind is unrealized, any merit (bsod nams) from deeds of going and so 
forth is not seen. Therefore with respect to all actions, the mind should be 
established as primary. (104) 101  
 
Here, Āryadeva prioritizes the state of mind (sems) over physical actions in relation to merit. In 
commenting on this verse, Candrakīrti explains that for any action of body, speech, or mind, it is 
the mental state associated with it that determines the moral quality:  
When such a mind is unrealized, for actions of going, coming, rising, 
walking, speaking, making fire offerings, and so forth, one’s merit or non-merit 
becomes non-merit alone. If one undertakes actions such as going for the sake of 
engaging in the act of killing, then going and so forth become non-meritorious; 
but if one undertakes [an action] for the sake of abandoning [killing], then that 
action becomes meritorious. When one undertakes [an action] with just a [neutral] 
mind, at that time, [the action] becomes neutral. Since it is like this, therefore, for 
other actions too the mind is established as primary, because it is precisely that 
mind that determines the nature of the motivated physical, verbal, and mental 
actions.102  
                                                
101 sems ma rtogs pa 'gro sogs la // gang phyir bsod nams la sogs pa // ma mthong de phyir las kun la // 
yid ni don por bsgrub par bya // (Toh. 3846, 6a). 
102 sems ji lta ba ma rtogs par 'gro ba dang 'ong ba dang langs pa dang 'chag pa dang / smra ba dang 
sbyin sreg la sogs pa'i bya ba dag la rang gi bsod nams sam / bsod nams ma yin pa yod pa ma yin pa kho 
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In this passage, when Candrakīrti states, “If one undertakes actions such as going for the sake of 
engaging in the act of killing, then going and so forth become non-meritorious,” he does not say 
that the ethical nature of going is determined by whether or not the act of killing is carried out, 
but that its ethical nature is determined by its being associated with a mind directed towards the 
act of killing.  Moreover, he makes the point that even the ethical status of mental actions is 
determined by the associated mental state.  In doing so, he makes an important distinction 
between the mind or mental state (sems), and mental actions (yid kyi las).  Thus, it is not that 
mental activities of any kind are prioritized over physical and verbal actions; instead, it is the 
associated mental state that is the determinant of the moral value of actions.   
Candrakīrti further explains that, when one has realized the morally mature mental state 
(sems) that conjoins compassion and wisdom that is not confused about the nature of things, the 
ensuing physical, verbal, and mental actions become beneficial and thus meritorious: 
When it is like that, then for the awakened (tathāgata) mental continuum, which 
has conjoined the method of great compassion and non-dual stainless wisdom, the 
causes for harm without exception cease, and being always gracious, one will not 
engage in what is harmful to living beings…  Therefore, when the mind is 
unrealized, actions which are meritorious, and so forth, do not become 
established.  With regard to this, it is said, “If the mind is extremely pure, actions 
become very pure.  Therefore, the skillful ones perform actions with a pure 
mind.”103 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
na ste / gal te 'gro ba la sogs pa de srog gcod pa rdzogs par bya ba'i phyir brtsams na ni / de'i tshe 'gro 
ba la sogs pa de bsod nams ma yin par 'gyur la / 'on te de spang ba'i don du rtsom na ni / de'i tshe de las 
bsod nams su 'gyur ro / gang gi tshe de tsam gyi sems pas rtsom na ni de'i tshe lung du ma bstan par 
'gyur ro // gang gi phyir 'di de lta yin pa de'i phyir las gzhan dag la yang yid gtso bor rnam par gzhag ste 
/ sems ji lta ba bzhin du des 'phangs pa'i lus dang ngag dang yid kyi las rnams kyi rang gi ngo bo rnam 
par 'jog pa'i phyir ro // (Toh.3865, 92b-93a). 
103 gang gi tshe 'di de lta yin pa de'i tshe de bzhin gshegs pa thugs kyi rgyud thugs rje chen po'i thabs 
dang / gnyis su med pa'i ye shes dri ma med pa dang rjes su 'brel pa / don ma yin pa'i rgyu ma lus pa 
gcod cing kun nas mdzes pa rnams la 'gro ba'i don ma yin pa la 'jug pa dogs par mi bya'o /… de'i phyir 
sems ma rtogs par bsod nams la sogs pa'i las rnams rnam par gzhag par mi 'gyur ro // 'dir bshad pa / gal 
te sems rab dang 'gyur na // las rnams shin tu dang bar 'gyur // de yi phyir na mkhas pa yis // sems dag pa 
yis las rnams bya / (Toh. 3865, 93a). 
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Here, Candrakīrti highlights the incompatibility of virtuous mental states and harmful actions.  
To be an ethical person is identified with having a mental state that is incompatible with 
“engaging in what is harmful to living beings.”  He identifies the ideal virtuous mental state as 
having two components, one that is motivational, great compassion, and the other that is an 
accurate way of seeing the world, wisdom.  When these two mental components have been 
realized, all actions become virtuous merely through association with this “pure” mind.  
Conversely, when such a mental state has not been realized, Candrakīrti states that even 
meritorious actions are not completely established as virtue due to their not being conjoined with 
a “pure” mind.  
In other words, if the accompanying mental state of any action is motivated by self-
interest rather than altruism, or the person views the world in a metaphysically inaccurate way, 
then any associated action is not fully established as virtuous.  This account is not 
consequentialist: this way of taking up the world is good not because of the virtues or actions 
that naturally arise out of it, but rather because it is metaphysically and epistemologically correct.  
This is also not a virtue ethics account because the relevant virtues are dependent upon, rather 
than constitutive of, the primary good, which is the correct metaphysical view of oneself and the 
world. 
According to Āryadeva, it is not only for neutral actions such as coming and going, that 
the associated mental state determines the moral value of the act.  In the next verse, he stresses 
that the associated mental state determines the moral value of all actions, whether one might 
ordinarily assign them a value of virtuous or non-virtuous:  
For bodhisattvas, due to their attitude, every [action] whether virtuous or even if non-
virtuous, becomes excellent virtue, because they control their minds. (105)104   
                                                
104 bsam pas byang chub sems dpa' la // dge 'am 'on te mi dge rung // thams cad dge legs nyid 'gyur te // 
gang phyir yid de'i dbang gyur phyir // (Toh. 3846, 6a). 
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The difference between this ethical system and consequentialism is made clear when Āryadeva 
draws a distinction between virtue (dge ba) and excellent virtue (dge legs).  An action might be 
considered virtuous, but without the appropriate accompanying mental state, it does not qualify 
as excellent virtue.  Yet, if the appropriate mental state is conjoined with the action, Āryadeva 
states that even “non-virtuous” actions can become excellent virtue.  Excellent virtue is not 
characterized by a type of action or by its consequence, but by the simultaneous associated 
mental state unique to a bodhisattva.  
Commenting on this verse, Candrakīrti contrasts the standard explanation of virtue and 
non-virtue as specific actions leading to the ripening of pleasant or unpleasant karmic results, 
with the understanding of genuine, or excellent virtue, whose defining characteristic is not reliant 
upon its karmic consequence but its unique mental state:  
As for non-virtue, it is due to having the ripening of suffering and lower rebirths 
that it is non-virtue.  Even though virtue consists in having the result of the 
ripening of happiness and pleasant rebirth, because the sufferings of birth, old 
age, death, and so forth [still] occur, it is not excellent virtue (dge legs).  For 
bodhisattvas who have mastered their minds, any of these two kinds of actions 
[i.e., virtuous and non-virtuous] that are not excellent virtue, become excellent 
virtue, and [excellent virtue] is established as the cause for reversing the cycle of 
ordinary existence.  As for the worldly, since their minds are untamed, and since 
[actions] rely on the mind, they will engage [in actions] with just this [untamed] 
mind, but since bodhisattvas have control over their minds, all the movements of 
their body, speech, and mind become of a single nature as excellent virtue.105 
 
According to Candrakīrti, ordinary virtue and non-virtue are defined primarily by their results.  
This may sound consequentialist, but it is not: excellent virtue is defined by a particular state of 
                                                
105 mi dge ba ni sdug bsngal dang ngan song gi rnam par smin pa can yin pa nyid kyi phyir mi dge ba'o // 
dge ba yang bde ba dang bde 'gro'i rnam par smin pa'i 'bras bu can yin du zin kyang skye ba dang / rga 
ba dang 'chi ba la sogs pa'i sdug bsngal sgrub par byed pa nyid kyi phyir na dge legs ma yin no // dge 
legs ma yin pa'i las gnyis po 'di thams cad ni byang chub sems dpa' sems la dbang thob pa rnams la dge 
legs nyid du 'gyur te / skye ba can rnams kyi 'khor ba ldog pa'i rgyur gnas so zhes bya ba'i don to / 'jig 
rten ni sems ma dul ba nyid kyi phyir sems la rag las pa na / sems ji lta ba bzhin du 'jug gi / byang chub 
sems dpa' rnams ni sems dbang du gyur pas / de dag gi lus dang ngag dang yid kyi g.yo ba thams cad 
dge legs su ro gcig pa nyid du 'gyur ro / (Toh. 3865, 93a-93b).  
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mind and is characterized by the fact that it does not result in causes for future samsaric 
existence.  Moreover, as Candrakīrti says, all actions associated with such a mental state are of a 
“single essence.”  Excellent virtue is not qualitatively distinguished based on greater or lesser 
actions.  Rather, excellent virtue is qualified by its unique associated mental state alone, 
regardless of the accompanying action. 
Āryadeva goes on to criticize the view of ethical actions as transactional and as having 
their moral value determined by the result:  
It is reproachable to regard taking and giving to be like trade, thinking, “A great result 
will arise from the giving of this gift.” (120)106   
 
It is clear here that Āryadeva’s moral emphasis is not on the personal consequences of one’s 
actions.  Even the concern for such consequences he regards as reproachable.  A bodhisattva 
does not engage in activities for future personal gain.  The mental state that is concerned about 
one’s own future circumstances is contrary to the mental state that Āryadeva has described as 
qualifying deeds as excellent virtue.  This mental state is grounded in an accurate metaphysical 
view and is concerned with others rather than oneself.  
5.3 Re-envisioning Merit and the Field of Merit  
 In Theravāda ethics, although there is much emphasis placed on phenomenology in terms 
of the primacy mind and mental states in the Abhidhamma literature, the topic of karmic causes 
and effects might be read as consequentialist, as mentioned above in the discussion of 
Goodman’s interpretation.  In chapter 2, I argued that Theravāda ethics need not be interpreted as 
consequentialist.  In the Mahāyāna ethical writings, such as those of Śāntideva, an explicit 
treatment of karmic cause and effect in phenomenological terms, leaves little room for a 
consequentialist reading.  Śāntideva’s moral emphasis on the phenomenological is particularly 
                                                
106 'dir byin pa yi sbyin pa las // 'bras bu chen po 'byung 'gyur zhes // len dang yongs su gtong ba ni // 
tshong spogs bzhin du smad par 'gyur // (Toh. 3846, 6b). 
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evident in the way he reinterprets Buddhist notions of merit, merit accumulation, and the field of 
merit (puṇya kṣetra), to which we will now turn.  Here, we will see that Śāntideva’s ethical 
reasoning is not utilitarian.  His moral concern is neither with determining the best recipient of 
an action so as to maximize a future karmic result nor with the best kind of action to perform.  
We can describe Śāntideva’s ethics as a kind of moral phenomenology because his moral 
explanations focus on the way one should take up the world perceptually and affectively.  This 
differentiates his ethics from virtue ethics: in virtue ethics, one cultivates a disposition to act; in a 
moral phenomenology, one cultivates a disposition to see.  
 In the general Theravāda understanding, merit accumulation is focused, in particular, on 
the act of giving – with the object, or recipient being the monastic community.  As Harvey 
(2000) explains,  
The primary ethical activity which a Buddhist learns to develop is giving or generosity, 
dāna, which forms a basis for further moral and spiritual development…  The key focus 
of giving is the monastic Saṅgha, or Community. (pp. 61-62) 
 
Harvey (2013) presents the concept of a field of merit in relation to this model of merit 
accumulation as follows:  
The Saṅgha, moreover, is a potent ‘field of karmic fruitfulness’ (S.v.343), so gifts 
‘planted’ in it are seen as providing a good harvest of karmic fruitfulness for the donors. 
(pp. 267-268) 
 
Brekke (1998) highlights other sutta sources from the Pāli cannon granting the saṅgha the status 
of a field of merit:  
In the Pāṭika Suttanta the Buddha says that the Order should be respected and 
revered and given gifts and homage; it is the world’s unsurpassed field of merit. 
Likewise, in the Saṃgīti Suttanta the Saṃgha is described as the world’s 
unsurpassed field of merit. (p. 299) 
 
An emphasis on the qualities of the recipient in merit accumulation is also highlighted in stories 
of the Avadānasataka collection.  In these stories, Strong (1979) observes, “What is striking in 
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them is the apparent discrepancy between act and fruit” (p. 230), since what is given is often 
quite trivial when compared to the karmic results they yield.  Strong recognizes that, together 
with the intention of giving, “much of the effectiveness of the act itself is related to the object of 
devotion toward which it is directed, the field of merit in which it is planted” (p. 233).  On this 
account, then, it is the recipient of the gift who is an important determinant of the merit produced 
for the donor; thus, the higher the qualities possessed by the recipient, the greater the merit 
resulting from giving to them.   
The Numerical Discourses of the Buddha (Aṅguttara Nikāya) states,  
However, I say that what is given to one of virtuous behavior is more fruitful than [what 
is given] to an immoral person. And [the most worthy recipient] is one who has 
abandoned five factors and possesses five factors. (trans. Bodhi, 2012, 3:57, p. 255) 
 
Bhikkhu Bodhi (2012) commenting on this passasge says, “the merit gained by giving is 
proportional to the spiritual qualities of the recipients, and thus the noble persons, especially 
arahants, serve as the most fertile field of merit” (p. 38).  He describes the direct proportionality 
between the amount of merit earned by the giver and the qualities of the receiver as follows,  
By accepting the gifts of lay people, the monastics give them the opportunity to acquire 
merit. Since the volume of merit generated by the act of giving is considered to be 
proportional to the worthiness of the recipient, when the recipients are the Buddha and 
those following in his footsteps, the merit becomes immeasurable (see MN 142, not 
included in this anthology). For this reason, the sāvakasaṅgha, the spiritual community of 
noble disciples, is called “the unsurpassed field of merit for the world” (anuttaraṃ 
puññakhettaṃ lokassa). Gifts to the Saṅgha, it is said, conduce to great blessings; they 
lead to one’s welfare and happiness for a long time and can bring rebirth in the heavenly 
worlds. (Bhikkhu Bodhi, 2005, pp. 152-153) 
 
Brekke (1998) further explains, “For a gift to be efficient in terms of merit, the monks should 
first of all be of pure conduct. There is also the idea that the longer a person has been a monk, the 
greater is the merit produced from giving him alms” (p. 300).  This understanding of the objects 
of actions, or recipients, as occupying points on a scale of more or less fertile fields of merit, 
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with the purest saṅgha at the peak, is summed up in the Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha 
(Majjhima Nikaya) as follows:  
While a gift to an animal yields a hundred-fold, and to an unvirtuous human a 
thousandfold, one to an ordinary virtuous person yields a hundred thousandfold, and one 
to a spiritually Noble person has an immeasurable fruit. (vol. III, pp. 255–7, as cited in 
Harvey, 2000, p. 21) 
   
On the Theravāda model, then, it is foremost the object and secondarily the action that are 
emphasized in merit accumulation.  In sum, merit is produced by means of actions of generosity 
toward objects with superior qualities, like the saṅgha.  
This emphasis on the qualities of the object, or field of merit, which Barbara Clayton 
(2006) terms a “hierarchy of karmic fruitfulness” (p. 109), is also taken up in Mahāyāna notions 
of merit accumulation.  Clayton explains the hierarchy of karmic fruitfulness as follows:  
the idea that there is a kind of ranking of beings according to the quantity of 
karmic fruitfulness (puṇya) associated with them. In the Mahāyāna such an idea is 
apparent in the fact that bodhisattvas are in a sense “worth more” because they are 
greater or better “fields of karmic fruitfulness” (puṇya-kṣetra) than other types of 
beings. (p. 109.) 
 
Occupying the peak of this hierarchy of karmic fruitfulness are, as expected, those whose 
qualities are the greatest, Buddhas.  Hence the Buddha field (buddha-kṣetra) is regarded as the 
most fruitful field, or object in reference to which one can “plant” one’s meritorious actions.  
 Śāntideva takes these familiar notions of merit accumulation and the hierarchy of karmic 
fruitfulness and reinterprets them based on a phenomenological understanding of merit and 
virtue, resulting in an upheaval in the hierarchy.  Here, merit does not depend upon the greatness 
of the object toward which one acts.  Instead, virtue consists in the way the agent sees the object 
and approaches the action.  Moreover, Śāntideva redefines the greatness of the object in terms of 
how one views the object rather than the qualities that the object possesses.  When virtue is 
understood in this way, then not only may Buddhas be sources of virtue, but ordinary sentient 
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beings may also be sources of virtue.  Śāntideva says, “Hence, the Muni has said that the field of 
sentient beings is a Buddha-field” (VI.112ab).107  On the basis of granting foremost ethical 
importance to the way the agent sees the object and approaches the act, Śāntideva makes the 
radical statement that ordinary sentient beings are a field or source of merit of equal weight to a 
Buddha field.  Śāntideva justifies this position through an explanation of what actually qualifies 
as virtue, which he describes as what is praiseworthy, and also through redefining what actually 
qualifies something as a field of merit:  
That which is praiseworthy is a loving thought, that is actually the greatness of sentient 
beings; whatever virtue comes from faith in the Buddha, that is actually the greatness of 
the Buddhas. (VI:115).108  
 
Here, Śāntideva clarifies that we should think about virtue and what is praiseworthy in terms of 
how we see others.  We see other beings as an object of love and we see Buddha’s as objects of 
inspiration.  
Prajñākaramati comments on this verse as follows:  
One who remains in a loving mind towards living beings is honored by people; this is 
actually the greatness of this loving mind and of nothing else [i.e., it is not the qualites of 
living beings], which relies on oneself. Thus, having relied on the tathāgatas, whatever 
merit arises from the act of faith consists in one’s own mind. That is actually the unique 
greatness of the Conqueror, because nothing else possesses that kind of quality.109  
                                                
107 sattvakṣetraṃ jinakṣetramityato muninoditam / VI.112ab.  
de phyir sems can zhing dang ni // rgyal ba'i zhing zhes thub pas gsungs // (Toh. 3871, 19a). 
 Gyaltsab Je, commenting on this verse, suggests that here Śāntideva is referencing the following passage 
from the Ārya-dharmasaṃgīti-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra (Chos yang dag par sdus pa’i mdo, H 239: vol. 65, 
97b.7): sems can gyi zhing ni sang rgyas kyi zhing ste / sangs rgyas kyi zhing de las sangs rgyas kyi chos 
rnams thob par ‘gyur gyi / der ni log par sgrub par mi rigs so /. “The field of sentient beings is a Buddha 
field.  From the Buddha field, the qualities of a Buddha are obtained.  Regarding that, it is unsuitable to 
establish the opposite.” 
108 maitryāśayaś ca yatpūjyaḥ sattvamāhātmyam eva tat | 
buddhaprasādād yatpuṇyaṃ buddhamāhātmyam eva tat ||VI.115||  
byams sems ldan la mchod pa gang // de ni sems can che ba nyid // sangs rgyas dad pa’i bsod nams gang 
// de yang sangs rgyas che ba nyid // (Toh. 3871, 19a). 
109 sattveṣu maitracittavihārī punaryatpūjyate janaiḥ, tattasyaiva maitryāśayasya pratyātmagataṃ 
māhātmyaṃ nānyasya / tathā tathāgatamāhātmyamālambya svacittaṃ prasādayato yatpuṇyam 
utpadyate, tadbhagavata eva māhātmyamasādhāraṇam, anyasya tathāvidhaguṇābhāvāt // (Vaidya, 1960, 
p. 111). byams sems zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs te / sems can rnams la byams pa'i sems su gnas pa la 
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Here Prajñākaramati explains that it is the qualities of the mind, such as love and faith, and not 
the qualities of others towards whom one acts, whether ordinary people or even Buddhas, that 
determine moral significance.  In this context, Buddhas are not great because of the qualities they 
possess, but because of the way we mentally approach them.  Also, ordinary people, although 
lacking the same qualities as a Buddha, can be equally “great” if we regard them in a morally 
praiseworthy manner.  
In the next verse, Śāntideva goes so far as to say that Buddhas and ordinary beings are 
equally great since they may both equally serve as an object with respect to which one may 
cultivate praiseworthy attitudes:  
Living beings are equal with Conquerors in virtue of the fact that they both have a role in 
establishing enlightened qualities. (VI.116ab)110  
 
Here, Śāntideva is not arguing that Buddhas and ordinary sentient beings themselves have equal 
moral standing. He makes this clear by saying, “But no [ordinary beings] are equal with Buddhas 
due to their share of an endless ocean of qualities” (VI.116cd).111   This qualifier is consistent 
with Śāntideva’s moral emphasis on how one sees the world, since Buddhas view the world 
without the confusion that characterizes the experience of ordinary beings, and in this way are 
morally superior. 
                                                                                                                                                       
skye bo rnams kyis mchod pa gang yin pa de ni byams sems ldan pa de'i so so rang gi rnam pa'i che ba'i 
bdag nyid de gzhan gyis ni ma yin no // de bzhin du de bzhin gshegs pa la dmigs nas rang gi sems dad par 
byed pa'i bsod nams skye ba gang yin pa de ni bcom ldan 'das nyid kyi che ba'i bdag nyid thun mong ma 
yin pa ste / gzhan la rnam pa de lta bu'i yon tan med pa'i phyir ro / (Toh. 3872, 133a-133b). 
110 buddhadharmāgamāṃśena tasmāt sattvā jinaiḥ samāḥ | 
na tu buddhaiḥ samāḥ kecid anantāṃśair guṇārṇavaiḥ ||116||  
sangs rgyas chos ’grub cha yod pa // des na de dag mnyam par ’dod // yon tan rgya mtsho mtha’ yas pa’i 
// sangs rgyas rnams dang ‘ga’ mi mnyam // (Toh. 3871, 19a). 
111 buddhadharmāgamāṃśena tasmāt sattvā jinaiḥ samāḥ | 
na tu buddhaiḥ samāḥ kecid anantāṃśair guṇārṇavaiḥ ||116||  
sangs rgyas chos ’grub cha yod pa // des na de dag mnyam par ’dod // yon tan rgya mtsho mtha’ yas pa’i 
// sangs rgyas rnams dang ‘ga’ mi mnyam // (Toh. 3871, 19a). 
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Clayton (2006) argues that the Buddhist idea of a hierarchy of karmic fruitfulness fits 
best with a utilitarian ethical system, since an ordering of the recipients of giving based on 
maximizing merit demonstrates an emphasis on the outcome of acts, and it is this hierarchy that 
directs ethical decisions:   
In the idea that one should give to the Saṇgha rather than someone else because it 
will be more karmically “fruitful,” we seem to see an obvious example of 
utilitarian-style reasoning, because the principle seems to be that one should try to 
maximize the karmic benefits of one’s actions… This focus on the consequences 
of actions rather than the character of the agent, of course, does not fit well in a 
virtue tradition. (p. 111) 
 
Yet, as evidenced in the verses cited above, Śāntideva’s ethical reasoning is not utilitarian.  His 
presentation of merit and merit fields actually flattens the hierarchy of karmic fruitfulness.  This 
is because Śāntideva’s moral concern is not with who might be the best recipient of an action, so 
as to maximize a future karmic result.  Neither is he primarily concerned with the best type of 
action to perform.  Instead, he is concerned with the right way to take up the world, with virtuous 
mental states such as love and faith.  On this view, virtue is not dependent upon the qualities of 
the people with whom we come into contact, but consists in the mental attitude with which we 
engage others, how we see them. 
5.4 Knowledge as the Moral Solution: A Transformation of View 
Buddhist ethicists like Āryadeva and Śāntideva conceive of a perfectly ethical state in 
which, because of the way the morally mature experience the world, there is no tension between 
what one would like to do and what is right to do.  The reason this is thought to be possible is 
because the source of any tension between how we would like to live and how we ought to live is 
characterized by the confusion with which ordinary people experience the world.  As Āryadeva 
explains, this confusion is founded in a mistaken perception of things as permanent, pleasurable, 
pure, and having a self.  By developing an experience characterized by accurate ascertainment of 
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things as impermanent, painful, impure, and selfless, confusion along with the vice that 
accompanies it, is eliminated.  The Buddhist moral solution, then, is the elimination of unhealthy 
mental states through resolving the confusion that pervades them.  
Like the moral problem, the Buddhist ethical solution is firmly grounded in the mental 
domain.  The moral problem is not focused on actions and consequences, but on specific 
phenomenological properties that characterize our experience of the world. Buddhist ethicists 
like Āryadeva and Śāntideva point to knowledge that transforms the way we experience the 
world as the moral solution rather than a mental faculty like will.  Buddhist moral development 
goes beyond mere restraint.  Since the moral problem is a type of confusion rather than emotions, 
these Buddhist ethicists employ knowledge rather than will as their moral solution.  
According to Āryadeva, since attachment is engendered by confusion, it should be 
resolved through knowledge.  He explains that, for example, it is through knowledge of the 
nature of the body that one can remove attachment to it.  He suggests that similar knowledge into 
the nature of phenomena could resolve all disturbing attitudes: “Having heard that the body has 
no good qualities, attachment does not remain long. By that very path, are all [mental afflictions] 
not also extinguished?” (199).112  Having described the moral problem as confusion, Āryadeva 
explains that the solution to confusion is seeing dependent arising.  
Just as tactile sensation pervades the body, confusion pervades all [afflicted 
mental states]. Thus, through overcoming confusion, all mental afflictions are also 
overcome. 
 
And when one sees dependent arising, confusion will not occur. Thus, through all 
the effort made here, this very topic is to be explained. (135-136)113  
 
                                                
112 lus la yon tan med thos nas // 'dod chags yun ring mi gnas te // lam de nyid kyis thams cad kyang // zad 
par 'gyur ba ma yin nam // (Toh. 3846, 10a). 
113 lus la lus dbang ji bzhin du // gti mug kun la gnas gyur te // de phyir nyon mongs thams cad kyang // gti 
mug bcom pas bcom par ‘gyur // rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba ni // mthong na gti mug 'byung mi ‘gyur // 
de phyir 'bad pas kun gyis ‘dir // gtam de kho na bsnyad par bya // (Toh. 3846, 7b). 
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Āryadeva explains that his earlier presentation of afflicted mental states as being pervaded by 
confusion was necessary, so that he could explain how insight into dependent arising, meaning 
accurate knowledge of the status of things, could remove confusion and the vice that 
accompanies it.  
The accurate knowledge required for this ethical transformation is not a type of 
knowledge in which one adjusts one’s desires and aversions to be more “realistic.”  Nor is it a 
knowledge that helps one face suffering through understanding that one could not have done 
anything to avoid a certain misfortune.  It is the type of knowledge that transforms the first-
person experiential aspect of our moral life. The Buddhist ethical project does not merely aim for 
a state of equanimity in the face of the changing fortunes of one’s life.  The goal is not for a 
stoic-like attitude in which we accept that we have limited control over the physical world and 
strive to leverage the influence we do have over the mental domain.  Instead, the knowledge 
required for ethical transformation must correct the mistaken beliefs responsible for the 
confusion that is the source of both epistemological error and immorality.  This knowledge is not 
employed to cope with or accept the world, but to change the way we experience it.  The solution 
is to see the world more accurately, so as to transcend the struggle in which there is a world with 
which one is in conflict, and which exerts power over one’s mental life.  The knowledge that that 
is responsible for this transformation cannot be merely intellectual, but must also be instrumental 
in shaping our experience. 
Throughout the Four Hundred Stanzas, Āryadeva emphasizes that a transformation of 
vision is what brings one to a moral state:  
If one sees correctly, the supreme state [is reached], and if one sees [correctly] even a 
little, good rebirths [are reached]. Thus, thinking of the inner nature, the wise person 
constantlyengenders intelligence. (196)114   
                                                
114 yang dag mthong na gnas mchog la // cung zad mthong na bzang 'gro ste // de phyir nang bdag bsam 
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For Āryadeva, there is a link between correctly seeing the world, being wise, and leading a good 
life or living in a supreme state.  The view is described as correct because it is based on the 
knowledge of the impermanent, unsatisfactory, and selfless nature of the things in the world:  
Whoever comes to see existence as like a collection of machines and illusory 
beings, they, being deeply illuminated, will go to the supreme state. (174)115   
 
Our ordinary perception of the world, including feelings and sensory data, is an expression of our 
state of confusion.  All this portrays not only a partial, but also a distorted picture of the world, 
oneself, and one’s place in it.  
While the moral problem is described as misunderstanding and misperception, the moral 
solution is described as a correct way of seeing based on an accurate understanding of the nature 
of oneself and the other things in the world.  This correct way of seeing dissolves the confusion 
responsible for our suffering and destructive mental states.  Śāntideva states,  
In order to overcome suffering and to obtain happiness, they wander aimlessly in vice; 
the entirety of the dharma, the secret of the mind, is not known by them. (V:17)116   
 
For these reasons, a necessary component of Śāntideva’s and Āryadeva’s Buddhist ethical 
practice is the development of metaphysical knowledge and epistemic accuracy.  
Moral development proceeds from one's view and is measured by how complete or 
incomplete that view is. According to Āryadeva:  
First reverse that which is non-meritorious, then reverse the [conception grasping at] a 
self, and finally, reversing all [wrong] views – whoever knows this is a wise person. 
(190)117   
                                                                                                                                                       
pa la // mkhas pas rtag tu blo gros bskyed // (Toh. 3846, 10a). 
115 gang gis 'gro ba 'khrul 'khor gyi // tshogs 'dra sgyu ma'i skyes bu ltar // mthong par gyur pa de dag 
ches // gsal bar go 'phang dam par ‘gro // (Toh. 3846, 9a). 
116 duḥkhaṃ hantuṃ sukhaṃ prāptuṃ te bhramanti mudhāmbare |  
yair etad dharmasarvasvaṃ cittaṃ guhyaṃ na bhāvitam //. 
gang gis chos kyi gtso bo mchog // sems kyi gsang ‘di ma shes na // bde thob sdug bsngal gzhom ‘dod 
kyang // de dag don med gyi nar ‘khyam // (Toh. 3871, 10b) 
117 bsod nams min pa dang por bzlog // bar du bdag ni bzlog pa dang| // phyi nas lta ba kun bzlog pa // 
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To be intelligent in this context means to have insight into the nature of things, people, and 
events.  Morally wise persons are not those who simply restrain themselves from engaging in 
wrong actions based on not wanting certain consequences; the morally wise person possesses a 
certain of view of herself and the world.  This emphasis on the way one takes up the world is so 
important that Āryadeva makes the striking claim that,  
It is preferable to slip even from ethics than from [correct] view in any way.  Through 
ethics one goes to heaven; through view one goes to the highest state. (286)118   
 
The reason for this emphasis on view over discipline is that the effort of discipline provides only 
a temporary moral solution, whereas an accurate understanding of the world removes wrong 
views entirely and brings about a stable moral state.  Āryadeva further explains his reason for 
prioritizing view over discipline as follows:  
When one correctly knows the abiding of consciousness and so forth [i.e. its 
arising, abiding, and perishing], mental afflictions will never remain in one's mind 
(150).119   
 
He further states,  
The matchless door to happiness, which is perilous for all wrong views, and is the object 
of all the Buddhas, that is called selflessness. (288)120 
 
These passages make it clear that the resolution to the confusion that engenders non-virtuous 
mental afflictions is the knowledge that transforms our view of the world so that it is accurate.  
                                                                                                                                                       
gang gis shes de mkhas pa yin // (Toh. 3846, 9b). 
118 śīlād api varaṃ sraṃso na tu dṛṣṭeḥ kathaṃ cana / śīlena gamyate svargo dṛṣṭyā yāti paraṃ padam 
// (Tillemans 1990: 33). 
tshul khrims las ni nyams bla yi // lta las cis kyang ma yin te // tshul khrims kyis ni mtho ris 'gro // lta bas 
go 'phang mchog tu ‘gyur // (Toh. 3846, 13b). 
119 gang gis rnam shes gnas la sogs // yang dag tu na rnam shes pa // de yod na ni nyon mongs rnams // 
nam yang blo gros la mi gnas // (Toh. 3846, 8a). 
120 advitīyaṃ śivadvāraṃ kudṛṣṭīnāṃ bhayaṃkaram / viṣayaḥ sarvabuddhānām iti nairātmyam ucyate 
// (Tillemans 1990: 39). 
zhi sgo gnyis pa med pa dang // lta ba ngan rnams 'jig byed cing // sangs rgyas kun gyi yul 'gyur la // 
bdag med ces ni bya bar brjod // (Toh. 3846, 13b). 
 181 
This accurate view of the world is not only incompatible with vice, but also characterizes the 
experience of the morally mature.  Once again, we see that, in contrast to virtue ethics, the moral 
solution lies in correct metaphysical knowledge about ourselves and the world rather than virtue, 
practical wisdom, and will, and, in contrast to consequentialism, the moral concern is with the 
mental state of the agent rather than the consequences of actions. 
5.5 Moral Language 
5.5.1 Moral Language and Knowledge 
 The fact that the experience of the morally mature is characterized by an accurate way of 
seeing the world, according to Mahāyāna Buddhist ethicists like Āryadeva and Śāntideva, is 
evident in their moral language, which demonstrates the relationship between their ethics and 
mental development.  Both Śāntideva and Āryadeva refer to the morally immature as fools, or 
children (bāla), and the morally mature as intelligent and wise (budhah), which is related to their 
mental capacity in terms of the way they both see the world and work with mental states.  For 
example, Śāntideva describes a wise person as someone who is able to effectively deal with 
disturbing emotions and who is able to maintain a mental state of undisturbed calmness:  
Even when suffering, the intelligent (budhah) person would not allow the calmness of his 
mind to be disturbed, for, he is at war with mental afflictions, and when in battle pain is 
common” (VI.19).121    
 
In addition to budhah, Śāntideva, also uses two other terms connoting a wise person who 
demonstrates moral maturity, vidvan and prājñaḥ.  In the Tibetan translation of the text, all three 
terms referring to a wise person are represented simply by mkhas pa. Śāntideva states,  
The world is not given up due to affection, desire for gain, and so forth.  Therefore, in 
order to renounce this, the learned (vidvan) should reflect in this way. (VIII.3)122   
                                                
121 duḥkhe ’pi naiva cittasya prasādaṃ kṣobhayed budhaḥ | 
saṃgrāmo hi saha kleśair yuddhe ca sulabhā vyathā ||VI.19||  
mkhas pas sdug bsngal byung yang ni // sems kyi rab dang rnyog mi bya // nyon mongs rnams dang g.yul 
‘gyed la // g.yul ‘gyed tshe na gnod pa mang // (Toh.3871, 15a). 
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And,  
Therefore the wise person (prājñaḥ) should not desire.  It is from desire that fear arises, 
and [all objects of desire] naturally vanish. Having accomplished stability, consider this. 
(VIII.19)123 
 
Similarly, Āryadeva says in his concluding verse of the fourth chapter, which explains the 
method for abandoning self-grasping (bdag tu ‘dzin pa spang ba’i thabs bstan pa):  
As for pride engendered by power and riches, one should look at those whose worldly 
power is equal or superior to one’s own; [such an attitude] does not remain in a pure 
heart. (100)124  
 
Commenting on this verse, Candrakīrti explains that one with a pure heart refers to a wise person 
who views others in an accurate way.  He states, “If pride arises when others view you as 
supreme, due to not remaining in that state by means of viewing others, wise persons do not 
become arrogant.”125 Here, Candrakīrti refers to those who are able to overcome pride due to 
power and wealth as wise, and explains that the wise are so because of the way they see others.  
Just as the morally mature are referred to with words connoting someone with wisdom, 
Śāntideva describes the morally immature who engage in non-virtue as foolish or childlike.  For 
instance, he states, 
                                                                                                                                                       
122 snehān na tyajyate loko lābhādiṣu ca tṛṣṇayā | 
tasmād etat parityāge vidvān evaṃ vibhāvayet ||VIII.3||  
chags pa’i phyir dang rnyed sogs la // sred pas ‘jig rten mi spong ste // de bas ‘di dag yongs spongs la // 
mkhas pas ‘di ltar dpyad par bya // (Toh.3871, 23b). 
123 tasmāt prājño na tām icched icchāto jāyate bhayam | 
svayam eva ca yāty etad dhairyaṃ kṛtvā pratīkṣatām ||VIII.19||  
de bas mkhas pas chags mi bya // chags pa las ni ‘jigs pa skye // ‘di dag rang bzhin ‘dor ‘gyur bas // 
brtan par gyis te rab tu rtogs // (Toh.3871, 24a). 
124 dbang phyug gis bskyed nga rgyal ni // mnyam dang khyad par 'phags pa yi // pha rol nus ldan blta 
bya ste // dam pa'i snying la mi gnas so // (Toh. 3846, 6a). 
125 bdag nyid la gzhan pas mchog tu byung ba mthong ba na nga rgyal du 'gyur na/_de ni gzhan la bltas 
pas mi gnas pa'i phyir mkhas pa rnams rlom par mi 'gyur ro / (Toh. 3865, 88b). 
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If the nature of the foolish (bāla) is to cause harm to others, my anger (kopaḥ) toward 
them is not appropriate, just as [it would be inappropriate to have anger] toward fire for 
its nature of burning. (VI.39)126  
 
[I am] unperturbed by the contradictory desires of the childish, for this is due to the 
arising of their mental afflictions (kleśa); thus [I] am full of pity for them. (V.56)127  
 
Here, the fact that the morally immature cause harm to others is linked with both their ignorance, 
being termed as foolish, and with mental afflictions.  Here Śāntideva’s response to the morally 
immature is also a mental approach—rather than feeling angry towards them one should develop 
compassion for them.  
Importantly, when describing the morally immature as childish, the reason is often 
indicated as their inability to perceive or see things in an accurate way.  Āryadeva says, 
For the wise, even higher rebirth produces fear equal to that of hell. At all times, it is rare 
for any state of worldly existence not to arouse fear in them. 
  
Even if the childish came to know the suffering of cyclic existence in every respect, at 
that moment, their mind together with [their body] would completely fall apart. (164-
165)128  
 
The reason for this moral distinction between the childish and the intelligent corresponds to their 
respective ways of experiencing the world.  While the morally mature, or wise, take up the world 
with an understanding of the nature of suffering, the morally immature, or foolish, are largely 
unaware of their own suffering. 
                                                
126 yadi svabhāvo bālānāṃ paropadravakāritā | 
teṣu kopo na yukto me yathāgnau dahanātmake ||VI.39||  
gal te gzhan la ‘tshe byed pa // byis pa rnams kyi rang bzhin ni // de la khro ba mi rigs te // sreg pa’i rang 
bzhin me bkon ‘dra // (Toh.3871, 16a). 
127 parasparaviruddhābhir bālecchābhir akheditam | 
kleśotpādād idaṃ hy etad eṣām iti dayānvitam ||V.56||  
phan tshun mi mthun byis pa yi // ‘dod pa rnams kyis mi skyo zhing // nyon mongs skyes pa ‘di dag gi // 
sems ‘di byung snyam brtser ldan dang // (Toh.3871, 12b). 
128 mkhas pa rnams la mtho ris kyang // dmyal ba dang mtshungs 'jigs skyed ‘gyur // rnam pa kun tu 
de rnams la // srid gang 'jigs pa mi skyed dkon // gal te byis pa'ang rnam kun tu // 'khor ba'i sdug bsngal 
shes gyur na // skad cig de la sems dang ni // lhan cig gtan tu 'jig par ‘gyur // (Toh. 3846, 8b). 
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5.5.2 Moral Language and Mental States 
In the ethical writings of Āryadeva and Śāntideva, a phenomenological approach to ethics 
is evidenced in the way they relate Buddhist moral terms to mental states.  Both these writers 
consistently associate with mental states the full range of Buddhist moral terms, puṇya (bsod 
nams), kuśalam (dge ba), and gunaḥ (yon tan) to convey a morally positive tone; they also 
employ their opposites, pāpam (sdig), akuśalam (mi dge ba), and doṣa (skyon), to convey a 
morally negative tone.  To demonstrate this point, I will now examine the use of these moral 
terms primarily in Śāntideva’s ethically focused Chapter Six, wherein the moral significance of 
nearly every appearance of these ethical terms is related to some mental aspect of the agent.  
In the first two verses of Chapter Six, Śāntideva explains that good deeds, such as 
generosity, are incompatible with negative mental states, such as anger.  He states that one of the 
most extraordinary virtuous activities is a mental state, patience.  He further argues that the worst 
type of vice (pāpam) is also a mental state, hatred.  
All these good deeds, like generosity and honoring the Sugatas, which have been 
performed throughout hundreds of eons—that is what anger destroys. (VI.1)129  
 
There is no vice (pāpam) like hatred, and no austerity (tapas) like patience. Thus, through 
making effort in various methods, one should meditate on patience. (VI.2)130  
 
Here, Śāntideva explains that negative mental states, such as anger, are incompatible with good 
deeds (sucaritaṃ), such as generosity.  His advice for overcoming anger and hatred is to 
familiarize oneself with an opposing mental state, that of patience.  
                                                
129 sarvam etat sucaritaṃ dānaṃ sugatapūjanam / 
kṛtaṃ kalpasahasrair yat pratighaḥ pratihanti tat // VI.1  
bskal pa stong du bsags pa yi // sbyin dang bde gshegs mchod la sogs // legs sbyang gang yin de kun yang 
// khong khro gcig gis 'joms par byed // (Toh.3871, 14b). 
130 na ca dveṣasamaṃ pāpaṃ na ca kṣāntisamaṃ tapaḥ / 
tasmātkṣāntiṃ prayatnena bhāvayed vividhairnayaiḥ // VI.2 
zhe sdang lta bu'i sdig pa med // bzod pa lta bu'i dka' thub med // de bas bzod la nan tan du // sna 
tshogs tshul du bsgom par bya // (Toh. 3871, 14b). 
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Śāntideva goes on in later verses of this chapter to utilize the two Sanskrit words most 
commonly indicating the concept of virtue, kuśalaṃ and puṇya,131 and stresses their 
incompatibility with negative states of mind such as anger.  He says, 
Joy is not disturbed by me even due to the most undesired occurrences. When 
sorrowful, what is wished for cannot be enjoyed while virtue (kuśalaṃ) is 
abandoned. (VI.9)132  
 
And, 
How can one let virtues (puṇya), kindness, and one’s own good qualities (guṇa) 
be obstructed? Let the acquirer not take possession—tell me, with what are you 
not angry? (VI.85)133  
 
In VI.9 Śāntideva stresses the importance of maintaining a positive mental state in the face of 
adversity since negative mental states and virtue are contrary.  Śāntideva’s position in VI.85 is 
even stronger, explaining that getting angry out of jealousy over others’ possessions obstructs 
our virtue.  
Śāntideva addresses the idea that when one is wealthy, one could do good in the world, 
and explains that virtue is not reliant upon physical actions or conditions, and that if to gain 
wealth we engage in mental afflictions, we are actually engaging in vice:  
                                                
131 The etymology of the Pāli equivalents of puṇya (bsod nams) and kuśalam (dge ba), kusala and puñña, 
is discussed in the introduction.  There is disagreement on whether these terms are two different 
perspectives on the same action or whether they refer to two differing types of actions.  Keown (1992) 
takes the position that the terms refer to different aspects of the same action, that “every virtuous action is 
both kusala and puñña" (p. 123), while Vélez de Cea (2004) disagrees, arguing that they represent two 
different kinds of action (p. 130).  He sees puñña as a more general term that describes actions based on 
their karmic significance while kusala is a more specifically Buddhist term and describes actions based on 
their soteriological significance.  See the introduction for a more detailed treatment of their differences.  
132 atyaniṣṭāgamenāpi na kṣobhyā muditā mayā | 
daurmanasye ’pi nāstīṣṭaṃ kuśalaṃ tv avahīyate ||VI.9|| 
ci la bab kyang bdag gis ni // dga’ ba’i yid ni dkrugs mi bya |// mi dga’ byas kyang ‘dod mi ‘grub // dge 
ba dag ni nyams par ‘gyur // (Toh. 3871, 14b-15a). 
133 kiṃ vārayatu puṇyāni prasannān svaguṇān atha | 
labhamāno na gṛhṇātu vada kena na kupyasi ||VI. 85|| 
bsod nams dang ni dad pa’am // rang gi yon tan ci phyir ’dor // rnyed pa gyur pa mi ‘dzin pa // gang gis 
khro ba mi byed smros // (Toh. 3871, 18a). 
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One may say, "I can bring about the termination of vice (pāpam) and engage in virtue 
(puṇya) on account of a making a profitable living," but actually the termination of virtue 
and engaging in vice [will follow] on account of anger for the sake of profit. (VI.60)134  
  
Śāntideva makes the point that we should think of vice and virtue in terms of how we mentally 
approach our current situation and not as deeds we might undertake in the future.  We should not 
think of virtue and vice merely as things we do, but also as mental attitudes.   
 Śāntideva continues his examination of the nature of merit through considering a  
scenario in which someone’s efforts at doing good deeds are obstructed. He states, 
My merit has been hindered by another,” – anger is not appropriate in this case.  Austerity 
is not the same as patience; surely this is an occasion for it. (VI.102)135  
 
If due to my own fault (doṣeṇa) I do not show patience now, here obstruction is done by 
me when the cause for virtue (puṇya) has come. (VI.103)136  
 
Śāntideva explains that no one can really obstruct virtue since it is determined by our own mental 
attitude.  If one has patience with the obstructer, then one is engaging in virtue, and if one loses 
patience with that person, then one’s mental attitude is the real obstruction to virtue.  From this 
verse, it is clear that, according to Śāntideva, a moral agent cannot be associated with negative 
emotions. 
Through this analysis of the use of moral terms in these Buddhist ethical texts, it is 
apparent that these Mahāyāna Buddhist accounts of mental states are not of mere psychological 
                                                
134 pāpakṣayaṃ ca puṇyaṃ ca lābhāj jīvan karomi cet | 
puṇyakṣayaś ca pāpaṃ ca lābhārthaṃ krudhyato nanu ||VI.60||  
gal te rnyed pas gson gyur na // sdig zad bsod nams bya zhe na // rnyed pa’i don du khros gyur na // bsod 
nams zad sdig mi ‘gyur ram // (Toh. 3871, 17a). 
135  puṇyavighnaḥ kṛto ’nenety atra kopo na yujyate | 
kṣāntyā samaṃ tapo nāsti nanv etat tad upasthitam ||VI.102||  
'di ni bsod nams gegs byed ces // de la’ang khro bar rigs min te // bzod mtshungs dka’ thub yod min na // 
de la bdag ni mi gnas sam // (Toh.3871, 18b). 
136 athāham ātmadoṣeṇa na karomi kṣamām iha | 
mayaivātra kṛto vighnaḥ puṇyahetāv upasthite ||VI.103||  
gal te bdag ni rang skyon gyis // 'di la bzod pa mi byed na // bsod nams rgyu ni nyer gnas pa // 'di la bdag 
gegs byed par zad // (Toh.3871, 18b). 
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import, but are also morally significant.  Śāntideva casts Buddhist moral concepts in terms of 
mental states.  He explains the two types of bodhicitta as types of mind.137  Of the six 
perfections, the first four, patience, generosity, morality, and effort, which have obvious ethical 
dimensions, are defined by Śāntideva as mental states.  For example, he describes patience as 
refraining from getting angry, generosity as the unrestricted thought, or intention to give,138 and 
he describes effort not as physical exertion, but as the mental state of joy directed towards what 
is virtuous.139  The last two perfections, meditation and wisdom, obviously belong to the mental 
domain, and given the ethical emphasis placed on the development of knowledge, should also be 
considered ethical practices.  
This moral emphasis on wisdom, or a correct metaphysical knowledge of ourselves and 
the world, clearly distinguishes Mahāyāna Buddhist ethics from virtue ethics.  As discussed 
earlier, while virtue ethics does incorporate the notion of practical wisdom, it does not resemble 
the metaphysical knowledge required in a Buddhist ethical context.  Moreover, the emphasis on 
the accuracy of the metaphysical view with which an act is undertaken as determining its moral 
value underscores a significant contrast with consequentialist ethical theories.  This distinction is 
made clear in the Perfection of Wisdom sūtras, to which we will now turn.  
 
5.6 The Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras as a Precursor  
to Mahāyāna Buddhist Moral Phenomenology 
Āryadeva, Candrakīrti, and Śāntideva all had their metaphysical views shaped by the 
Perfection of Wisdom sūtras.  Within these sūtras, we can also see the seeds of their Mahāyāna 
strand of Buddhist ethics as a type of moral phenomenology.  The notion that one’s view of the 
                                                
137 See Guide to Awakened Living I.15 
138 See Guide to Awakened Living V.10ab 
139 See Guide to Awakened Living VII.2a 
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world is the most important aspect of one’s moral life is evident in the Perfection of Wisdom 
sūtras.  For instance, in the Heart Sūtra,140 when Śāriputra, inspired by the Buddha, asks the 
bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara how best to practice, Avalokiteśvara gives a perhaps unexpected 
response.  One might have expected that he first enumerate a path of practice such as that of the 
Noble Eight Fold Path (āryāṣṭaṅgamārga) or the Three Higher Trainings (triśikṣa).  Instead of 
emphasizing right action, right speech, moral conduct, or meditation, he advises that aspiring 
bodhisattvas should transform their vision in order to see the world in a correct way, a way that 
completely recasts every aspect of their experience.  In so doing, Avalokiteśvara places Buddhist 
practice directly in the realm of phenomenology. He instructs,  
Any son or daughter of good lineage who wishes to engage in the practice of the 
profound perfection of wisdom should view thus: look upon the five aggregates as empty 
of essence.141   
 
In this passage, two Sanskrit verbs are employed in Avalokiteśvara’s instruction that an aspiring 
bodhisattva should bring about a transformation of vision.  The first is vyavalokayitavyaṃ, 
translated here as “should view.”  This word derives from the verbal root “lok” which has the 
stative sense of “to see” or “to perceive,” but here we find it in its causative form together with 
two verbal prefixes (vi- and ava-) which transform the meaning of this gerundive to carry the 
dynamic sense of “should be looked at,” or “should be viewed.”  The second verb 
samanupaśyati, translated here as “look upon as,” comes from the root dṛś and also has this same 
dynamic sense.  What is significant about the use of dynamic verbs in Avalokiteśvara’s 
                                                
140 Jan Nattier has argued that the Sanskrit Heart Sūtra is likely a back-translation from the Chinese. See 
Jan Nattier, "The Heart Sūtra: A Chinese Apocryphal Text?" Journal of the International Association of 
Buddhist Studies, 15/2 (1992), 153-223.  Even if the Heart Sūtra is an apocryphal Chinese text, 
nonetheless in the relevant respects under discussion here, its account matches the Diamond Cutter Sūtra 
and other clearly Indic texts. 
141 yaḥ kaśchit kulaputro vā kuladuhitā vā gaṃbhīrāyām prajñāparamitāyaṃ caryāṃ cartukāmaḥ / 
tenaivaṃ vyavalokayitavyaṃ / pañca skandhāstāṃśca svabhāvaśūnyānsamanupaśyti sma / (Vaidya, 
1961). 
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instruction is that it implies that a transformation in vision is called for as intentional ethical 
activity. 
In suggesting that we should regard all things as empty of essence, it is proposed that the 
way we view the world does not have to be passive, that it involves intentional activity, and that 
seeing the world in the right way is an important component of Buddhist practice.  This is also 
evidenced in the description of the perfection of wisdom as a mind free from fear. 
Avalokiteśvara states, 
“Thus, Shariputra, since there is no attainment on the part of bodhisattvas, one 
who’s mind is without obscuration remains resting in the perfection of wisdom. 
On account of having a mind without obscuration, one without fear who has 
passed beyond error has reached the final end, nirvana."142 
 
This instruction raises some questions for aspiring bodhisattvas.  Is this a description of a moral 
state, free from fear, achievable only in meditation that requires withdrawal from the world or is 
this advice to be applied to practice in general?  For example, how does this advice relate to the 
other perfections such as giving, patience, and enthusiasm?  The Heart Sūtra does not explicitly 
answer these question; however, the relationship between the view expressed in the Heart Sūtra 
and these ethical concerns is clarified in the advice found in the Diamond Cutter Sūtra 
(Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra).  
Similar to the Heart Sūtra, the Diamond Cutter Sūtra begins with a question on the best 
way to practice.  This time, however, it is Subhūti who asks the question and the Buddha who 
responds. Subhūti asks, “How, Lord, should one who has set out on the bodhisattva path take his 
stand, how should he proceed, how should he control the mind?” (trans. Harrison, 2006, p. 142).  
                                                
142 Translation based on the Sanskrit: tasmācchāriputra aprāptitvena bodhisattvānāṃ 
prajñāpāramitāmāśritya viharati cittāvaraṇaḥ| cittāvaraṇanāstitvād atrasto 
viparyāsātikrānto niṣṭhanirvāṇaḥ|  
shā ri'i bu / de lta bas na / byang chub sems dpa' rnams thob pa med pa’i phyir shes rab kyi pha rol tu 
phyin pa la brten nas gnas te sems la sgrib pa med pas 'jigs pa med de / phyin ci log las shin tu 'das nas 
mya ngan las 'das pa'i mthar phyin to / (H 26: vol. 34, p. 260). 
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Notice that this question differs slightly from the one asked in the Heart Sūtra.  Rather than 
asking how to begin practice, Subhūti is seeking advice for someone who has already set out on 
the path.  The Buddha’s response makes it clear that the view of selflessness is not a practice 
confined to the realm of meditation, but that it needs to be conjoined with the other activities of a 
bodhisattva.  The Buddha states,  
But after I have brought immeasurable living beings to final extinction in this 
way, no living being whatsoever has been brought to extinction. What is the 
reason for that? If, Subhūti, the idea of a living being occurs to a bodhisattva, he 
should not be called a bodhisattva. Why is that? Subhūti, anybody to whom the 
idea of a living being occurs, or the idea of a soul, or the idea of a person occurs, 
should not be called a bodhisattva. (trans. Harrison, 2006, p. 143) 
 
Here, the Buddha emphasizes that not only are the intention and effort to liberate all beings 
important for a bodhisattva, but also that these actions must be conjoined with a view of the 
world that sees the selflessness of persons.  This is the same view expressed in the Heart Sūtra as 
one that sees all phenomena as empty of essence.  The view of selflessness articulated in the 
Diamond Cutter Sūtra explicitly includes both persons and objects.  He next discusses the view 
in relation to the act of giving, taking the discourse into familiar ethical territory: 
However, a bodhisattva should not give a gift while fixing on an object, Subhūti. 
He should not give a gift while fixing on anything. He should not give a gift 
while fixing on physical forms. He should not give a gift while fixing on sounds, 
smells, tastes or objects of touch, or on dharmas. For this is the way, Subhūti, a 
bodhisattva should give a gift, so that he does not fix on the idea of the 
distinctive features (of any object). Why is that? Subhūti, it is not easy to take the 
measure of the quantity of merit, Subhūti, of the bodhisattva who gives without 
fixation. (trans. Harrison, 2006, p. 143) 
 
Where the Heart Sūtra instructs that we should not view the world in a way in which we fix on 
forms, sounds, smells, tastes, objects of touch, or even objects of thought, the Diamond Cutter 
Sūtra similarly describes a meaningful act of giving as one in which there is no “fixing on 
sounds, smells, tastes, or objects of touch or on dharmas.”  The reference to generosity in this 
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passage makes it clear that the instruction pointing to a change in vision found in both of these 
sūtras is not only applicable to meditation, but must also be taken into ethical activity.  
It is significant that generosity is taken up as one of the first ways of explaining the 
relationship between the transformation of vision and ethical activity.  Generosity is one of the 
most important practices for a bodhisattva as the first of the six perfections that characterize the 
bodhisattva’s path.  Generosity is also an expression of the selfless attitude at the heart of the 
bodhisattva ideal, bodhicitta.  This ideal involves the aspiration to forsake one’s own liberation, 
instead aiming to become a Buddha who returns to help all beings.  Here, we find something that 
would normally be regarded as a moral act, the quintessential act of a bodhisattva – that of giving 
– not qualifying as the act of a bodhisattva unless it is coupled with this accurate metaphysical 
vision.  The Buddha’s point here is that generosity is not the ethical activity of a bodhisattva 
unless it is free of the confusion of ordinary experience.  This point is extended in the following 
passage:  
Subhūti, one should regard a bodhisattva who has sunk to the level of objects and 
who gives a way a gift which has sunk to the level of objects as being like, say, a 
man who has been plunged into darkness. Subhūti, one should regard a 
bodhisattva who gives a gift which has not sunk to the level of objects as being 
like, say, a man endowed with sight, who would see shapes of various kinds when 
dawn breaks and the sun comes up. (trans. Harrison, 2006, p. 150) 
 
Here, the phrase “sunk to the level of objects,” refers to the ordinary perspective that holds things 
to have essence.  The contrast between the practice of generosity for those who have sunk to the 
level of objects with those who have not sunk to the level of objects, is illustrated through the 
imagery of light, dark, and a man endowed with sight, which not only allude to the metaphysical 
vision with which one is advised to take up the world, but which are also ethically suggestive.  
Harvey (2000) has observed that in Buddhist texts, actions and their outcomes are often 
described as bright and dark depending upon whether or not they are harmful (p. 44).  Adam 
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(2005) has also noted that the presence or absence of physical light indicates moral meanings in 
Buddhist works.  His analysis of the Pāli terms sukka and kaṇha used in Buddhist texts to 
describe actions and results reinforces Harvey’s work by pointing out that these words not only 
have the moral meaning of pure and impure, or good and evil, but also that of bright and dark, 
and white and black.  Adam cites the PTS Dictionary which notes in the entry for kaṇha, “In 
general it is hard to separate the lit. and fig. meanings; an ethical implication is found in most 
cases” (p. 67).  This supports the reading that the imagery of light and dark here is also ethically 
suggestive. 
 Adam (2005) suggests that the descriptions of brightness and darkness of an action can be 
understood more literally to refer to the “epistemic quality of the underlying mental state of the 
agent” (p. 67).  According to this understanding, those mental factors that darken the mind have 
the effect of obscuring the mind’s capacity to develop insight, and those that brighten the mind 
support the mind’s capacity for insight (Adam, 2005, pp. 67-8).  If we read the above passage 
from the Diamond Cutter Sūtra with sensitivity to the ethical sentiment of the analogy, then we 
can start to understand that the suggestion that it is important that a bodhisattva take this specific 
vision into everyday action, and also that this is ethical advice.  Later in the sūtra, it is explained 
that the view is considered morally significant since the actions that accompany it are founded 
upon a metaphysically accurate premise.  The Buddha says, “As long as there is any distinctive 
feature there is falsehood, and as long as there is no distinctive feature there is no falsehood 
(trans. Harrison, 2006, p. 144).  A view that fixes onto things holds to the real existence of their 
distinctive features (svalakṣaṇa).  It is due to fixing on falsehood that one tends towards vice.  To 
have a more accurate metaphysical view is to be free of falsehood and to be free of falsehood is 
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to be a moral self.  The Buddha makes this point by telling the story of one of his former lives in 
which he was tortured by the king of Kaliṃga.  The Buddha states,  
When, Subhūti, King Kaliṃga cut off my limbs and extremities, I did not at that time 
have any idea of a self… If, Subhūti, I had had the idea of self at that time, I would also 
have had the idea of ill-will at that time. (trans. Harrison, 2006, pp. 149-50)   
 
Here, the Buddha states that although being unjustly tortured, because of his metaphysical view – 
the view that realizes the selflessness of person - he did not develop ill-will.  While this is 
certainly a discussion of ethics, the treatment of the topic does not center on the morally right 
course of action in response to torture.  Rather, the discussion is phenomenological, with the 
Buddha offering a first person account conveying that his experience of no-self was incompatible 
with the experience of ill-will, and it is this that gives him the status of a moral agent.  
This emphasis on selflessness raises a question about the status of agency and 
responsibility in Buddhist ethics.  These verses from the Diamond Cutter Sūtra provide some 
insight into the Madhyamaka approach to agency.  In the citation above describing the 
bodhisattva’s activity of giving, there is no attempt to differentiate between types of giving based 
on the benefit accrued by the recipient, or to evaluate the moral status of the agent based on the 
consequences of the action.  It might then be expected that the Buddha would make a distinction 
between agents based on their intention, perhaps judging an act’s moral value based on whether 
or not the agent approached the act of giving with bodhicitta.  
The advice here, however, is not explicitly concerned with the agent’s intention or with 
allocating praise or blame.  When Harrison (2006) gives the translation of the line above that 
reads, “Subhūti, a bodhisattva should give a gift, so that he does not fix on the idea of the 
distinctive features (of any object),” he notes that the use of the term nimitta for “distinctive 
features” could equally be read to mean “cause” or “reason” (p. 143).  Given this, Harrison offers 
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another possible reading: “the bodhisattva’s giving is not based even on the idea of a motive (for 
giving), let alone any motive itself” (p. 143).  This would indeed undermine a karmic 
transactional approach to the notion of merit accumulation, which has been used by 
consequentialist and virtue ethics interpretations of Buddhist ethics.  Here, the bodhisattva does 
not engage in the act of giving as a type of motive-driven exchange in which she offers 
something positive in return for some benefit, not even for some type of soteriological 
momentum.  
In either case, it is apparent in these verses that the act of giving here is not being 
evaluated based on either its consequence or the agent’s intention.  Instead, it is presented as a 
first person description of the experience of giving, and what defines it as morally significant, 
and what is important about the agent’s role, is the particular vision with which the activity is 
undertaken.  The moral concern here is clearly not agency; it is not who or why, but how that is 
emphasized.  In a sense, the role of the agent is to get out of the way.  
It is not that the consequences of actions and the intention with which they are 
undertaken are ethically irrelevant.  Nor is this an argument that a correct metaphysical vision 
transforms any action into an ethical action.  Stealing does not somehow become morally 
permissible through being conjoined with an accurate metaphysical view.  Instead, the correct 
metaphysical view of the world is incompatible with the mental state that would motivate one to 
steal out of greed.  
Because we ordinarily experience the world through fixing on the appearance of the 
essential existence of things, not only is this metaphysical view inaccurate, but it also inclines 
one towards vice.  This is the primary moral problem. Its solution, then, is to develop a correct 
metaphysical view, so that the way one experiences the world becomes incompatible with vices 
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such as ill-will.  It is for this reason that a Buddhist phenomenological approach to ethics 
suggests that the ability to view the world in an accurate way is more morally important than the 
consequences of our actions or even our intentions.  
The development of an alternate and more accurate view of the world is the most 
important feature of agency for a Mahāyāna Buddhist, and is also what distinguishes the 
extraordinary agent (ārya, ‘phags pa) from an ordinary agent (pṛthagjana, so so kye bo).  What 
is ethically most important from this phenomenological perspective is neither duty nor the 
consequence of an action, but a moral perception and the moral responsiveness that this 
perspective engenders.  The ideal of the importance of an accurate metaphysical perspective in 
ethical action is repeated throughout the Diamond Cutter Sūtra, with the Buddha continually 
comparing what would normally be considered Buddhist ethical activity with the view of the 
awakened perspective of an extraordinary agent, stating that the latter is even more meritorious:  
“What do you think, Subhūti?  If someone were to fill this trigalactic 
megagalactic world-system with the seven treasures and give it as a gift, then 
what do you think, Subhūti, would that gentleman or lady generate a lot of merit 
on that basis?” 
 
Subhūti said, “A lot, Lord, a lot, Blessed One.  That gentleman or lady would 
generate a lot of merit on that basis.  Why is that, it is indeed, Lord, quantityless.  
For that reason the Realized One teaches that a quantity of merit is quantityless.”   
The Lord said, “If, however, some gentleman or lady were to fill this trigalactic 
megagalactic world-system with the seven treasures and give it as a gift, Subhūti, 
and if someone else were to do no more than learn just one four-lined verse from 
this round of teachings and teach and illuminate it for others, then the latter would 
on that basis generate a lot more merit, an immeasurable, incalculable amount.  
Why is that?  Because it is from this, Subhūti, that the supreme and perfect 
awakening of the Realized Ones is born, it is from this that the Buddhas and 
Lords are born.  What is the reason for that?  The so-called  ‘dharmas of a 
Buddha,’ Subhūti, are indeed devoid of any dharmas of a Buddha.” (trans. 
Harrison, 2006, p. 145) 
 
As the Buddha suggests in the Diamond Cutter Sūtra, for activities such as generosity to be truly 
ethically efficacious, they must be supported by a correct perspective.  In this way, Mahāyāna 
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Buddhist ethics is practiced as an acquisition of wisdom that, when internalized, brings about a 
transformation of the way one views both oneself and the world.  This process fosters positive 
mental states and results in an intuitive and spontaneous positive engagement with the world.  
From this brief survey of Prajñāparamitā literature, it is evident that the cultivation of an 
experience that is informed by a correct metaphysical view is paramount to Mahāyāna ethical 
practice.  We have seen passages where the Buddha states that the merit associated with ethical 
acts, such as generosity, is determined by their being conjoined with a mental state that lacks a 
hypostatizing view of phenomena.  This is certainly echoed in the passages discussed above of 
Āryadeva, Candrakīrti, and Śāntideva, in which the mental state of the agent is regarded as the 
primary determinant of the moral value of an action.  In particular, it parallels the notion that an 
act may qualify as excellent virtue only when conjoined with the bodhisattva’s mental state that 
possesses wisdom. We can see a shared central concern for the first person experience of the 
moral act that runs through all these works, with specific phenomenological properties identified 
as qualifying the moral value of both action and agent.  Finally, this literature clearly prioritizes 
mental states in general in expounding Mahāyāna ethical practice and providing early examples 
of the way in which Mahāyāna ethical practice may be conceived as a kind of moral 
phenomenology. 
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Conclusion 
The subject matter of ethics figures prominently in Buddhist literature, with advice on 
how we should live our lives, how to engage in virtues and avoid vices, and how to work to 
remove the suffering of others.  What is not found in Buddhist literature is an explicit theory of 
metaethics, an account of the nature of ethical concepts, and an articulation of how these 
concepts relate to each other to give an overall structure to Buddhist ethics.  These types of 
metaethical questions, however, have become extremely important in Western philosophical 
traditions, not only for understanding more about the subject of ethics itself, but also for 
comparing different ethical systems.  So, in order to understand what Buddhist ethical thought 
might contribute to contemporary discussions on ethics, it is useful to attempt to articulate the 
general forms and central themes common to Buddhist ethical writings.  A natural place for 
Western philosophers to begin an examination of the structure of Buddhist ethics is to look at 
Western ethical systems to see if Buddhist ethics falls into one of these familiar categories.    
Western interpreters commonly propose that the structure of Buddhist ethics follows one 
of two Western ethical theories.  Some maintain that Buddhist ethics has a structure similar to 
consequentialism.  They argue that Buddhist ethics, like universalist consequentialism, is 
primarily concerned with the consequences of actions and their impacts on the welfare of all 
sentient beings.  Others argue that Buddhist ethics is a type of virtue ethics.  They argue that 
Buddhist ethics, like virtue ethics, is primarily concerned with the cultivation of good character 
traits and that these traits or virtues constitute Buddhism’s final good.  
Those who promote the consequentialist interpretation of Buddhist ethics argue that 
Buddhist ethics shares the focus of universalist consequentialism on agent neutrality.  This, they 
contend, explains the promotion of demanding activities such as self-sacrifice, the motivational 
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advice to eliminate the suffering of all beings (maximize overall happiness), and the 
metaphysical arguments for compassion found in Buddhist ethical texts.  
Those who promote a virtue ethics interpretation of Buddhist ethics argue that this 
reading accounts for the emphasis that Buddhist ethics places on the agent, in particular, the 
emphasis on the mental state of the agent.  For evidence of this, they point to directives in 
Buddhist texts to develop virtues, such as generosity and compassion, and to avoid vices, such as 
stinginess and anger, as well as the emphasis in Buddhist ethical writings on concern for the 
agent’s motivation when engaging in actions.  
The fact that the respective proponents of these competing accounts of Buddhist ethics 
find evidence for contrary structures—one that is agent relative and the other agent neutral—
suggests that Buddhist ethics may have a completely unfamiliar structure.  And while it is true 
that we can find similarities between Buddhist ethical writings and consequentialist and virtue 
ethics systems, this does not make Buddhist ethics one of these systems.  Both these 
interpretations of Buddhist ethics have serious problems since there are central features of 
Buddhist ethical writings that preclude Buddhist ethics in general from being classified either as 
a consequentialist ethical system or as a type of virtue ethics.  
First, Buddhist ethics is not a type of consequentialism, because for a system of ethics to 
be consequentialist, it requires that the moral standing of an action be judged solely upon the 
consequences that follow from it.  Buddhist ethicists, however, do not assign a moral value to 
actions based only on their consequences.  The Buddhist doctrine of karma, for example, clearly 
prioritizes the intention or motivation of an action when assessing the moral value of that action.  
If Buddhist ethics were a type of consequentialism, then the mental activities associated with the 
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verbal and physical actions we undertake would be irrelevant to determining the moral standing 
of a given action.  
Moreover, the examples from Buddhist ethical texts that are put forward as evidence of 
the agent neutral approach of universalist consequentialism, such as the promotion of self-
sacrifice and the dedication of merit, are found under closer examination to be moral instructions 
for enhancing the agent’s motivational state and supporting the agent’s moral development.  In 
Buddhist ethical writings, we continually find that it is the agent, and most especially the mental 
domain of the agent, that is of primary moral significance.  For example, the monastic rules are 
not justified in terms of their consequences or practiced for a universal good.  They are intended 
to support the ethical development of individuals seeking personal liberation.  
I have also argued that the Buddhist metaphysical positions, such as selflessness, do not 
commit Buddhism to a consequentialist ethics.  Instead, a close reading of these arguments of 
Buddhist thinkers like Śāntideva reveals that Buddhist ethical theories sometimes call on 
metaphysical positions to challenge the accuracy of the ordinary way in which an agent engages 
with the world, so as to effect a transformation in the agent’s experience of the world.  Simply 
put, the morally immature are described as seeing the world incorrectly, while the morally 
mature see the world in a metaphysically correct way.  This is hardly the agent neutral approach 
of universalist consequentialism. 
Buddhist ethics is also not a type of virtue ethics.  For a system of ethics to be virtue 
ethics, it must be primarily concerned with the cultivation of virtues, and these virtues must be 
constitutively related to the final good as described by that system.  Virtues as described in 
Buddhist ethical writings, however, they do not do the same type of work that they do in systems 
of virtue ethics.  In Buddhist ethical and psychological texts, virtues are commonly described in 
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terms of mental events as opposed to character traits.  Even if it were accepted that virtues in 
Buddhist ethics are states of character, the final good in Buddhism, nirvana, is not described in 
terms of these virtues.  Nirvana is consistently described in negative terms, as an unchanging 
cessation or absence of suffering.  Moreover, as I have argued, Buddhist ethics is primarily 
concerned with dispositions to perceive rather than dispositions to act.  In Mahāyāna Buddhism, 
it is clear that virtues, such as generosity, are perfected by a particular way of seeing the world.  
It is a correct metaphysical view that qualifies excellent virtue, and it is this correct view that 
characterizes the morally mature agent. 
There is certainly benefit in comparing Buddhist and Western ethical systems.  Such 
comparative studies, however, would be much richer if we first understand Buddhist ethical 
thougth on its own terms, instead of trying to understand Buddhist ethical writings through the 
structural lens of a Western ethical system.  When we impose one of these familiar frameworks 
onto Buddhist ethics, we risk overlooking the important and unique features of Buddhist ethical 
writings as a result of undue emphasis on the distinguishing attributes of the two competing 
Western ethical systems.  I have argued here that reading Buddhist ethical texts on their own 
terms reveals a common thread in the form of a central concern with the first-person study of the 
experiential aspect of our moral life.  What we find is an emphasis on the way we experience the 
world and with effecting a transformation in this experience.  For this reason, I have suggested, 
following Garfield (2011), that Buddhist ethics is best thought of as a unique kind of moral 
phenomenology.   
Even though I have suggested that there is a common emphasis on phenomenological 
properties in ethical writings across Buddhist traditions, my primary claim in this thesis concerns 
the ethical writings of Indian Mahāyāna Mādhyamika thinkers like Āryadeva, Candrakīrti, and 
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Śāntideva, whose unique form of moral phenomenology has been influenced by both the 
Abhidharma literature and the Perfection of Wisdom sūtras. From the Abhidharma tradition was 
inherited an ethical emphasis on the basic building blocks of experience in the form of the five 
constantly operative mental activities (sarvatra-ga). From the Perfection of Wisdom sūtras was 
inherited an ethical emphasis on the metaphysical way the agent “sees” or understands herself, 
her action, and the patient of her actions. It is this unique kind of moral phenomenology 
evidenced in the writings of these Mādhyamika ethicists that I have sought to characterize in this 
thesis.  
In the Buddhist moral phenomenology of the Mādhyamika ethicists considered here, the 
way one perceives the world has an ethical value.  Seeing the world can be divided into two 
types of moral perception, the confused way of seeing the world that accompanies vice and the 
accurate way of seeing the world that accompanies virtue.  The moral problem is that a 
metaphysically inaccurate vision of oneself and the world engenders the experience of suffering 
and vice.  The moral solution is the development of a metaphysically correct view of the world 
and one’s place in it, which resolves suffering and is conducive to virtues.  Moral development 
may be understood as a transformation of the agent’s experience of the world from the morally 
immature experience which is characterized by confusion, to the experience of the morally 
mature, who see themselves and their relation to the world accurately.  
My argument that phenomenology is the central concern in Buddhist ethical thought is in 
part grounded in the observation that the mental domain is of foremost ethical significance in 
Buddhist texts.  This is indicated by the fact that in Buddhist psychological treatises, such as 
those of Vasubandhu, Asaṅga, and Buddhaghosa, the description of mental activities includes an 
assignment of a moral value to each mental activity.  These texts also describe perception not as 
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the passive representation of the world on the basis of sensory contact, but as an active, 
constructive process.  This constructive perceptual process is ethically significant because it is 
understood that the way we think and feel about ourselves and the things in the world is the 
foundation for the way we engage with and act in the world.  
The Buddhist psychological account of the basic mental activities that shape our 
experience provides evidence for why these thinkers considered the mental domain, and in 
particular the way we perceive the world, to be ethically significant.  The Five Constantly 
Operative Mental Processes that are the building blocks of each moment of experience (contact, 
feeling, ascertainment, intention, and attention) are each important components of Buddhist 
moral phenomenology.  In particular, the two mental activities of feeling and ascertainment are 
singled out for their constructive role in perception.  To perceive an object is to both classify it 
and to associate it with an accompanying feeling.  In reliance on contact with an object, we 
experience one of the three kinds of feelings (pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral) with respect to that 
object.  Feeling has a particularly close relationship with ascertainment, which performs the role 
of apprehending distinguishing characteristics of objects, identifying them, and categorizing 
them.  It is due to the operation of feeling and ascertainment that, when we see a person, we 
consider them a friend, an enemy, or a stranger.  In this way, the active and constructive nature 
of our perception as informed by these mental processes has an ethical value.  These mental 
activities determine in each moment the way we view ourselves and the people and things in our 
world.  Foundational to this engagement with the world is the mental activity of cetanā.  Cetanā, 
often translated as intention, is best understood as the mental impulse directing the mind toward 
a given object.  Where cetanā points, the other mental functions follow, and in this way it plays a 
key role in shaping and constructing our experience.  While cetanā directs a mind towards a 
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general object, attention directs the mind to engage with specific objects, and in this way, 
attention also plays a fundamental role in shaping our experience.  It is with these formations and 
categorizations that, in each moment of our experience, we engage in thoughts, speech, and 
action that are either wholesome or unwholesome. 
Building on the presentation of the constructive nature of perception in the psychological 
texts of Vasubandhu, Asaṅga, and Buddhaghosa, the Mahāyāna Buddhist ethical writers 
Āryadeva and Śāntideva argue that experience constructed under the influence of confusion, a 
hypostatized view of ourselves and the world, has moral implications because it supports 
suffering and vice.  Conversely, they maintain that experience guided by an accurate knowledge 
of oneself and the world—which understands things to be impermanent, selfless, and 
interdependent—is incompatible with vice, supports wholesome mental states, and is a defining 
characteristic of excellent virtue.  
The moral language used in the works of Āryadeva and Śāntideva, supports this reading 
of Mahāyāna Buddhist ethics.  The morally mature are designated by terms indicating that they 
are knowledgeable, while the morally immature are referred to as foolish.  Virtue and vice are 
also consistently associated with mental states.  Āryadeva’s 400 Stanzas endorses this picture of 
Mahāyāna Buddhist ethics of placing correct view as the foundation for ethics.  Āryadeva as well 
as Candrakīrti in his commentary on the 400 Stanzas emphasize the primacy of mental states 
accompanying an action in the ethical assessment of the deed.  In particular, they describe 
excellent virtue as being characterized by the unique mental state of a bodhisattva that unites 
wisdom that correctly understands the nature of reality with the motivational component of 
compassion.  
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Śāntideva’s How to Lead an Awakened Life also prioritizes the mental state of the agent 
as the determinant of the moral value of an action.  This is exemplified in his reinterpretation of 
the field of merit, wherein the mental attitude of the agent is prioritized over the object, recipient 
of actions, and the action itself.  Moreover, the description of virtue in the Perfection of Wisdom 
Sūtras clarifies that good deeds are qualified as good because of the accurate metaphysical view 
that accompanies them.  These texts also describe the unique mental state of a bodhisattva that 
unites wisdom that correctly understands the nature of reality with the motivational component 
of compassion, which is the defining characteristic of excellent virtue.  
Why Buddhist thinkers, who have such a rich philosophical tradition of metaphysics, 
epistemology, and so forth, did not write treatises providing an explicit theory of metaethics is an 
interesting question.  Perhaps the absence of this kind of a treatment of the topic indicates that 
Buddhist ethics is so closely related with the larger Buddhist project of addressing the problem 
of suffering, that it was thought unnecessary to treat it as a separate subject.  Given the critical 
role that ethics plays in the larger Buddhist problem and solution, suffering as caused by 
confusion and its removal as brought about by knowledge, it may have seemed unnatural to 
Buddhist philosophers to identify an ethical structure distinct from the structure of the general 
Buddhist project of the transformation of one’s experience.  
Yet, if the general form of Buddhist ethics is understood as a kind of moral 
phenomenology, this allows for a number of advantages.  First, it articulates a central theme that 
charaterizes Buddhist ethics which makes it more transparent to those wishing to engage with 
Buddhist ethical thought in contemporary and comparative discussions on ethics; at the same 
time, it allows for an appreciation of Buddhist ethical writings on their own terms, with a 
recognition of intimate connection between ethics and the structure of the larger Buddhist 
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soteriological project of the transformation of experience.  This reading also does not require us 
to stretch or distort Buddhist metaphysical assertions about persons and pains, or to 
overemphasize the function of virtues, problems that come about from attempting to force 
Buddhist ethics to accord with familiar Western ethical systems.  
There is a temptation when encountering any unfamiliar system to draw parallels to 
familiar frameworks, and this can be helpful in the stage of initial encounter, but this approach 
may obstruct the understanding of the unique features of this “other” system.  Only when we 
genuinely encounter Buddhist ethical thought on its own terms, can we grasp what it may have to 
contribute to larger discussions in the field of ethics. Two kinds of moral perception are central 
to Buddhist ethical thought: the confused way of seeing the world that supports vice and the 
accurate way of seeing the world that characterizes virtue.  This places the way we experience 
the world at the foundation of ethics.  This unique ethical perspective has much to contribute to 
the contemporary conversation on ethics, especially on moral issues that are grounded in 
perceptual and conceptual biases entrenched in the way people ordinarily take up the world.  
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